Statewide Resilience Strategy and Legislative Recommendations to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security

Deputy Chief John Steinbeck, Co-Chair, HSWG
Chief Caleb S. Cage, Co-Chair, HSWG

June 30-July 1, 2018
Statewide partners:

Earlier this year, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security directed us, in our capacities as Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group, to transition to a model of resilience for statewide emergency management and homeland security efforts. An executive order (Executive Order 2018-4, “Implementation of Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Strategy”) signed by Governor Sandoval in March of this year outlined specific deadlines and requirements for achieving the Commission’s vision. One requirement of this executive order was that we develop a statewide resilience strategy as well as a final list of legislative and budgetary recommendations to be pursued during the 2019 legislative session. The strategy and reports that follow are intended to meet these two requirements of the executive order.

The development of this strategy and the recommendations were required to follow a very aggressive timeline, however, we worked hard in this timeframe to ensure we were getting broad input from as many stakeholders as possible. This input came in a number of forms. First, we made presentations regarding the transition to a resilience model to various groups that advise on Nevada’s various emergency management and homeland security efforts, and we also presented the impacts of the transformation during a statewide conference. Second, as can be seen in this report, we convened or supported a number of public bodies made up of experts from local, tribal, state, and federal partners to provide the specific reports and recommendations included here.

The Nevada Commission on Homeland Security provided critical input for us throughout this entire process. This body, which is chaired by Governor Sandoval and has representatives from the Nevada legislature, as well as local, state, tribal, and federal partners, not only initiated this process through their initial directive and the subsequent executive order signed by the Governor, the Commissioners also received several updates and provided additional input as the strategy and recommendations were developed. During a meeting of the Commission held on August 15, 2018, the Commissioners received a detailed overview of this report, offered suggestions for improvements, and approved the document through a unanimous vote. The suggestions for improvement were significant and are provided below.

First, Sheriff Lombardo provided input on two recommendations found on page 79 of the “Final Legislative Recommendations to the Commission on Homeland Security.” Recommendation number four in this report calls for the establishment of the State of Nevada’s fusion center, the Nevada Threat Analysis Center, in statute as well as the creation of an advisory board for the entity, while recommendation number five calls for requiring the state fusion center to develop
an annual threat assessment to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. Given that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department also operates a recognized fusion center, the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center, Sheriff Lombardo asked that these recommendations be broadened to include both fusion centers. Sheriff Lombardo also requested the removal of a full paragraph from page 72 of this same report as its subject matter did not pertain directly to the response efforts covered. All of these changes were approved by a full vote of the Commission.

Although not included in the Commission’s vote for approval, Governor Sandoval noted uncertainty about recommendation number one on page 78 of the “Final Legislative Recommendations to the Commission on Homeland Security.” If implemented, this recommendation would allow the Governor to temporarily change state laws in order to effectively respond to an emergency or disaster in Nevada. This recommendation was poorly worded, and should have allowed for the “temporary suspension” of laws similar to the current ability to temporarily suspend regulations and orders. While allowing executive authority to suspend laws is a currently practiced that is codified in a growing number of states, Governor Sandoval rightly pointed out that in Nevada the Governor currently has the ability to convene a special session in order to accomplish this. Based on this input and the confusing way the recommendation is drafted, this change will not be pursued.

Through this letter, we formally recognize these recommendations and will commit to ensuring that they are reflected in the policy development and implementation processes in the months ahead. The Commission has requested continual updates on proposed legislation and other efforts to ensure that they provide proper oversight and input, which we will provide throughout the rest of the calendar year and beyond. Beyond the Commission’s oversight, this strategy and recommendations will be further vetted through statewide stakeholder groups, and importantly, through the Nevada legislature during the 2019 legislative session.

Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to all who supported the development of this strategy and the associated recommendations. This has been a significant undertaking, but one that we believe will greatly benefit our state. We look forward to working with statewide partners to ensure that we are working together to implement changes that make for a more resilient Nevada.

Sincerely,

John C. Steinbeck  
Deputy Chief/Emergency Manager  
Clark County Fire Department

Caleb S. Cage  
Chief/Homeland Security Advisor  
DPS, Division of Emergency Management
Dear Governor, Legislators, Statewide Partners,

I am writing to you on behalf of the members of the Nevada Emergency Preparedness Association (NEPA) to express our support for the Resilience Strategy Recommendations outlined in the 2018 Statewide Resilience Strategy and Legislative Recommendations to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. Implementing these recommendations, particularly the establishment of a Statewide Resilience Commission, will help define roles and responsibilities, and streamline critical processes at all levels of government.

We believe that collaboration will be the key factor for the State of Nevada to build statewide resilience and implement this new strategy. The incorporation of local and tribal components, along with private sector and other stakeholders, will ensure appropriate information sharing and cooperation moving forward.

We encourage you to support the Nevada Division of Emergency Management and Office of Homeland Security during the next legislative session to implement legislation and assign the resources necessary to carry out this strategy. As an organization, we are thankful for your consideration of our input.

Please do not hesitate to contact me at President@nepaonline.org or (702) 355-1542, regarding this or any other related issues.

Sincerely,

Yuri V. Graves
President

Nevada Emergency Preparedness Association
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Executive Summary to the Combined Strategy and Recommendation Reports

Deputy Chief John Steinbeck, Co-Chair, Homeland Security Working Group
Chief Caleb S. Cage, Co-Chair, Homeland Security Working Group

In 2017, the State of Nevada endured an unprecedented level of emergencies and disasters. Jurisdictions around the state were well prepared, responded effectively, and quickly moved into recovery, however, 2017 brought a new awareness of the intense crises that Nevada has faced and may continue to face in the future. As Nevada continues to change, and as the apparent threats faced by the state continues to evolve, Nevada must embrace a new paradigm of resilience to align statewide homeland security and emergency management efforts.

Nevada’s resilience paradigm should be adaptable, strategic, and developed in full collaboration with statewide partners. In order to implement it fully, it requires a deliberate process for developing and vetting new policies and new investments. In order to ensure accountability to these principles and outcomes, as well as ensuring transparency to the public, this process must be carried out throughout the remainder of calendar year 2018 and 2019, and under the guidance and supervision of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security.

The combined report that follows provides a plan for implementing this new paradigm, however, this transition should not result in broad and immediate change. Rather, it should embrace existing processes, policies, and systems that currently exist in executive orders, statutes, regulations, and current practices, and modify them in the months ahead through a strategic focus on statewide resilience. Support from local, tribal, state, and federal partners will allow various agencies throughout Nevada to participate fully in this transition.

The concept presented above is paraphrased from a directive approved by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security during their February 28, 2018 meeting. Also approved during the same meeting were a recommended Executive Order from the Governor, budget enhancements, and initial legislative recommendations. Together, these provide the foundation for implementing the resilience transition called for by the Commission members, a foundation that is expanded through this report.

Executive Order 2018-4, which was signed by Governor Sandoval on March 12, 2018, provides the key deliverables and timelines for Nevada’s transition to resilience. Although it covers a wide array of requirements for the Department of Public Safety’s Division of Emergency Management, it assigns the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working group the oversight of developing a strategy and additional policy recommendations.

Specific to this report, the Executive Order requires the Co-Chairs to develop a Statewide Resilience Strategy that aligns Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security initiatives. At a minimum, this strategy is to include proposals for streamlining Nevada’s public body structure, proposals for streamlining Nevada’s grants processes, proposals for incentivizing local partners to engage in this resilience model, proposals for a regional approach to resilience and preparedness, and other requirements. Additionally, Executive Order 2018-4 requires the Co-Chairs to provide
the Commission with a final list of legislative recommendations for the 2019 Legislative Session.

This report is intended to meet these requirements. It does so by combining a number of efforts that have been carried out between the dates of March 12 and June 30, 2018, during which time the Co-Chairs made a number of presentations of various levels of detail to partners throughout the state and incorporated their significant input accordingly. What follows is presented in five parts.

First, this report includes the required Statewide Resilience Strategy, which provides a high level approach for how Nevada should proceed as well as recommendations for the changes that would be necessary to fully implement this strategy. Second, the Co-Chairs provided an abridged version of various reports presented to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, which includes an overview of emergency and disaster activity in 2017, the legislative and budgetary recommendations approved by the Commission in February of 2018, as well as other recommendations that were identified throughout the development process. Third, the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee provided a report and recommendations for improving mutual aid in Nevada, with a particular focus on health care related systems. Fourth, the Resort Planning Task Force was established to address the need to improve processes and requirements for resorts in Nevada to submit emergency response plans, and the task force’s report and recommendations are included here as well. Finally, the report and recommendations from the Cyber Security Committee are also included here.

The Statewide Resilience Strategy

The Statewide Resilience Strategy provides a general overview for how and why Nevada should transition to a resilience paradigm for its emergency management and homeland security initiatives. It examines the existing efforts and provides proposals for how to reinforce existing systems, and more important, how to coordinate all of these systems in the most efficient and productive way possible. As a strategy, it does provide some mechanisms for making immediate change, but primarily it is focused on providing a high-level perspective on how this transformation should occur.
The proposed strategy consists of four primary components: the Resilience Commission, Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration, Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration, and an Ongoing Annual Assessment. These components provide a mechanism for coordinating emergency management and homeland security efforts between local, tribal, and state jurisdictions, and are intended to align all of Nevada’s efforts toward a single vision. This approach is intended to strengthen collaboration for existing systems (recovery and response, for example), and to ensure that all are coordinated efficiently and effectively.

The Resilience Commission serves as the centerpiece of this strategy. Not only does this proposal serve to streamline Nevada’s public body structure and grant processes, but it also establishes the central coordinating body for all of Nevada’s resilience efforts. The Resilience Commission proposed here will meet monthly, it will be made up of members from across the emergency management and homeland security spectrum, and it will establish a resilience goal and associated objectives to guide its efforts to vet and recommend grant allocations and policy proposals.

Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration incorporates the existing system established by the state’s Disaster Recovery Framework. This framework provides the mechanisms for how the state is organized for recovery efforts following an emergency or disaster, and in its current form, it already reflects key resilience principles. The work of the Disaster Recovery Framework is carried out by Recovery Support Functions (RSF), which provide key recovery preparedness support prior to emergencies and disasters, and are activated as necessary to support statewide recovery after an incident. Recovery Support Function 1, Community Planning and Capacity Building, which is administered by the Division of Emergency Management, will report the work of the various RSFs to the Resilience Commission for consideration.

Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration incorporates the existing system established by the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. This plan outlines how the state of Nevada prepares for and responds to emergencies and disasters throughout the state, and its model is reflected in many local and tribal emergency management plans as well. In addition to incorporated this existing effort into the Resilience Commission, this strategy also proposes aligning local and tribal efforts with the statewide effort as well through a number of recommendations.

The final component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy is an Ongoing Annual Assessment. This key component of the strategy is intended to ensure that Nevada’s resilience efforts are reflective and able to evolve over time as Nevada’s threats, hazards, capabilities, and capacities evolve as well. Through an annual report, the proposed assessment will include an overview of Resilience Commission activity, lessons learned from the previous year, an overview of existing threat, hazard, and preparedness assessments, and recommendations for improvement in the following year and beyond.

While the function of the Statewide Resilience Strategy through Resilience Commission has yet to be approved or fully developed, there are countless examples of how this system can be coordinated. Any number of capabilities, threats, hazards, or otherwise can be addressed through this system in a number of appropriate ways, however, a single example is provided here to show how specific gaps might be...
addressed through specific resources. This example discusses the need for improved disaster housing capacity within the state.

The need for increased disaster housing capacity has been identified for a number of years. Through the annual Stakeholder Preparedness Review, which was previously known as the State Preparedness Report, disaster housing has repeatedly been ranked low year after year. According to the Department of Homeland Security, housing is one of 32 Core Capabilities that states should address in order to recover from emergencies and disasters by “implement(ing) housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience.” To be clear, disaster housing has been a focus of the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) and its local and tribal partners, however, efforts could be improved with the coordination provided by this proposed strategy.

The example below shows six steps that could be taken to coordinate efforts to address Nevada’s disaster housing capacity within the framework provided by the Statewide Resilience Strategy. It addresses a single issue, disaster housing, however, it exemplifies how the entire proposed process could be used for any number of grant, policy, or preparedness efforts. The six-part process outlined below refers to the figure above.

- **Step 1**: Resilience Commission sets the State Resilience Goal and Objectives at the beginning of each year in order to drive capacity building in all areas of Nevada emergency management and homeland security. Housing would either be specifically identified as an objective, or it would align with one or more objectives.
- **Step 2**: The Resilience Commission shares these objectives with each of the other three components of the plan to be considered in their work.
- **Step 3**: Through the State Disaster Recovery Framework, RSF 4 focuses on housing. Members of this RSF would identify gaps in Nevada’s immediate, intermediate-term, and long-term disaster housing efforts, as well as state, local, tribal, and federal resources that could be used to fill these gaps.
- **Step 4**: RSF 1, Community Planning and Capacity Building, presents RSF 4’s efforts to the Resilience Commission for consideration.
- **Step 5**: The Resilience Commission makes funding recommendations based on RSF 4’s input for housing capacity building in accordance with the State Disaster Framework or considers supporting planning, training, exercise, and other response and preparedness efforts in accordance with the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.
- **Step 6**: The Resilience Commission assesses how well these goals were met and makes recommendations for future improvements through the annual assessment and the annual report.

**Overview of Recommendations**

Each of the five reports included here provides recommendations. As noted previously, these cover various aspects of emergency management and homeland security efforts in Nevada, including implementation of the Statewide Resilience
Strategy, general recommendations developed by the Co-Chairs, health care mutual aid, resort emergency response plans, and cyber security. Although each report provides full detail on the conceptual recommendations, they are abbreviated below for ease of reference.

**Resilience Strategy Recommendations**

1. The State of Nevada should establish a Statewide Resilience Commission in statute in order to coordinate grants and efforts with respect to the Statewide Resilience Framework.
2. The Statewide Resilience Commission should have limited authorization to establish subordinate public bodies.
3. Require DEM to prepare and annually review a State Disaster Recovery Framework.
4. Require certain state agencies to provide a liaison or liaisons to serve as representatives within the State Emergency Operations Center as Recovery Support Functions in accordance with the Disaster Recovery Framework.
5. Allow tribal governments to apply for assistance through the Disaster Relief Account.
6. Reestablish a state-level individual assistance program.
7. Require DEM to prepare and annually review a State Mitigation Plan, a State Preparedness Plan, and a State Response Plan.
8. Require certain state agencies to provide liaisons to serve as representatives within the State Emergency Operations Center.
9. Require county governments to have an emergency management function and allow contiguous counties to form regional emergency management programs.
10. Require DEM to create regulations for all DEM grants.
11. Require county governments to establish Local Emergency Planning Committees that are chaired by the county emergency manager.
12. Establish the Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission as a public body administered by DEM within NRS 414.
13. Require the Resilience Commission to provide an annual report to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security.

**Final Recommendations to the Homeland Security Commission**

1. Create funding override capabilities for the state’s Emergency Assistance Account (EAA) and Disaster Relief Account (DRA).
2. Require DEM to provide an annual report to the Nevada Department of Education, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Gaming Control Board regarding the status of compliance with emergency response plans for entities under their jurisdiction or oversight.
3. Establish a deployable statewide Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT).
4. Establish a deployable Disaster Assistance Response Team through Nevada Volunteers/AmeriCorps.
5. Allow the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security to have one bill draft request for each legislative session.
7. Require DEM to create regulations for all DEM grants.
8. Include in the Governor’s disaster powers the ability to temporarily change laws.
9. Combine the Board of Search and Rescue and the Committee on Training in Search and Rescue into a single public body, and modify other duties as well.
11. Establish the Nevada Threat Analysis Center (NTAC), while providing for an advisory committee, and confidentiality of certain information in law.
12. Require NTAC to provide an annual threat assessment.

Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee Recommendations

1. Grant the Governor explicit authority to temporarily waive licensing requirements and to grant temporary reciprocity to all medical providers, allied health professions, and others who work within a licensed hospital system that currently operates within Nevada for the declared period of the incident.
2. Improve collaboration with allied health boards and health-related member organizations to communicate the need for, and role of, volunteers during an emergency or disaster, to establish a process for an automatic opt-in for service when licensed, the importance of training and exercising the issuance of special volunteer medical licenses pursuant to NRS 630.258, and discuss opportunities to join national compact agreements.
3. Improve collaboration with the mental and behavioral health professional community by creating a tool defining the training and capability for each professional category; identifying and providing training and exercise opportunities professionals need during disaster response, and creating a list of professionals ready to support disaster response.
4. Improve planning for the use of volunteer health professionals as part of the Statewide Resilience Commission, identifying how volunteers would best be utilized in a local, regional, and/or statewide emergency, and establishing minimum criteria for the vetting of volunteers to be used in an emergency.
5. Provide for immunity and exemptions for certain people or entities that are participating in emergency or disaster response in accordance with Nevada’s Crisis Standards of Care Plan.
6. Require the establishment of a Disaster Behavioral Health Plan and require that it is reviewed and updated annually.
7. Establish Psychological First Aid standards and training requirements.
8. Change the membership of the State Disaster Identification Team from forensic and scientific practitioners to various types of emergency management and public health representatives.

9. Amend NRS 414 to state that the provisions of Chapters 239 and 241 of NRS do not apply to a meeting of the State Disaster Identification Team.

10. Allow the Division of Emergency Management to adopt regulations to govern the State Disaster Identification Team.

11. Repurpose the State Disaster Identification Team to function as an information-sharing body instead of a forensic support body by removing current duties and adding specific duties related to information sharing during an emergency.

12. Require the State Disaster Identification Team to conduct various duties.

13. Change current Nevada to require health care service providers to provide specific information to appropriate agencies when treating persons having injuries apparently inflicted during a mass casualty incident.

14. Change NRS 629 to ensure that health care providers are immune from civil penalties for sharing information regarding to persons having injuries apparently inflicted during a mass casualty incident.

**Resort Planning Task Force Recommendations**

1. Require DEM to provide a planning guide to Nevada resorts regarding the requirements outlined in NRS 463.790.

2. Require DEM to reconvene the Resort Planning Task Force within one year.

3. Require resorts to submit to the Nevada Division of Emergency Management a new plan, an updated plan, or a letter certifying that the existing plan is current, by November 1 of each year.

4. Require DEM to explore what other types of properties, organizations, and entities that should be required to develop and submit ERPs.

5. Provide a statement of purpose for the ERP requirement in NRS 463.790 in order to assist resorts in their planning processes.

6. Require resorts to provide name and contact information for a designee responsible for the maintenance of the ERP.

7. DEM should pursue automated solutions for ERP development, maintenance, and compliance.

**Cyber Security Committee Recommendations**

1. Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to develop an enterprise cyber risk management framework.

2. Require all cybersecurity stakeholders to improve oversight, transparency, access, and communication of capabilities and tools between stakeholders and customers.

3. Invest in dedicated cyber security professionals by adding one additional full-time Information Security Officer to each Executive Branch Department.
4. Provide procurement preference to vendors contracting with the state that carry cybersecurity insurance.

5. Require the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to develop comprehensive computer science education initiatives that include current cyber security best practices.

6. Require the Governor's Office of Economic Development to provide funding through Workforce Innovations for a New Nevada or the appropriate funding source to establish a Cyber Security Center of Excellence within the Nevada System of Higher Education.

7. Require the Nevada System of Higher Education to develop a report evaluating current cybersecurity education and training programs.

8. Require the Governor's Office of Economic Development to complete a report evaluating the economic impact of Nevada's cybersecurity industry.

9. Increase investments in the current cybersecurity workforce by bolstering training funds and allowing State of Nevada employees access to industry-leading training and certification programs based on their position, role within state cybersecurity, and available funding.

10. Exempt certain offices from open meeting laws as it pertains to the discussion of cyber security incidents, operations, and strategies.

11. Revise NRS 242.105 to allow political subdivisions within the state to also declare confidential documents through EITS.

12. Enhance provisions established through Assembly Bill 471, passed during the 2017 Legislative Session, to protect private-sector information that is shared with the State of Nevada.

13. Support the Department of Administration’s efforts to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the State CIO, the reporting structure for the State of Nevada Enterprise IT Services, Office of Information Security, and other efforts to provide incentives for attracting and maintaining the best talent for these positions.

14. Dissolve the Cyber Security Committee as a committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security and reestablish the committee as an advisory committee to the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination.

15. Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to provide the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security an annual statewide cyber threat assessment.


17. Revise NRS 205.4765, regarding unlawful acts regarding computers, to establish a range of offenses, from a misdemeanor to a felony, depending on the magnitude of the offense.

18. Expand the definition of emergency and disaster to include a significant cybersecurity incident.

19. Authorize the activation of the Nevada National Guard in the event of a significant cybersecurity incident.

20. Require political subdivisions within the state to develop Incident Response Plans and to share or certify those plans with the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination.
21. Require that state employees receive cybersecurity briefings before travel outside the United States to certain countries.
22. Establish a culture of cybersecurity by requiring state employees to undergo cybersecurity training four times per year.
23. Require that private entities holding contracts for state services are responsible for the security of any system relating to nonpublic information, whether such system is maintained electronically or otherwise.
24. Recognize the month of October as “Cybersecurity Awareness Month.”
25. Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to conduct cybersecurity briefings to the Governor’s Office and relevant Cabinet members on a quarterly basis.
26. Require periodic phishing or other social engineering testing for state agencies.

Conclusion

This strategy and the associated recommendations are the first step toward the transition toward resilience required by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security and the Governor’s Executive Order. They should serve as the starting point for a statewide discussion on how to implement the changes recommended, and if supported, they should be implemented over the remainder of 2018 and 2019. If this is done through the Co-Chairs and the various agencies involved, then Nevada will be able to lead toward resilience, not only within Nevada, but also nationally.

The framework provided in this strategy will allow Nevada to build on its current systems and ensure that they are coordinated through a single approach. It will allow for increasing collaboration and transparency as well as decreasing the bureaucratic burden. It will also allow for greater coordination and efficiency between Nevada’s emergency management, emergency response, and homeland security initiatives, coordination that is essential for providing safe and livable communities for all of Nevada’s residents and visitors.

With the threats that Nevada currently faces as well as the current capabilities and capacities required to respond to them, a change in process and paradigm is necessary, and the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group believe that the paradigm proposed here is the right direction for Nevada to pursue. It provides a roadmap for aligning Nevada’s current efforts toward long-term resilience, as well as ensuring that all statewide partners, including tribes, local jurisdictions, and state agencies, have direct input on how the process is established. Given its model for annual review and updates, it will also allow for the process suggested in the pages that follow is able to evolve as threats change and capacity grows.
Statewide Resilience Strategy

Deputy Chief John Steinbeck, Co-Chair, HSWG
Chief Caleb S. Cage, Co-Chair, HSWG
July 1, 2018
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Introduction

The Statewide Resilience Strategy presented here is based on input from federal and state models and requirements that informed Nevada’s transition to a resilience model. In 2018, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) published its 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, which lists fostering “a culture of preparedness in order to create a more resilient nation” as its first goal. According to follow-on communication from FEMA, Administrator Brock Long has reorganized his agency to create a new resilience organization at federal level. This new structure combines FEMA’s national preparedness office, grant programs, the Federal Insurance & Mitigation Administration, continuity programs, and other offices within the agency to achieve the goals of his agency’s plan.

As the FEMA strategic plan states, this is part of an effort to lead the nation in building a more prepared and resilient nation, but there is currently not a requirement that states, tribes, and territories follow FEMA’s lead in this initiative. However, FEMA’s leadership in this area is both positive and innovative, and given FEMA’s role in funding and supporting state emergency management and homeland security efforts, it makes sense to adopt this approach earlier rather than later. The Statewide Resilience Strategy proposed here marks the first comprehensive effort to follow FEMA’s lead in this federal initiative.

Although this is the first major development in aligning Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security efforts with a resilience model, there have been a number of important factors that led to this point. First, in his 2016 Strategic Plan, “Generations to Come: Nevada’s Strategic Planning Framework,” Governor Sandoval directed the Division of Emergency Management align its mission and vision with the “100 Resilient Cities” initiative by the year 2018. Second, through a number of meetings of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, the Commission approved this transition and outlined a specific timeline and deliverables for achieving this transformation.

First, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security voted to approve a directive to pursue a new paradigm for emergency management and homeland security in this state. According to the Commission’s directive, this new paradigm is to be “adaptable, strategic, and developed in full collaboration with statewide partners.” In order to achieve this goal, the Commission directed that the state pursue this effort in a way that is accountable, transparent, and completed by the end of calendar year 2018.

Following the directive, the Commission recommended that the Governor approve an executive order that outlined the specific steps for implementing this transition. Executive Order 2018-4, “Implementation of Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Strategy,” was signed by Governor Sandoval on March 12, 2018, and formally initiated this effort. Executive Order 2018-4 required that the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group make immediate temporary changes to the state grant process for the federal fiscal year 2018 grant cycle, build existing emergency management capacity and programs, and develop a statewide resilience strategy and legislative recommendations to be considered by the Commission.

The Statewide Resilience Strategy required by Executive Order 2018-4 is both a general requirement for a transition model and also includes specific requirements. In
addition to a Statewide Resilience Strategy, Executive Order 2018-4 requires the Co-Chairs to provide recommendations for streamlining Nevada’s board and committee structure for emergency management, streamlining the grants processes to sustain Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security capacity, developing incentives for local partners to participate in the resilience model, developing proposals for a regional approach to emergency management, and potential partnerships with the Nevada System of Higher Education. This report intends to fulfill this requirement of Executive Order 2018-4.

Defining Resilience

The term resilience may seem by some to be a relatively new buzzword within the emergency management community, however, the introduction of the concept brings with it powerful new tools and new ways of thinking about mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. This new approach is intended to better empower local communities, strengthen systems by coordinating and leveraging existing resources toward common goals, and ensuring that all partners and constituencies are represented throughout the emergency management cycle. This approach is especially important at times when investments in emergency resources appear to be declining and the threats to communities throughout Nevada continue to evolve.

There are many definitions and applications of the term resilience, but with respect to emergency management, the definition is tied closely to that of recovery. The State of Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework is based on FEMA’s National Recovery Framework, which defines recovery as a process that is unique to each community involved in each disaster, but broadly, it can be seen as “more than the community’s return to pre-disaster conditions.” According to the National Recovery Framework, communities that successfully recover from events have overcome “the physical, emotional and environmental impacts of the disaster,” they have rebuilt confidence by reestablishing “an economic and social base,” they have reestablished and reintegrated “the functional needs of all residents” by “reducing its vulnerability to all hazards facing it,” and finally, “the entire community demonstrates a capability to be prepared, responsive, and resilient in dealing with the consequences of disasters.” Regarding this definition, resilience is essentially the rate at which a community successfully recovers.

Academics have considered the topic of resilience in emergency management for some time, and although the concept is much more dynamic and complex, two key definitions provide the foundation for the work included in this framework. In Daniel P. Aldrich’s work, Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery, he defines resilience locally as “a neighborhood’s capacity to weather crises such as disasters and engage in effective and efficient recovery through coordinated efforts and cooperative activities.” In The Resilience Dividend: Being Strong in a World Where Things Go Wrong, Judith Rodin defines resilience as “the capacity of any entity—an individual, a community, an organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience.”
The 100 Resilient Cities framework provides a practical guide for achieving resilience, especially at the community level. This model addresses building resilience at the city level and does so by organizing government systems, policies, and leaders into four categories: Leadership and Strategy, Health and Wellbeing, Economy and Society, and Infrastructure and Ecosystem. It focuses on what it defines as the “Qualities of Resilient Systems” defined in the framework as a starting point. The “Qualities of Resilient Systems” were developed to identify what positive characteristics contribute to the likelihood of community resilience, or, its ability to rebuild after a shock or prolonged disruption. The seven qualities are provided below, as paraphrased from the “City Resilience Framework.”

- **Reflective:** Reflective organizations and systems embrace a changing and uncertain landscape, and they have internal features that allow them to evolve as well.
- **Robust:** Robust systems, designs, and organizations are thoughtfully conceived and developed, and are supported with adequate resources to address the existing and potential threats and hazards.
- **Redundant:** Redundant systems plan for additional capacity that can be employed during times of shock or prolonged disruption.
- **Flexible:** Flexibility refers to mechanisms inherent to a system that allow for changes when conditions change.
- **Resourceful:** Resourceful systems are made up of people who can quickly achieve their goals even if normal procedures and methods are disrupted.
- **Inclusive:** Inclusive communities are more likely to be resilient if they seek and obtain input from as broad an audience as possible, including vulnerable groups.
- **Integrated:** Integration refers to the alignment of public, private, and other entities toward a single goal and vision.

All of these definitions and approaches contributed to Nevada’s development of this Statewide Resilience Strategy, as required by Executive Order 2018-4. Additionally, the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group also relied on the resilience strategies of two western states to further inform this approach, namely Colorado and Oregon. These models, while specific to their respective states, provided advanced examples of how resilience can be achieved by better coordinating existing resources and systems and aligning them under unified and comprehensive resilience goals, objectives, systems, and structures.

Each of these state-level models defines resilience in their own terms and with respect to the threats and hazards they face as states, as would be expected. Based on their internal assessments of the threats and hazards they face, as well as the inherent consequences, each state developed strategies, policy bodies, reporting requirements, and plans to implement their efforts. Although each state’s effort is specific to their hazards, their levels of preparedness, and their ability to recover quickly, both models provide principles, definitions, and examples that are relevant to Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Framework.

The Oregon Resilience Plan: Reducing Risk and Improving Recovery for the Next Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami, for example, outlined a fifty-year strategy that
approached resilience by coordinating numerous state agencies toward their goals. Through various work groups established for their resilience efforts, they met throughout the majority of 2012 to develop their plan. Their efforts also resulted in state legislation through House Resolution 3, which defines resilience as meaning “Oregon citizens will not only be protected from life-threatening physical harm, but that because of risk reduction measures and pre-disaster planning, communities will recover more quickly and with less continuing vulnerability following a Cascadia Subduction earthquake and tsunami.”

Colorado, which established the Colorado Recovery Office after major floods in 2013, developed a strategy entitled, the Colorado Resiliency Framework. They too established a coordinating body called the Colorado Resilience Working Group to outline their efforts, which developed the various aspects of their plan. This body also developed the following definition: “Resiliency is the ability of communities to rebound, positively adapt to, or thrive amidst changing conditions or challenges—including disasters and climate change—and maintain a quality of life, healthy growth, durable systems, and conservation of resources for present and future generations.”

Although both plans provided useful approaches to developing state-level resilience, the Colorado Resiliency Framework aligned almost directly with Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework, and therefore, proved to be more useful to this effort. Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework identifies six Recovery Support Functions to be activated as necessary during the recovery process, and that are analogous to the Emergency Support Functions activated during the response period pursuant to the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. Additionally, Colorado’s timeline, threats and hazards, and resilience objectives match more closely with Nevada’s vision for resilience as well.

These various definitions and examples provide the foundation for Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Strategy. This strategy assumes that Nevada must work across sectors to assess its level of resilience, its existing resilience capacity, and the need to identify areas where both can be enhanced. It also assumes that resilience in Nevada will go beyond the basic definition of recovery, which is returning a community to pre-disaster conditions, and focus more on being prepared to adapt to and thrive after disasters and similar events by ensuring the efforts of government, non-profit, and private entities are aligned to pursue and achieve common goals. In order to build on these assumptions, the Statewide Resilience Strategy provides a single and comprehensive to coordinate Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security efforts.
Overview of the Statewide Resilience Strategy

The Department of Public Safety’s Division of Emergency Management has been instructed to develop a Statewide Resilience Strategy in order to provide for a more resilient Nevada. This direction began with the Governor’s 2016 strategic plan, and was further reinforced by a vote of support by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, to include a directive and an Executive Order. Based on this input and guidance, the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group have developed the following proposed Statewide Resilience Strategy, which is based on the federal focus on resilience and successful resilience initiatives from other states.

Although this strategy for building a resilient Nevada is based on models from the federal government and similar initiatives developed in other states, it is provided here as a plan specific to Nevada. That is, while this strategy is informed by other models and initiatives, it also identifies Nevada’s current emergency management and homeland security assets, practices, systems, and capabilities that can be adapted to meet the guidance provided by the Governor and the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. The model proposed here assumes that Nevada’s many positive current efforts should be realigned and transformed to conform to a resilience framework, and therefore, it does not propose that Nevada needs to begin anew with a clean slate.

The Statewide Resilience Strategy intends to provide a foundation for a more resilient Nevada by embracing existing state and federal models while also incorporating a streamlined approach to existing Nevada systems. It is intended to be a high-level model proposed to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security as a concept for how Nevada can and should proceed. However, if approved or amended by the Commission, extensive effort will need to be made to include perspectives from state, local, and tribal practitioners in order to ensure that implementation of the Statewide Resilience Strategy will be seamless and avoid historic challenges that the existing model was developed to address. This effort is currently underway, and will be continued following the Commission’s input.

The Statewide Resilience Strategy proposed here consists of four major components. These are the Resilience Commission, Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration, Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration, and an Ongoing Annual Assessment. These latter components are intended to coordinate Nevada’s mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts through the Resilience Commission, the first component of this strategy, in a manner that is focused on the gaps, challenges, objectives, and opportunities identified in the annual assessment.
Component 1: The Resilience Commission

As described above, the centerpiece for Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Strategy is the Resilience Commission. The Resilience Commission, which is required by Executive Order 2018-4 to be included in the Statewide Resilience Strategy, serves as the major policy body for all mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts throughout the state. If formally created, it would ensure that local, tribal, and state emergency management partners are working toward a collective goal, that resources are being used effectively, and all emergency management and homeland security efforts are focused on specific resilience objectives throughout the state.

In order to accomplish these objectives, the Resilience Commission as proposed here will exist as a mechanism to streamline Nevada’s existing emergency management and homeland security board and commission structure as well as its grant structure, both of which are also required components of the Statewide Resilience Strategy identified in the Executive Order. This will mean that many of the various public bodies that currently advise the Division of Emergency Management on grant funding and policy issues will be combined into a single body, and it will also allow for streamlining oversight for the various and disparate processes that govern Nevada’s grant allocations.
Streamlining and aligning systems and processes are important in their own right, but so are practices intended to ensure collaboration, transparency, and accountability, all of which are principles central to Nevada’s current public body and grant allocation processes. The proposed model for the Resilience Commission is structured to ensure that these principles remain in place while also ensuring that Nevada’s system is as efficient, responsive, and able to evolve as possible. Both can be accomplished, and should be done so in a way that drives efforts toward important goals and objectives.

The Resilience Commission will pursue all of these principles through coordination of its various systems. As proposed here, it will be made up of representatives from the various existing public bodies it is intended to replace, and it will take on the roles and responsibilities of the public bodies it absorbs as well. It will develop a Statewide Resilience Goal, which is akin to the National Preparedness Goal, and it will also identify a number of resilience objectives. Through its monthly meetings, the Resilience Commission will work to develop plans, vet grants and make funding recommendations with respect to the resilience goals and objectives, and it will deliberate to develop an annual report to recommend ways that the system and process can be improved in the future.

Component 2: Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration

As the major policy coordination body for the state, the Resilience Commission is a key part of facilitating collaboration for local and tribal recovery efforts, which is the second component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy. Primarily, and at least initially, this facilitation will be focused on implementing Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework. Coordinating the effort to further implement this framework through the proposed Resilience Commission will result in improved processes as well as a more resilient state, especially since the framework aligns directly with resilience principles and existing state emergency management systems.

The Disaster Recovery Framework was adopted by the state following an extensive development period administered by Washoe County Emergency Management and Homeland Security. Although a local government developed this framework, it was intended to serve as a statewide recovery model, and one that can be localized by tribal governments and political subdivisions in the state to address their unique challenges, needs, and opportunities. Washoe County’s leadership in this area has achieved both of these goals, with the framework serving as a statewide model that has been implemented following a number of local emergencies and disasters.

In practice, the Disaster Recovery Framework provides a model of Recovery Support Functions (RSF) akin to Nevada’s Emergency Support Functions (ESF), as identified by the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP). The RSFs are supported by the Division of Emergency Management and consist of state,
local, tribal, and non-profit service providers in each of the following areas: Community Planning and Capacity Building (RSF 1), Economic Recovery (RSF 2), Health and Social Services (RSF 3), Disaster Housing (RSF 4), Infrastructure Systems (RSF 5), and Natural and Cultural Resources (RSF 6). Training for statewide implementation of the Disaster Recovery Framework is also required by Executive Order 2018-4.

As a part of the Disaster Recovery Framework, members of the RSFs serve a number of functions. Outside of an emergency or disaster, the RSFs will identify gaps and challenges, develop immediate, intermediate, and long-term recovery objectives in each of their respective areas, as well as identify local, tribal, state, federal, or non-profit resources that can be used to address the identified objectives. When activated during an emergency, the appropriate RSF will identify resources that are available to meet the needs identified by the local, tribal, or state emergency management officials to facilitate local recovery.

The work of the RSFs aligned with the Disaster Recovery Framework will be coordinated through the monthly meetings of the Resilience Commission. The Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF, RSF 1, will serve as the representatives from the state’s recovery effort to its coordinating and policy body for resilience. This will not only allow for the Disaster Recovery Framework to inform the Resilience Commission’s goal and objectives, but also support efforts to build recovery capacity through grants and policies.

**Component 3: Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration**

The benefit of coordinating Nevada’s recovery effort under the Resilience Commission is also present in coordinating Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts under the same body, which is the third component of the proposed Statewide Resilience Strategy. Where the Disaster Recovery Framework defines how the state will coordinate recovery, the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP) defines how Nevada will coordinate resources for local, tribal, and state agencies during response. In order to be most useful, aspects of Nevada’s statewide response plan need to be adopted or at least considered by local governments during response, and incorporating these efforts into the Resilience Commission’s purview will assist this in happening.

The SCEMP provides Nevada’s all-hazard plan for how the state will respond during an emergency or disaster. It provides the foundation for the policies and procedures involved in activating and managing the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), and it also identifies which state agencies and private agencies are responsible for staffing the SEOC’s 17 current Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). During the response phase of any emergency or disaster, the SEOC manager will activate any of the ESFs that are necessary for that particular response, and the manager will also activate general staff members to conduct planning.
operations, logistics, and finance staff in order to coordinate the resources requested by the local, tribal, or state agencies.

As the SCEMP has long been developed, reviewed, and updated by the Division of Emergency Management, it provides the basic outline of how tribes and communities across the state prepare for events as well. State agencies that staff various ESFs, for example, are required to develop response plans to support their efforts when activated, and certain agencies also have Department Operations Centers within their home agencies that they can activate to provide further support. Local and tribal governments often have their own Emergency Operations Centers that can be activated to coordinate resources and information during an emergency or disaster event as well. This system, which is built around the SCEMP in many respects, requires extensive preparedness activities as defined by FEMA as the preparedness cycle, which is described in greater detail in Figure 4, above.

Many of the duties required of the RSFs in the Disaster Recovery Framework are already in place for the ESFs through the SCEMP. These include assessing threats, planning to respond to those threats, training and exercising of those plans, and other aspects of the preparedness cycle. These requirements would continue under the Statewide Resilience Strategy, but, as with the Disaster Recovery Framework, the SCEMP’s implementation, review, and updates will be carried out through the Resilience Commission’s monthly meetings. This will ensure that Nevada’s preparedness and recovery efforts are central to the state’s resilience efforts, and resources and initiatives are coordinated toward a single goal and through a single body.
Component 4: Ongoing Annual Assessment

Through the final component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy, all of the work of the Resilience Commission including preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, will be based on an annual resilience assessment of programs, capacity, and processes toward the overall resilience goal. This annual assessment will provide a feedback mechanism for the Resilience Commission to determine the effectiveness of its efforts, as well as to provide information regarding what changes might be adopted in the future. Including an annual assessment process as the fourth major component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy is intended to ensure that the overall process is one that evolves with the threats the state faces and how prepared it is to respond to and recover from them.

Annual assessment currently exist for the state and jurisdictions for preparedness and response activities, through the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, the Stakeholder Preparedness Review, the Jurisdiction Readiness Assessment, and other activities. The existing assessments are useful, but they are not currently combined to provide a comprehensive picture of Nevada’s significant threats and hazards. And accordingly, the state lacks a comprehensive methodology to coordinate its various resources toward specific goals.

In order to ensure that the annual assessment component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy is useful and meaningful, the Resilience Commission may develop partnerships with federal and state entities that can provide support and resources. For example, the National Governors Association recently provided the Co-Chairs with its State Resilience Assessment and Planning tool, which is currently being piloted by the organization around the country. Further, the Co-Chairs will engage with the University of Nevada, Las Vegas’ School of Public Policy and Leadership to assist in carrying out such assessments if possible, further meeting the requirement in Executive Order 2018-4 to seek ways to partner with Nevada System of Higher Education institutions.

The annual assessment is to be completed at the end of each year, to coincide with the completion of Nevada’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, and it will consider the various other threat assessments developed throughout the year. Any findings can be included in the Resilience Commission’s annual report, and can provide the foundation for the objectives the Resilience Commission develops for the following year.
The Four Components in Detail

The Statewide Resilience Strategy proposed here is outlined in more detail in the following pages. Each of the four components of the strategy is expanded upon in the subsequent sections, which include more information on purpose, background, and implementation. Combined, they provide the high level vision for the Statewide Resilience Strategy.

Even though considerable detail on the realigned structure is provided here, a significant amount of additional detail will need to be developed before this strategy is fully implemented. This will begin upon the approval of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, to include any amendments to the proposal, and will continue through outreach to local, tribal, and state partners to ensure that the details of the plan are in fact possible and that they will achieve the overall goals of the state. Further, as seen through the recommendations provided throughout this strategy, several important aspects of this strategy would benefit from consideration by the legislature for enactment in state law during the 2019 Legislative Session.

If all of these steps are followed, this model will provide for a more resilient state. It will allow for alignment of systems and structures, refinement of existing processes, and a unified vision for all of Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security efforts. In implementing this strategy, Nevada will take a significant step toward achieving the requirements outlined in the directive of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security and portions of the Governor’s Executive Order 2018-4.

Component 1: Resilience Commission

The Division of Emergency Management, which has 33 full time employees, currently administers or participates in approximately 34 boards, commissions, working groups, task forces, and committees. To be clear, this number of public bodies could be slightly misleading; some of the public bodies included in this number have not met in years, while others do not require a major commitment from the Division of Emergency Management. However, even if the number of public bodies were reduced by half, it would still be an extraordinary staff-to-public body ratio.

The Division of Emergency Management’s public bodies have various origins and purposes. Without detailing the histories and missions each of the 34 separate public bodies, a few general categories can be applied to help the general nature of the Division of Emergency Management’s public bodies be fully understood. Some of these public bodies are established in the Nevada Revised Statutes, although this is a relatively low number. Others of these public bodies were established by a vote of the Homeland Security Commission or through Executive Orders signed by the Governor. Often these public bodies were established to meet certain grant requirements for oversight, compliance, and transparency. And finally, a significant number of these public bodies were established by the Division of Emergency Management Chief under the authority provided in NRS 414, which authorizes the Chief to coordinate emergency management efforts within the state.

The purpose of these public bodies vary from group to group, however, they can generally be seen as fitting into two categories. The first category of public body
administered, supported, or participated in by the Division of Emergency Management are public bodies that provide policy advice and recommendations. The second category are public bodies that assist the Division of Emergency Management in vetting and recommending grant allocations for various emergency management, emergency response, and homeland security grants. Because these are general categories, there are of course public bodies that serve both a policy function and a grant function, grant bodies that have subcommittees that provide policy support, and so on. The public bodies in each category are listed in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant Supporting Public Bodies</th>
<th>Policy Supporting Public Bodies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness WG</td>
<td>Intra-state Mutual Aid Committee (IMAC)</td>
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<td>Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS)</td>
<td>IMAC Policy and Procedure Subcommittee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCHS Critical Infrastructure Committee</td>
<td>Nevada Drought Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCHS Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan SBC</td>
<td>Nevada Drought Response Committee</td>
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<td>Nevada Earthquake Safety Council (NESC)</td>
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<td>NCHS Cyber Security SBC</td>
<td>NESC Unreinforced Masonry Committee</td>
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<td>Nevada Threat Analysis Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Board (SARB)</td>
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<td>Homeland Security WG</td>
<td>SARB Training Committee</td>
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<td>Public Safety Communication Committee (NPSCC)</td>
<td>Resort Planning Task Force</td>
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<td>NPSCC Grants SBC</td>
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<td>NPSCC Legislative SBC</td>
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<td>NPSCC Statewide 911 Coordinator SBC</td>
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<td>Nevada Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee</td>
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*Figure 6: DEM public bodies that support the grant system (column 1) and public bodies providing policy support (column 2).*

There are a number of significant challenges associated with the Division of Emergency Management’s current public body structure. First, as described above, the Division of Emergency Management currently has a nearly 1:1 ratio of full time staff members with public bodies. This is also challenging for local and tribal partner organizations, which typically have only a single staff person, often with multiple duties, but who need to attend various meetings and participate in numerous processes. Second, and more important, this broad number of grant and policy bodies ensures that each grant overseen by the Division of Emergency Management has a distinct committee structure and process. And third, many of these public bodies, particularly the policy bodies, lack significant policy or budgetary authority, resulting in frustration for those attempting to improve emergency management and homeland security within their communities and in the state. For all of these reasons the entire public body structure is unsustainable and in need of reform.

In order to meet Nevada’s objective of transitioning to a resilience framework, Nevada’s current grant structure also needs to be streamlined into a single and coherent system, or as close to one as possible. This should mean reducing the number of overall public bodies, combining duties where overlaps exist, and aligning this system
toward specific and achievable resilience goals and objectives. This process of reducing, combining, and aligning is outlined below.

**Remove**

The first and easiest step in the realignment process is to reduce the total number of overall public bodies overseen by the Division of Emergency Management. This is the easiest step because many of the public bodies included in the total have not met in years, have fulfilled their initial objectives, and for other reasons. Public bodies fitting into these categories, identified in red below, should simply be formally removed through an appropriate mechanism.

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</table>

*Figure 7: Public bodies recommended for removal, marked in red.*

None of the public bodies marked for removal above was established through legislation, meaning that each was created by an executive order, a vote of a public body, or by the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management. Several of these bodies have achieved their initial objectives, and indeed, some have already terminated due to sunset provisions within their establishing documents. They are listed here, however, to capture the full scope of the public bodies that have been established in support of Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security efforts. The public bodies that have not been terminated should be formally removed from the total list of public bodies. Doing so would reduce the total number of public bodies by approximately one-third, from 34 public bodies to 22.
The next step in the resilience transition process is to combine existing public bodies in ways that make sense. Combining grant bodies should not be seen as simply an effort to broadly sweep together as many public bodies as possible to reduce workload, but rather to combine bodies in ways that make sense, and to do so in a way that allows for streamlining processes as well. The proposed process for doing so is provided below.

The first step in combining emergency management and homeland security public bodies is to establish which entities should remain established in their current form, or close to their current form. This step requires efforts to ensure that the public bodies that are combined are combined for thoughtful, logical reasons, and not merely arbitrarily. It should also be noted that this is, in large part, an interim step, and one that will be further changed during the alignment step, which follows.

The first category of public bodies that need to be combined consists of simply those boards that are designated to remain in or near their current form. These boards might oversee grants or policies that only impact specific geographic areas, or specific stand-alone programs, or that are created in statute and are not recommended for removal from statute at this time. In future iterations, it may be valuable to consider removing or combining several of these boards, however, the focus ahead of the next legislative session is rather to ensure that these statutorily-created and unique bodies are aligned with the overall resilience effort, which will be carried out in the next step.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Bodies to be Maintained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCHS Finance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue Training Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8: Public bodies recommended to be maintained, including the Resilience Commission.*

Combining these public bodies into this category will ensure that they remain active, and that they are a part of the realignment effort below, however, some explanation for why each of these boards is important. First, the Commission on Homeland Security and the Finance Committee are key strategic bodies for Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security efforts, and they should therefore remain in statute, though some recommendations for improving their roles is provided below. The Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee is a body that is currently created in statute to advise the Division of Emergency Management on the administration of the Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid System. It is an important body overseeing a unique and specific program. Similarly, the Search and Rescue Board is currently created in statute to advise the Division of Emergency Management on the administration of search and rescue coordination efforts. Another report recommends combining the duties and functions of both Search and Rescue Boards, a recommendation that is included below. The Emergency Preparedness Working Group is also combined into this category as it oversees a unique grant process for six specific counties.
All of the public bodies recommended to be included into this category already exist, except for the Resilience Commission. As noted previously, the Resiliency Commission is required by Executive Order 2018-4, so it is added to this first list accordingly. The purpose, duties, and timeline of the Resilience Commission will be described below.

With these public bodies separated out, the next step is to combine many of the remaining policy and grant bodies. This step largely consists of combining the public bodies that all oversee similar programs. That is, it consists of combining the functions of subcommittees into the committees they were established to support. This also is a conceptual and intermediate step, which will be further developed in the alignment step below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1: Public Bodies to be Maintained</th>
<th>Step 2: Public Bodies to be Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS)</td>
<td>Homeland Security WG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCHS Finance Committee</td>
<td>Public Safety Communication Committee (NPSCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee (IMAC)</td>
<td>State Emergency Response Commission (SERC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue Board (SARB)</td>
<td>Emergency Management Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness WG</td>
<td>Nevada Earthquake Safety Council (NESC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience Commission</td>
<td>Nevada State Citizen Corps Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience Commission</td>
<td>Nevada Threat Analysis Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCHS Cyber Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nevada Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9: Proposal to combine bodies to assist with streamlining the grant process.*

**Align**

The final step in streamlining the Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security grant structure is to align the remaining public bodies into a resilience paradigm. The realignment effort proposed below is not only intended to streamline the grant structure and its related processes, but also to create a single and comprehensive system for coordinating all of the policy and grant activities of the Division of Emergency Management. As mentioned previously, this effort establishes the Resilience Commission as the coordinating body for this proposed system, and also as the centerpiece of the overall Statewide Resilience Strategy.

The first step of the proposed alignment effort is to establish the Resilience Commission within the larger public body structure. The Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee, the Search and Rescue Board (especially if it is combined with the Search and Rescue Training Committee), and the Emergency Preparedness Working Group will be maintained within this proposed restructuring, however, they should not be considered to be a part of the overall grant and policy structure for statewide resilience. The grant and policy structure for statewide resilience should consist of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, the Finance Committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, and the Resilience Commission. The proposed new structure is provided below:
Within this proposed structure, these three bodies will continue to serve in roles similar their functions within the current structure, with a few modifications, specifically as the model pertains to the Homeland Security Grant Program. Under the proposed model, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security will remain the senior policy and approval body for all Homeland Security Grant Program grants. It will continue to set objectives, define strategic objective, and make final recommendations for the grant process.

The Finance Committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security is currently established in statute and serves as the primary body for vetting and recommending all homeland security grants and appropriate project change requests. While valuable in its current form, several changes should be considered to further streamline the homeland security grants process. First, the Finance Committee can remain in its current form, allowing it to serve as the final body to review grants for financial compliance and make recommendations to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. Second, the Finance Committee can take on the form and membership of the Homeland Security Working Group as updated and outlined in EO 2018-4, providing a 17-member body that will have working knowledge of the grant proposals because these members will largely be representatives of the Resilience Commission. A final possibility would be to absorb the Finance Committee’s duties into either the Resilience Commission or the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security.

This final possibility aligns with the proposed structure of the Resilience Commission. In this structure, the Resilience Commission would fulfill the role of the current Homeland Security Working Group, which will no longer be an active body. Under the current structure, there are a number of committees that provide subject matter expertise in vetting grants—the Nevada Public Safety Communications Committee and the Cyber Security Committee, for example—and the Resilience Commission will absorb key members of these various committees, while also absorbing their duties and responsibilities. By replacing the Homeland Security Working Group, the Resilience Commission will provide this function for the Finance Committee, however it is restructured, and will have members who are from those sectors who can provide advice and recommendations.

The second step of the proposed realignment effort is to establish the duties, membership, and processes for the Resilience Commission as they pertain to the Homeland Security Grant Program and other emergency management and emergency response grants coordinated by the state. As noted previously, the proposed Resilience Commission should absorb representative members from many of the remaining public
bodies, as well as their duties and responsibilities. These remaining public bodies are the result of the steps taken during the combining steps mentioned above, resulting in six public bodies that should be absorbed within the Resilience Commission. The Resilience Commission Structure is provided below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resilience Commission Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Communication Committee (NPSCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Emergency Response Commission (SERC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Management Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada Earthquake Safety Council (NESC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada State Citizen Corps Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Public bodies with members, duties, and functions to be absorbed into the Resilience Commission.

In this proposed structure, the Resilience Commission will have a number of important responsibilities. Many reflect the duties and responsibilities of the public bodies that are proposed to be absorbed into the Resilience Commission. In doing so, this will not only serve to align many of the policy and grant efforts under a single commission, but also, in doing so, it will serve to streamline the current grant structure.

That is to say, several of the grant structures that currently exist separately, and therefore require local, tribal, and state jurisdictions to pursue grant funding through various grant processes. Aligning these processes under the Resilience Commission will remove several existing processes while preserve transparency and accountability for the distribution of federal and state dollars. The improvement in process will also allow for more efficiency and consistency between local government agencies and the Division of Emergency Management with regard to grant administration including project change requests, de-obligations, and reporting requirements.

The duties in carrying out this realignment consist of the following. At the beginning of each year, the Resilience Commission will develop, review, and update a State Resilience Goal, which is based on the concept provided by the National Preparedness Goal. Once the State Resilience Goal is established, the Resilience Commission will develop a number of resilience objectives, which will be used to drive the prioritization of grant dollars throughout the following year. This process will allow the Resilience Commission to align all of the available grants—SERC, Hazard Mitigation, Emergency Management Program Grant, and Homeland Security Grant Program dollars—toward a single, unified, and collaboratively developed goal.

For the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Resilience Commission will serve in the role of the current Homeland Security Working Group, which vets and recommends proposals for State Homeland Security Program and Urban Area Security Initiative program funding to the newly-formed Finance Committee. For all other grants, the Resilience Commission will review, vet, and make recommendations for funding projects proposals from state, local, and tribal jurisdictions. This includes performing these duties for new projects as well as making recommendations for project change requests and de-obligation and re-obligation of funding opportunities as they become
available. The Resilience Commission will also serve an important accountability function in the state’s processes by reviewing reports on jurisdictional grant compliance.

If the Resilience Commission is to absorb these various public bodies and their responsibilities, then it should also be required to have a membership that represents all of these organizations and their duties. To carry out its various tasks, the Resilience Commission should be large enough to represent these agencies, but not too large to not be able to accomplish its various tasks. Since the Resilience Commission is proposed to replace the Homeland Security Working Group as it existed prior to Executive Order 2018-4, it should largely match the membership, duties, and focus on collaboration and transparency as was also the focus of that version of the Working Group. This is also true for other bodies, such as the Nevada Earthquake Safety Council, the Hazard Mitigation Committee, and the others provided in Figure 9, above.

While the membership of the Resilience Commission will evolve following input from the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security and other efforts to collaborate with statewide partners, a starting place for this discussion is provided below. As with the previous Homeland Security Working Group model, the Resilience Commission should have the State Administrative Agent and the Urban Area Administrative Agent as the established Co-Chairs. The Co-Chairs should serve as voting members, and also be authorized to appoint voting members from organizations and geographic areas like those proposed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Resilience Commission Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Co-Chair: Chief of DEM, SAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Co-Chair: Clark County EM, UAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Inter-Tribal Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 City of Las Vegas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 City of Henderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 City of North Las Vegas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Washoe County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Washoe County Sheriff’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Northeastern Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Southeastern Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Western Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Central Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Office of Cyber Defense Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nevada National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Nevada Hospital Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 State Fire Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Members from each CERT Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Statewide Interoperability Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 HAZMAT SME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 State Seismologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 State Climatologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Member of each Bomb Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Public Health Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Nevada Threat Analysis Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Urban School District Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Rural School District Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Public and Private Sector SERC members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 McCarran International Airport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12:** Within the re-aligned resilience structure, the following groups and representatives are recommended to be appointed to the Resilience Commission.

There are several obvious challenges with this proposed list that can be identified immediately. First, many local law enforcement, fire, emergency management, and other service organizations are not specifically recommended. Second, if all of the members here are appointed, including representatives from each bomb squad and Community Emergency Response Teams in the state, then the membership could grow to over 40 representatives. And third, the current model only proposes a single tribal representative.
To address the first challenge, some of the proposed members are purposely written to be general in nature so that the Co-Chairs can appoint representatives from various law enforcement, fire, emergency management, and other service organizations. Regarding the second challenge, it is expected that the recommended membership will evolve throughout 2018 if this concept is approved, though the final version of the membership should not exceed 35 members. Regarding tribal participation in this process, this is an important concern. However, this can also be addressed through the ways outlined above, and further, increased tribal collaboration will be addressed in later sections of this report.

A public body of this size and absorbing such a large portfolio of duties cannot accomplish its mission if it follows a traditional quarterly meeting cycle. The Resilience Commission should, therefore, be required to meet monthly on a specific day of the month. In previous discussion with statewide partners, the third Thursday of each month has been the arbitrarily established and notional day for this all-day meeting, however, if this concept is approved, then the membership would be surveyed to determine which recurring monthly date would be best. The Resilience Commission should also be required to establish policies and procedures for its meetings, its various grants, and its policy development process.

The third step of the proposed alignment is to reassign certain public bodies to advise appropriate agencies. As recommended in the Final Legislative Recommendations, the Nevada Threat Analysis Center should have an advisory body established in statute. Governor Sandoval established the Nevada Threat Analysis Center Advisory Committee through an Executive Order in 2015. As it is currently established through Executive Order, the Nevada Threat Analysis Center Advisory Committee is not administered by the Division of Emergency Management, however, the agency is represented in its membership and the Nevada Threat Analysis Center provides an essential homeland security function for the state. This public body should be established in law, and it should continue to be administered by the Nevada Threat Analysis Center and the state Homeland Security Advisor should be a member.

The Cyber Security Committee developed a report of legislative and policy recommendations throughout 2017 and 2018. As a committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, the Cyber Security Committee is currently administered by the Division of Emergency Management. However, since the Cyber Security Committee was established, Governor Sandoval proposed and approved legislation establishing the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination within the Nevada Department of Public Safety. This new agency absorbed many of the functions of the Cyber Security Committee, although the Cyber Security Committee is still an important resource for providing subject matter expertise on cyber security grant proposals and overall state strategy, as well as assisting with collaborating with federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. The Cyber Security Committee’s 2018 report includes a recommendation to create this public body in statute to be administered and supported by the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination. This realignment proposal supports the Cyber Security Committee’s recommendation. The Administrator from the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination should be included as a voting member on the Resilience Commission in order to provide subject matter expertise on matters relating to cyber security.
Preserving the Purpose of the Resilience Commission

The Resilience Commission is proposed here to streamline the Division of Emergency Management’s public body structure and to ensure that resources and policies are aligned with statewide objectives. A danger of this approach, as has been seen through previous iterations of similar processes, is the pervasive urge of public bodies to create subcommittees, task forces, working groups, or other public bodies to carry out important work. Creating these public bodies is not inherently negative, and the Resilience Commission should have the authority to do so. However, in order to ensure that the Resilience Commission does not slowly evolve back into the existing and unsustainable structure, certain conditions should be applied to this authority. The first proposed condition is that if the Resilience Commission is to create a subordinate body, it should be to address a specific need and it should be required to achieve a short-term objective or deliverable. The second proposed condition is that the Resilience Commission is authorized to only create two subordinate bodies at any given time, and that each body should automatically sunset after six months unless approved by majority vote of the Resilience Commission.

Streamlining the State Grant Processes

The process proposed above streamlines the board and commission process, the processes for emergency management and emergency response grants, and it modifies portions of the process for the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which here references both the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative grants. The change proposed here provides the final aspect of streamlining this grant program.

Overview of the SHSP/UASI Process

Nevada is uniquely collaborative and transparent with the HSGP process, specifically in the selection of SHSP and UASI projects requesting federal funding. As the process of administering the HSGP lies with the Division of Emergency Management acting as the State Administrative Agency (SAA), preparation for the process begins in the fall as the Division of Emergency Management conducts a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), which is a multifaceted process by which all states identify the events or conditions under which state capabilities are planned for and measured. Though not specific to those events with a terrorism nexus, the THIRA is a federal requirement in obtaining HSGP funding, and input for the THIRA can come from a multitude of sources including after action reports, improvement plans, multi-year training and exercise plans, surveys, quarterly reports, and other THIRA assessments.

Completion of the THIRA involves statewide participation and outreach to federal, state, tribal, local, non-profit, and private sector partners. The THIRA is the foundational assessment, under which the Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR), formerly the State Preparedness Report, is conducted annually at the state level. The SPR enhances this process by measuring the state’s core capabilities contained in five
mission areas against the events identified in the THIRA, with the requirement of each state to identify the top 5-6 events from the THIRA to measure capability against. This process has the ultimate goal, in theory, to build capability for the top 5-6 events identified in the THIRA.

In January, the results from the Nevada THIRA are translated to a visual tool referred to as the “Nevada Heatmap,” which shows increases, decreases, or static change in each of the 32 Core Capabilities established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As foundational reports for the HSGP process, both the THIRA and SPR are integral in the creation of Nevada’s capability priorities and ultimately the drivers of the final grant award for the state including the SHSP and UASI funding streams.

With the completion of the THIRA and SPR, the process moves in an administrative direction over the course of the next several months with the management of the HSGP Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) release and subsequent open meeting schedule allowing for the preparation, submission, vetting, and ultimate submission of the HSGP Grant Application to DHS. The allowable process time to complete these tasks ranges typically from 45-60 days, but can be shortened significantly should guidance be delayed. During this time, significant effort is placed on HSGP messaging, timelines, grant guidance, stakeholder outreach, project submission and review, and committee approvals necessary and required of the process.

**Administration of the HSGP in Nevada**

Nevada is uniquely set up with a legislative requirement to provide a comprehensive state oversight structure for the coordination of domestic preparedness for acts of terrorism and related emergencies. Per Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 239C.160, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS) is tasked with making recommendations with respect to actions and measures that may be taken to protect residents and visitors of the state from potential acts of terrorism and related emergencies in addition to serving as the public body serving in review capacity for the state’s applications to the federal government for homeland security grants and related programs.

Upon release of the THIRA and SPR data, the NCHS reviews and approves a selected number of core capabilities to be used in consideration of HSGP project requests for the current fiscal year. HSGP project proposal solicitations are sent out through the Division of Emergency Management, collected, reviewed, and summarized. The HSGP projects submitted for those projects with statewide impact are presented to the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group (HSWG) for review, vetting, technical review, and ultimately rank-prioritization for funding consideration. The HSGP projects submitted for those projects with Las Vegas Urban Area impact are presented to the Urban Area Working Group (UAWG) in a similar and parallel process. Recommendations from the HSWG and UAWG are forwarded to the NCHS Finance Committee for additional review, and then final funding recommendations are put before the NCHS for approval in submitting the final HSGP Grant Application to DHS. In total, this process historically has entailed a minimum of at least 11 open meetings in a 12
week period based on NOFO requirements. In 2017, the NOFO was considerably delayed, resulting in the administration of 12 open meetings in 16 weeks:

History of SHSP/UASI Funding

Of particular significance to Nevada is the continued downward or at least unpredictable trend of both the SHSP and UASI funding allocations seen nationally. From the 2008 to 2017, the SHSP has seen a decline of over 53% in funding allocation, and the UASI has seen a similar decline of nearly 26%. Until 2018, both funding streams remained at a stagnant rate of increase since 2014. As funding allocations decrease, the ability to impact the creation and sustainment of statewide, urban, and blended statewide/urban projects becomes increasingly difficult. Figure 14 illustrates the SHSP/UASI national funding trend and associated funding levels:

Figure 13: The HSGP [SHSP/UASI] Cycle from 2017 provided as an example.

Figure 14: National Funding Levels: SHSP versus UASI 2008-2017
In review of the allocations specific to Nevada in both the SHSP and UASI funding streams between 2008 and 2016, the downward trend is more alarming translating to nearly a 60% decline in funding in the SHSP, and a similar decline of 69% in UASI funding as shown in Figure 15 below:

With historic administrative and federal timeline challenges, the existing HSGP process of selecting appropriate SHSP and UASI projects has become less efficient, allowing the process to dictate the outcome of projects supporting grant required capability and the inability to effect change through innovation rather than the strategic emphasis on choosing project deliverables exhibiting a proven accountable record.

Additionally, with the declining availability of HSGP funding over the past decade, it is imperative that the State and the UASI refine their current processes in order to achieve fundamental outcomes necessary for the continued sustainment and introduction of innovative projects to increase Nevada’s core capability capacity. These outcomes must include:

- Maintenance of transparency and collaboration as developed during the previous HSGP process;
- Reduction of bureaucracy;
- Sustainment of previously funded projects exhibiting a proven track record; and
- Ensuring future investments are made in a strategic manner.

To effect this fundamental change in the current HSGP process, it is the Co-Chairs of the HWSG recommendation to remove the majority of committee and subcommittee review as described through the establishment of the Resilience Commission earlier. Instead of having 11 open meetings or more of numerous committees, working groups, and subcommittees in a highly compressed timeline, the Co-Chairs recommend the combining the various subcommittees into the Resilience Commission. Steps to consider for a new process are provided below.

**Figure 15: Funding Levels SHSP and UASI 2008-2016/Nevada Data.**
1. **Fall of previous year**: Co-Chairs host three HSGP conferences (South, North, and Rural) in order to gain participation in the THIRA/SPR process, see presentations from previous investments with a proven track record or that are a grant requirement (fusion centers, bomb squads, National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC), for example), and brainstorm and prioritize through a vote potential future investments with conference participants;

2. **Winter of previous year**: The NCHS will develop an action plan for supporting Clark County’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) ranking and UASI funding to be executed ahead of the January and February rankings;

3. **January**: Co-Chairs present the results from the THIRA/SPR and conference processes to the NCHS;

4. **February**: Instead of ranking the top five Core Capabilities, the NCHS will look at sustainment/grant requirement projects (fusion centers, bomb squads, NIMS, and SWIC, for example) as well as potential future projects. Through this process, the NCHS will vote to conditionally fund the sustainment/grant requirement projects, and prioritize the new projects for the remaining SHSP/UASI funding for innovation. The NCHS will also approve state grant guidance as developed by the Co-Chairs.

   i. Co-Chairs develop a recommended project funding list based on the NCHS established priorities, funding sustainment/grant requirement projects first and new projects second, identify grant project applicants (example, a local, tribal, or state agency would be asked to head up a Cyber Security project as identified from the conferences and prioritized by the HSC). Co-Chairs facilitate the grant proposal and investment justification process to ensure the projects have an owner and that they are compliant with state and federal grant guidance.

   o **Sustainment projects**: Organizations identified for sustainment (fusion centers, bomb squads, NIMS, SWIC, etc.) will be required to develop a brief 3-5 year funding plan to ensure that they are working together to achieve strategic results. For example, instead of bomb squads applying separately and irregularly, they will be asked to put together a plan that will identify key funding requirements for the next 3-5 years, where in the first year, two bomb squads might have equipment needs met and all four receive funding for training, and in subsequent years, other equipment and training needs are addressed. This would prevent the bomb squads, in this example, from requesting major funding allocations all at once, which results in some not being funded.

   o **New projects**: Organizations identified for new projects would also be asked to provide a short (one page) 3-5 year funding plan for their projects so that they will be sure to align with the NCHS strategic vision and also ensure that sustaining them will not be beyond the grant’s funding ability in the future.

5. **March**: NCHS Finance Committee holds a public meeting to review the Co-Chairs' recommendations and offers feedback for improvements; and
6. **April**: NCHS Finance Committee holds a second public meeting to review the updated project recommendations from the SAA/UAWG Chair based on their previous feedback. NCHS holds a final public meeting to approve the proposed projects.

![Proposed HSGP Process](image)

**Figure 16: Proposed HSGP Process.**

**Resilience Commission in the Statewide Resilience Strategy**

As has been noted, the Resilience Commission is not only a proposal for streamlining Nevada’s current emergency management and homeland security grants and public body structure. It also serves as the centerpiece of the Statewide Resilience Strategy. As will be described in the following sections of this strategy, the Resilience Commission serves as the coordinating body for Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration, Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration, and the Ongoing Annual Assessment process. All of these efforts will be carried out through the monthly meetings of the Resilience Commission, and will result in the Resilience Commissions Annual Report and Recommendations to the Homeland Security Commission.

**Recommendations**

This foundation provides a number of actionable recommendations. These initial recommendations include concepts that will allow Nevada to pursue a resilience paradigm as required by the directive approved by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. They are provided here, and will be further developed in subsequent sections of this framework:

**Recommendation #1**: The State of Nevada should establish a Statewide Resilience Commission in statute in order to coordinate grants and efforts with respect to the Statewide Resilience Framework.

Pursuant to Executive Order 2018-4, this recommendation calls for the formal establishment of a Statewide Resilience Commission. The Resilience Commission should serve as the main grant and policy coordinating body for the state, and it should be made up of key representatives from the public bodies it is intended to absorb. The Resilience Commission should be required to meet once
a month, develop an annual state resilience goals and related objectives, and
develop a recommendation for a statutory definition of resilience.

**Recommendation #2:** The Statewide Resilience Commission should be
authorized to establish subcommittees, task forces, or working groups with two
specific caveats.

In order to ensure that the efforts to streamline Nevada’s public body structure
and grant processes remain in place, the Resilience Commission should have
the authority to create various subordinate public bodies. However, it should only
be authorized to create two subordinate public bodies at any given time, they
should be established to accomplish a certain objective or purpose, and they
should automatically sunset unless the Resilience Commission votes to maintain
them for longer.
Component 2: Local and Tribal Recovery Collaboration

As described in the previous section, the Resilience Commission is proposed to be established for a number of important reasons. The proposed model allows for the public body to maintain the transparent and collaborative aspects of the current grant structure while also streamlining the various emergency management, emergency response, and homeland security grant opportunities for state, tribal, and local governments. The proposed model also intends to streamline the current public body structure for these same jurisdictions.

However, the creation of the Resilience Commission also provides an important opportunity to increase collaboration between local, state, tribal, and federal governments and service providers with respect to the Recovery process, which is the second component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy proposed here. Recovery, which is at its most fundamental level, the ability for a community to return to pre-disaster conditions following an emergency or disaster, is significantly aligned with the principles and concepts of Resilience. The concept outlined below is intended to establish a statewide system that allows for coordination and collaboration between all levels of government toward unified recovery goals before, during, and after an emergency incident.

As it is proposed here, establishing this system for statewide recovery is also intended to meet another requirement of Governor Sandoval’s Executive Order 2018-4. This Executive Order directs the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group to develop this Statewide Resilience Strategy, and include in it “proposals for incentivizing local partners through grants and other preparedness opportunities to engage in local resilience models.” The Statewide Resilience Strategy in its entirety is intended to accomplish this goal by creating a coordinated and unified structure to pursue resilience objectives, and efforts to develop systems for recovery efforts, discussed in this section, and efforts to solidify existing systems for preparedness and response efforts, discussed in the next section, intend to advance this requirement further.

This section provides an overview of the current Disaster Recovery Framework and how it is proposed to develop recovery initiatives toward statewide resilience. It provides an overview of how the Disaster Recovery Framework works before, during, and after an emergency or disaster, and how those efforts interact with the Resilience Commission. Finally, it suggests a number of recommendations to ensure that this concept can be implemented through state law and policy.

Overview of the Disaster Recovery Framework

Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework is one of the newest comprehensive planning initiatives adopted by the state. Prior to establishing the formal plan, the Division of Emergency Management provided recovery support to local communities in a number of ways, primarily through state recovery staff, grant funding, and the activation of Emergency Support Function 14 (Recovery) during an emergency or
disaster. Following an emergency or disaster, the Division of Emergency Management provides support to local, tribal, and state jurisdictions to support their efforts in receiving reimbursement and other Recovery resources.

The development of the Disaster Recovery Framework is a significant step forward in the Division of Emergency Management’s efforts to lead statewide recovery efforts. As with preparedness and response efforts, recovery is enhanced when there are plans, relationships, and goals in place, and when resources are directed to all efforts in anticipation of an emergency or disaster impacting a community. The Disaster Recovery Framework provides this model, and since the principles of recovery are closely aligned with those of resilience, this model should be adopted into Nevada’s overall resilience efforts.

The Disaster Recovery Framework was formally adopted by the Division of Emergency Management in early 2017 after it was developed through a Homeland Security Grant Program project requested by Washoe County Emergency Management and Homeland Security. Washoe County provided key leadership in administering this process on the state’s behalf by convening local and tribal partners, developing the concept and the model, and providing training throughout the state to ensure that it was understood and adopted. Since it was adopted in 2017, the Disaster Recovery Framework has served to inform local recovery planning efforts in a number of major events, and it has also been reviewed and updated over time.

Much like the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) established in the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP), the Disaster Recovery Framework provides a model of Recovery Support Functions (RSF). According to the SCEMP, Nevada currently has 17 ESFs that receive training and exercise opportunities during the preparedness phase, and can be activated as a part of the State Emergency Operations Center during the response phase. If the function of a specific ESF is required during an emergency or disaster, the ESF is expected to activate internal plans, such as the Nevada Department of Transportation’s Emergency Operations Plan, and provide resources and support through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and at the request of the local, tribal, or state jurisdictions. And activated ESF should be prepared to provide support for multiple operational periods 24 hours a day until it is deactivated.

The RSFs established in the Disaster Recovery Framework work in a similar manner to the ESFs, however, they are not intended to be activated for 24-hour periods. Because the work of recovery takes place over months and often years, when RSFs are activated, they should anticipate weekly or monthly collaboration meetings. And like the ESFs, much of their work is done in preparation for a recovery effort, and their effectiveness can be assessed and improved through ongoing training and exercise opportunities coordinated by the Division of Emergency Management.

The Disaster Recovery Framework establishes six RSFs, which, if activated during an emergency or disaster response, are coordinated through ESF-14 (Recovery). These RSFs are administered and coordinated by the Division of Emergency Management and consist of state, local, tribal, and non-profit service providers in each of the following areas: Community Planning and Capacity Building (RSF 1), Economic Recovery (RSF 2), Health and Social Services (RSF 3), Disaster Housing (RSF 4), Infrastructure Systems (RSF 5), and Natural and Cultural Resources.
Prior to an emergency or disaster, the RSFs work to identify gaps and challenges in their respective areas, develop immediate, intermediate, and long-term recovery objectives in each of their respective areas, and identify resources that can be used to address the identified objectives. During an emergency or disaster, an activated RSF will identify resources that are available to meet the needs identified by the local, state, or tribal emergency management officials to facilitate local recovery.

Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework is focused on establishing a model for statewide recovery efforts; however, it is also a fundamental part of Nevada’s Statewide Resilience Strategy. For example, the Disaster Recovery Framework is directly connected to resilience efforts through its seven guiding principles. These guiding principles, listed below, were established in the development of the framework, and they are also key principles intended to guiding Nevada’s recovery efforts following an emergency or disaster.

1. Understanding Disaster Risk
2. Local Primacy
3. Long-Term Recovery Planning
4. Resilience and Sustainability
5. Accessibility and Recovery
6. Coordination with Mitigation Planning Efforts
7. Equitable Recovery

As noted previously, this Statewide Resilience Strategy is informed by resilience efforts in other states, especially Oregon and Colorado. The Colorado Resiliency Framework, which was published in 2015, is built around six Resiliency Framework Sectors. These sectors are intended to be specific parts of a collectively and integrated planning and recovery model. The table below depicts Nevada’s six RSFs next to their corresponding sectors from the Colorado Resilience Framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nevada Recovery Framework RSFs</th>
<th>Colorado Resiliency Framework Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Planning and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Recovery</td>
<td>Health and Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Services</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Housing</td>
<td>Watershed and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Systems</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and Cultural Resources</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17:** Important elements of Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework’s RSFs and the Sectors from the Colorado Resiliency Framework are shown here to depict the clear overlap between recovery efforts and resilience efforts.

Beyond the clear similarities between Nevada’s RSFs and Colorado’s sectors, both of these frameworks are also implemented to similar ends, namely, to increase recovery and resilience efforts in each state. The significant difference is that Nevada’s framework provides for a substantial mechanism for establishing objectives and working toward those objectives through the RSF model. According to Nevada’s Disaster Recovery Framework, each RSF is responsible for performing the following functions:
As noted previously, the establishment and implementation of the Disaster Recovery Framework signifies important progress toward Nevada’s recovery goals. Similarly, it provides an important model for increasing Nevada’s emergency and disaster resilience as well. Although it currently exists as a stand-alone plan, the Disaster Recovery Framework should be incorporated into the Statewide Resilience Strategy in order to produce capacity and capability for improving both recovery and resilience in the state.

Disaster Recovery Framework and the Resilience Commission

The Resilience Commission proposed in this strategy serves as Nevada’s primary body for coordinating Nevada’s statewide emergency management and homeland security efforts. These include all efforts associated with capability and capacity building during the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases of emergency management, including grants and policy efforts. In this role, the Resilience Commission serves as a key coordinating body for the Disaster Recovery Framework, which will in turn enhance the state’s overall resilience efforts.

The work of the various RSFs, as outlined in the Disaster Recovery Framework, will be ongoing, and it should be coordinated through the monthly meetings of the Resilience Commission. In practice this means that the RSFs will work independently to prepare for short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term recovery efforts by establishing gaps and goals, building partnerships, and identifying resources from all service providers. The Division of Emergency Management will work to ensure that local, tribal, and state partners receive training on the Disaster Recovery Framework, provide exercise opportunities, and update the framework based on lessons learned and improvement plans.

The work of the independent RSFs will be provided to the Resilience Commission during their monthly meetings through RSF 1, Community Planning and Capacity Building. This RSF, which is administered by the Division of Emergency Management, will provide information regarding the state’s recovery effort to the Resilience Commission, which is intended to inform the Resilience Commission’s goal and objectives. This collaboration between the Resilience Commission and the
elements of the Disaster Recovery Framework is intended to build recovery and resilience capacity through the allocation of grants and the development of statewide policies.

Recommendations

Establishing the administration of the Disaster Recovery Framework as a component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy is an essential part of this strategy. Through its coordination with the Resilience Commission, it will allow Nevada to improve its recovery capability and capacity, and in doing so, will also improve Nevada’s overall resilience. As is shown through the implementation of the Disaster Recovery Framework, some of this can be accomplished by the Division of Emergency Management through administrative actions. However, in order to ensure that this model is an enduring part of Nevada’s resilience initiatives, some legislative changes should be pursued, which are provided through the recommendations below.

Recommendation 1: Change NRS 414 to require the Division of Emergency Management to prepare and annually review a State Disaster Recovery Framework.

NRS 414.040 requires the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management to “assist in the development of comprehensive, coordinated plans for emergency management by adopting an integrated process, using the partnership of governmental entities, business and industry, volunteer organizations and other interested persons, for the mitigation of, preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies or disasters.” While the current language provides the Division of Emergency Management with the authority to develop various plans associated with recovery efforts, and to ensure they are coordinated with entities throughout the state, it does not provide language calling for a specific recovery framework. This recommendation calls for language that would require the Division of Emergency Management to develop a specific planning framework for recovery, and to ensure it is reviewed and updated annually, and to ensure that recovery plans based on this framework are included in local, tribal, school, and other emergency operations or response plans that are required by state law.

Recommendation 2: Require certain state agencies to provide a liaison or liaisons to serve as representatives within the State Emergency Operations Center as Recovery Support Functions in accordance with the Disaster Recovery Framework.

NRS 414.040 requires the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management to “coordinate the activities of all organizations for emergency management within the State, maintain liaison with and cooperate with agencies and organizations of other states and of the Federal Government for emergency management and carry out such additional duties as may be prescribed by the Director.” This
language is sufficient to support the Division of Emergency Management’s efforts, as seen through the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center in accordance with the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan; however, there is no specific policy in state law that requires partner agencies to support this plan. With the development of the Disaster Recovery Framework, it is anticipated that challenges associated with this lack of clear statutory policy will persist in carrying out the duties of the Recovery Support Functions. This recommendation calls for language in NRS 414 that requires specific agencies to provide liaisons to support the Division of Emergency Management’s RSFs before, during, and after emergencies. According to the Disaster Recovery Framework, the following agencies are identified as the appropriate representatives for each Recovery Support Function:

- RSF 1—Community Planning and Capacity Building: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- RSF 2—Economic Recovery: Governor’s Office of Economic Development
- RSF 3—Health and Social Services: Department of Health and Human Services
- RSF 4—Disaster Housing: Department of Business and Industry, State Housing Division
- RSF 5—Infrastructure Systems: Department of Administration, Division of Public Works
- RSF 6—Natural and Cultural Resources: Department of Conservation and Natural Resources

**Recommendation 3:** Allow tribal governments to apply for assistance through the Disaster Relief Account in the same way that political subdivisions of the state currently can.

Currently, only political subdivisions within the state can apply for partial reimbursement through the state Disaster Relief Account. This recommendation calls for expanding the eligibility criteria outlined in NRS 353.2735 to allow for Nevada’s 27 federally-recognized tribal governments to seek partial reimbursement through this account as well.

**Recommendation 4:** Reestablish a state-level individual assistance program.

Individual Assistance is a program administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to support private property and business owners to recover from emergencies and disasters when certain damage thresholds are met by a county or tribal government. The State of Nevada previously maintained a similar account at the state level, however it was discontinued in previous budget cycles. This recommendation calls for reestablishing the state-level individual assistance program, and doing so under the current structure of the Disaster Relief Account.
Component 3: Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration

In much the same way that the Disaster Recovery Framework serves as the overall plan for how Nevada will build capacity for recovery efforts, the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP) serves as Nevada's plan for coordinating preparedness and response efforts. In reality, the two plans provide near identical models for how Nevada prepares for response and recovery efforts, both of which follow national models and established emergency management principles. Incorporated Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts into the Statewide Resilience Strategy in the same way as the Disaster Recovery Framework, will ensure that all of Nevada’s emergency management efforts are directed toward building resilience capabilities and capacity.

Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts are derived from and aligned with the SCEMP. The SCEMP, which has been operational, reviewed, and updated for over a decade, is a key component of the Division of Emergency Management’s preparedness and response capabilities. While it is a central element of Nevada’s emergency management activities, and while it is supported by various preparedness and response activities to include grants, exercises, and others, the current model can be improved by incorporating all of Nevada’s preparedness and response activities into the Statewide Resilience Strategy.

Incorporating this component into the Statewide Resilience Strategy can be done primarily by establishing these efforts as part of the Resilience Commission. As the state’s primary coordinating body for all grant and policy efforts related to emergency management and homeland security, the Resilience Commission can ensure that scarce grant dollars are allocated in the best possible way, and to ensure that there is a platform for policy advocacy going forward. Additionally, in order to ensure that Local and Tribal Preparedness and Response Collaboration can reach its full potential, the preparedness and response system must be refined to complement its coordination with the Resilience Commission.

Incorporating this preparedness and response system into the Statewide Resilience Strategy will result various benefits. As described with the Disaster Recovery Framework in Component Two of this strategy, is intended to enhance coordination and collaboration between all levels of government toward unified resilience goals during all phases of an emergency incident. Further, the changes to the current system proposed here will also allow meet the requirements to the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group to provide proposals to encourage local governments to participate in this statewide resilience initiative.

This section provides an overview of Nevada’s current preparedness and response efforts, and how they are proposed to be incorporated into the Statewide Resilience Strategy. It provides an overview of how the SCEMP works before, during, and after an emergency or disaster, and how those efforts should interact with the
Resilience Commission. Finally, it suggests a number of recommendations to ensure that this concept can be implemented through state law and policy.

Overview of Current Preparedness and Response Efforts

Based on requirements from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts begin with a statewide assessment of Nevada’s threats and hazards, as well as how prepared it is to respond to each. The resulting gap analysis provides a basic roadmap for building the preparedness capacities that the state needs to develop through allocating grant funding, planning, training, and exercise efforts, as well as other aspects of the preparedness cycle. All of these aspects inform the SCEMP, which serves as the Division of Emergency Management’s framework for response, and therefore, a central piece of the Division of Emergency Management’s preparedness efforts.

Within the SCEMP, the Division of Emergency Management identifies the state agencies that are required to provide liaisons as Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) when it is activated. All ESFs will not necessarily be activated for each emergency or disaster, however, those ESFs with a clear nexus to the response effort, or the recovery effort to follow, will be. Some agencies provide ESFs who perform emergency management or response roles within their day-to-day duties at their home agency, while others designate ESFs as additional duties.

During the response phase of the emergency management cycle, elements of the SCEMP are activated to coordinate resource and information requests for local, state, and tribal jurisdictions, and it mirrors and is incorporated into the FEMA’s structure and processes as well. Local and tribal governments develop similar models that work best for their communities, but combine, the local, state, tribal, and federal governments to work together to coordinate the appropriate level of resources.

During the preparedness phase of the emergency management cycle, the SCEMP serves as the central framework for planning, training, exercises, and other aspects of the preparedness cycle. The Division of Emergency Management will regularly activate the SEOC in accordance with the SCEMP to exercise various scenarios, identify gaps in planning and capabilities, and to ensure that statewide partners can participate. Many of the agencies supporting ESF functions also have emergency operations plans that are activated to support their roles within the SEOC.

In addition to the SCEMP, Nevada assists local and tribal jurisdictions in building response and recovery capacity through a number of efforts. Through the Division of Emergency Management, Nevada coordinates various federal grant programs, such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant, Homeland Security Grant Program, and several grants supported by the Department of Energy. Similarly, the State Emergency Response Commission provides a number of grants to jurisdictions through their Local Emergency Planning Committees to prepare for and respond to other hazards as well.

While these various preparedness and response systems currently exist, they are not aligned toward specific statewide goals. That is, even if the current model was merely adopted as a part of this strategy, it would not necessarily ensure that the
current systems are adequately coordinated. Several challenges remain within the current system that should be addressed.

The first challenge addresses the current statutory authority of the Division of Emergency Management with respect to the implementation of the SCEMP. Although the SCEMP is generally required by NRS 414 and promulgated by the Governor, there is not a requirement in law for specific state agencies identified in the SCEMP to provide liaisons to the State Emergency Operations Center when activated for an emergency or an exercise. This requires the Division of Emergency Management to implement this important effort based on relationships, a method that is challenging with turnover in personnel at all levels of state government.

Second, the Division of Emergency Management’s commitment to ensure Nevada’s 27 federally-recognized tribal governments receive adequate emergency preparedness and response support also lacks a formalized structure and system. Currently, this effort is pursued through providing grant funding to the Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission, which provides staff and oversight to the tribal governments through planning, training, and exercise support, as well as through activation in support of response. This approach has resulted in increased capacity building for tribal governments in Nevada, however, there are opportunities for improvement.

Third, although the model intended to streamline the public body and grant structure presented in a previous section proposes moving the State Emergency Response Commission grants under the purview of the Resilience Commission, it does not ensure that local governments will be aligned with this structure. This proposal is key to the overall Statewide Resilience Strategy in that it allows for all of Nevada’s mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery grants to be aligned into a single system and toward a single set of resilience objectives, and it can be further improved by ensuring that the county governments align the local counterparts to the State Emergency Response Commission, Local Emergency Planning Committees, with this resilience strategy.

State Preparedness and Response Efforts and the Resilience Commission

Nevada’s preparedness and response framework, as implemented at the state level through the SCEMP, has proven to be a successful model, and as such, it would benefit statewide resilience efforts if incorporated into the Statewide Resilience Strategy. If resilience is the ability for a community to recover from and thrive after an emergency or disaster, ensuring that communities around the state have the capacity to respond to such events is crucial. This can be done if these activities are coordinated at the state level with local, state, and tribal input, collaboration, and support.

As with the Disaster Recovery Framework, Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts should be coordinated by the Resilience Commission. As proposed in this strategy, the Resilience Commission serves as Nevada’s primary body for coordinating Nevada’s statewide emergency management and homeland security efforts. These include all efforts associated with capability and capacity building during all phases of emergency management, to include preparedness and response. In this role, the Resilience Commission serves as a key coordinating body for the Division of
Emergency Management’s preparedness and response activities, which will in turn enhance the state’s overall resilience efforts.

Local and tribal emergency management partners will not only be able to inform the work of the Resilience Commission, they will also be represented on it. In the proposal to streamline Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security public body structure, local and tribal emergency managers will serve as voting members of the body. If the recommendations below regarding the Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission and the Local Emergency Planning Committees are approved, then the ability for these jurisdictions to advocate from the local and tribal perspective will also be improved.

Recommendations

Nevada’s preparedness and response efforts are an essential component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy. Improving the current systems and coordinating them through the Resilience Commission will allow Nevada to improve its overall emergency and disaster capability and capacity, and also assist the state in pursuing resilience goals and objectives. Several legislative and regulatory changes are recommended below in order to ensure that this strategy can be implemented.

**Recommendation 1:** NRS 414 should be amended to require the Division of Emergency Management to prepare and annually review a State Mitigation Plan, a State Preparedness Plan, and a State Response Plan (SCEMP).

NRS 414.040 requires the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management to “assist in the development of comprehensive, coordinated plans for emergency management by adopting an integrated process, using the partnership of governmental entities, business and industry, volunteer organizations and other interested persons, for the mitigation of, preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies or disasters.” While the current language provides the Division of Emergency Management with the authority to develop various plans associated with mitigation, preparedness, and response efforts, and to ensure they are coordinated with entities throughout the state, it does not provide language calling for a specific recovery framework or an annual update. This recommendation calls for language that would require the Division of Emergency Management to develop a specific planning framework for these three areas, and to ensure they are reviewed annually.

**Recommendation 2:** Require certain state agencies to provide a liaison or liaisons to serve as representatives within the State Emergency Operations Center as Emergency Support Functions in accordance with the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

NRS 414.040 requires the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management to “coordinate the activities of all organizations for emergency management within the State, maintain liaison with and cooperate with agencies and organizations of
other states and of the Federal Government for emergency management and carry out such additional duties as may be prescribed by the Director.” This language is sufficient to support the Division of Emergency Management’s efforts, as seen through the activation of the State Emergency Operations Center in accordance with the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan; however, there is no specific policy in state law that requires partner agencies to support this plan. This recommendation calls for language in NRS 414 that requires specific agencies to provide liaisons to support the Division of Emergency Management’s ESFs before, during, and after emergencies. According to the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the following agencies are identified as the appropriate representatives for each ESF:

- ESF 1—Transportation: Department of Transportation
- ESF 2—Telecommunications and Information Technology: Department of Administration, Enterprise IT Services
- ESF 3—Public Works and Engineering: Department of Administration, Public Works Division
- ESF 4—Firefighting: Department of Public Safety, State Fire Marshal Division
- ESF 5—Emergency Management: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- ESF 6—Mass Care, Sheltering, and Housing: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- ESF 7—Purchasing and Resource Support: Department of Administration, State Purchasing Division
- ESF 8—Public Health and Medical Services: Department of Health and Human Services
- ESF 8.1—Mental Health: Department of Health and Human Services
- ESF 9—Search and Rescue and Specialized Response: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- ESF 10—Hazardous Materials: Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Division of Environmental Protection
- ESF 11—Agriculture and Natural Resources: Department of Agriculture
- ESF 12—Energy: Governor’s Office of Energy
- ESF 13—Public Safety and Security: Department of Public Safety, Nevada Highway Patrol
- ESF 14—Community Recovery: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- ESF 15—Public Information: Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management
- ESF 16—Military Support: Nevada National Guard
- ESF 17—Cyber Defense Coordination: Department of Public Safety, Office of Cyber Defense and Coordination
**Recommendation 3:** NRS 414 should be amended to require county governments to have an emergency management function.

Currently, NRS 414.090 states that “each political subdivision of this state may establish a local organization for emergency management in accordance with the state emergency management plan and program for emergency management,” where “political subdivision” is defined in this statute as cities or counties within Nevada. Because the language is permissive, several counties throughout Nevada have struggled to maintain emergency management programs, in which case, local emergency management efforts typically revert to the Division of Emergency Management. This recommendation calls for county governments in Nevada to be required to maintain emergency management functions, and for city governments to be permitted to maintain emergency management functions. If several counties determine that a regional emergency management structure consisting of multiple contiguous counties is preferred, they should be authorized to pursue this structure instead of having individual county emergency management programs.

**Recommendation 4:** Require the Division of Emergency Management to create regulations for all grants.

As listed elsewhere, the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group developed an initial list of legislative recommendations to provide a foundation for Nevada’s efforts to transition to a resilience strategy. These recommendations were presented to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security during its February 28, 2018 meeting, and they were approved by a vote of the Commissioners. The seventh recommendation in this list was to “require DEM to create regulations for all DEM grants processes.” Though this recommendation is provided elsewhere, it is included here because the authority to establish regulations for grant funding is key to ensuring the success of the Resilience Commission and this Statewide Resilience Strategy. Additionally, because regulations can increase bureaucracy, the recommendations proposed here are intended to be general in nature, and not unlike the current grant compliance requirements established by the federal government and the Division of Emergency Management. Rather, they are merely codified here to ensure that the Division of Emergency Management can support the efforts of the Resilience Commission, the Homeland Security Commission, and its Finance Committee.

**Recommendation 5:** NAC 459 should be amended to require county governments to establish Local Emergency Planning Committees that are chaired by the county emergency manager.

NAC 459 currently outlines the duties and responsibilities of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC), which are the local counterparts to the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). In their current form, LEPC members are appointed by the SERC and they elect their own chairs. This
recommendation calls for changing the current regulation to require county governments to establish a LEPC and for the chair of the body to be the local emergency manager, who will also serve as a member of the Resilience Commission. In this structure, the LEPC may receive and determine the distribution of appropriate emergency management, emergency response, and homeland security grant funding and coordinate all-hazards preparedness activities.

**Recommendation 6**: Establish the Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission as a public body administered by the Division of Emergency Management.

The Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission (ITERC) is an important advisory body that currently exists within the Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada. ITERC provides support to Nevada’s 27 federally-recognized tribal governments by providing staff and oversight to the tribal governments through planning, training, and exercise support, as well as through activation in support of response. ITERC should be formalized in law, and the Division of Emergency Management should provide administrative support. Additionally, a representative from ITERC should be appointed to serve on the Resilience Commission to ensure that tribal governments are represented.
Component 4: Ongoing Annual Assessment

The Statewide Resilience Strategy is required of Executive Order 2018-4, as is the development of final legislative recommendations by the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group. The Executive Order was recommended by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS) and signed by the Governor following a series of presentations in late 2017 and early 2018 by the Co-Chairs. Both of these requirements are intended by the NCHS to provide guidelines for transitioning Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security initiatives towards a model of resilience.

An important aspect of the presentations provided by the Co-Chairs to the NCHS is the importance of ensuring that Nevada’s efforts are able to continually evolve in order to meet the evolving threats and hazards the state faces. This principle was presented in a number of contexts throughout these presentations, but most clearly through a reference to the seven “Qualities of Resilient Systems,” which were developed as a part of the “100 Resilient Cities” initiative. The first of these qualities is that a resilient organization is “reflective,” meaning that they “embrace a changing and uncertain landscape, and they have internal features that allow them to evolve as well.”

If the Statewide Resilience Strategy is approved for implementation, it is intended to establish a way to improve and coordinate existing systems within a new framework. The risk with any system, especially one that is made up of partners across local, state, and tribal partners, is that it can stagnate over time. In cases where systems stagnate, they risk no longer being able to adequately meet the challenges they face, evolve as resources evolve, or in the worst cases, experience a combination of both.

Throughout this strategy and the final legislative recommendations required by Executive Order 2018-4, a number of safeguards are suggested to ensure that Nevada’s efforts evolve and that they evolve in the correct direction. For instance, the initial recommendations approved by the NCHS suggest allowing that body one bill draft request per legislative session in order to allow them to recommend changes to the legislature from their position as the primary strategic and oversight body for the state. Additionally, within this strategy, there is a suggestion to ensure that the Resilience Commission is able to establish subordinate public bodies, but that it does so in a way that is sustainable.

The fourth component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy is an ongoing annual assessment, and it is intended to provide an additional mechanism to ensure that Nevada’s resilience efforts continue to be reflective and evolve over time. An annual assessment like the one proposed here is not an entirely novel idea, and it too risks becoming bureaucratic in nature. However, if emphasis and leadership are continued to be directed toward resilience, then such a mechanism can provide an important and formal tool for the Resilience Commission.

This section provides an overview of Nevada’s current efforts to assess emergency management and homeland security capabilities and capacities, as well as
how these efforts can be improved upon and incorporated into the Statewide Resilience Strategy. In doing so, it intends to show how these assessments and others can potentially be combined to not only assess the state of Nevada’s resilience capacity, but also to provide ongoing recommendations for improvements. It concludes by providing recommendations to ensure that this concept can be implemented through state law and policy.

Overview of Nevada’s Current Emergency Management Assessments

A number of annual assessments currently exist for the state and jurisdictions for preparedness and response activities. These include the Division of Emergency Management’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and Stakeholder Preparedness Review, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Jurisdiction Readiness Assessment, as well as others. Additionally, Executive Order 2018-4 also requires the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group to collaborate with the Nevada Threat Analysis Center and the Southern Nevada Counter Terrorism Center to develop a statewide threat assessment in late 2018.

These existing and required assessments are useful for the purposes they aim to address, namely natural disasters, man-made disasters, or public health emergencies or disasters. In their current form, they exist as independent assessments, and therefore are not considered together to provide a comprehensive picture of Nevada’s significant threats and hazards. A comprehensive methodology to coordinate Nevada’s various threat assessments is an essential component of the statewide effort to coordinate resources toward specific goals.

In addition to these current and required assessments, national models currently exist. For example, the National Governors Association recently developed a State Resilience Assessment and Planning tool, which is currently being piloted by the organization around the country. This tool is similar to the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, however, it is an assessment of state-level capacity and it is focused specifically on resilience.

As the final component of the Statewide Resilience Strategy, it is important to note that the requirement for ongoing annual assessment is not intended to create additional layers of bureaucracy, reports, or other challenges. Instead, it is intended to provide a tool for assessing the effectiveness of current efforts, and to provide a platform to advocate for change, either in policy, regulation, or statute. The requirement for an annual assessment can be implemented in a number of ways, from providing a single analysis of all current assessments, or introducing new assessments that could provide important context for the state’s reflection.

Ongoing Annual Assessments and the Resilience Commission

Whichever form the annual assessment takes, it should result in an annual report of the Resilience Commission. This requirement would provide the public body with an appropriate mechanism to coordinate the various assessments, to consider any changes in its development of resilience goals, and to present recommendations to decision makers throughout the state. Including an annual assessment process as the
The fourth major component of the State Resilience Strategy is intended to ensure that the overall process is one that evolves with the threats the state faces and how prepared it is to respond to and recover from them.

The annual assessment should be completed at the end of each year, to coincide with the completion of Nevada’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, and it will consider the various other threat assessments developed throughout the year. Any findings can be included in the Resilience Commission’s annual report, and can provide the foundation for the objectives the Resilience Commission develops for the following year. This assessment will also be incorporated into the Resilience Commission’s annual report and recommendations.

If approved, the Co-Chairs of the Resilience Commission should seek opportunities to collaborate on this annual assessment with state and national organizations, such as the National Governors Association and the Nevada System of Higher Education. These opportunities should only be pursued if they bring significant value to the statewide threat assessment effort. If current assessments prove to be adequate, then the Co-Chairs should lead the effort to combine them to develop the annual assessment.

**Recommendation**

**Recommendation 1:** The Resilience Commission should be required to provide an annual report to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security

This strategy recommends the creation of a Resilience Commission, its membership, and its duties. This body is intended to serve as the primary coordinating body for all emergency management and homeland security activities in the state, and to work through three components to do so. The fourth component, an ongoing annual assessment, is intended to provide a mechanism to ensure that this body is reflective and able to evolve. The annual report proposed here is intended to formalize this requirement. It should serve as a way to combine existing threat assessment efforts, to record the major activities of the Resilience Commission in the preceding year, and to allow the public body to make recommendations for improving the system and processes in the future.
Final Legislative Recommendations to the Commission on Homeland Security

Caleb S. Cage, Chief, NDEM
John Steinbeck, Deputy Chief, CCFD/OEM
June 30, 2018
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**APPENDIX: EXECUTIVE ORDER 2018-4**
I. Executive Summary

This report provides policy and budget recommendations for improving emergency management and homeland security in the state of Nevada. These recommendations are intended to be conceptual in nature, to cover a wide variety of public safety topics and areas, and they are intended for audiences including the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, the Governor, the Legislature, and the Division of Emergency Management’s local, state, and tribal partners. Together with similar reports and recommendations developed by similar committees and public bodies, the recommendations included here should serve as the foundation for Nevada’s state-level emergency management efforts during the 2019 Legislative Session.

Versions of this report were presented in various forms to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security throughout the end of 2017 and 2018. During the December 6, 2017 meeting, the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group presented a high level after action review covering the unprecedented emergencies and disasters that occurred in calendar year 2017, which included floods, fires, a mass shooting incident, and more. Based on that initial report, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security requested a set of high level recommendations to be presented at its January 2018 meeting. And finally, based on those two reports, the Commissioners again requested specific final recommendations for how the state should proceed to be presented at its February 2018 meeting.

During the February Commission meeting, four specific items were presented by the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group: a directive for the state to pursue a resilience strategy for emergency management and homeland security, and executive order to provide a timeline for planning and deliverables, a proposed budget, and initial legislative recommendations. All four of these proposals were approved by a vote of the Commission, some with minor modifications. This report draws upon all of these previous reports and develops the legislative and budgetary recommendations previously approved by the Commission.

In addition to providing the final versions of the policy and budget recommendations approved by the Commission at its February 2018 meeting, this report also provides additional recommendations pulled from a number of sources. These sources include recommendations following a review of current emergency management and homeland security statutes, previous policies established through executive orders or other means but not created in statute, after action reports, and other assessments. Additionally, as with the other reports and recommendations developed ahead of the 2019 Legislative Session, the Co-Chairs also sought and received input from various partners,
organizations, and jurisdictions throughout the development process in order to ensure that these recommendations had the broadest possible support.

This report begins by placing the emergencies and disasters of calendar year 2017 into the broader historical context in order to show how truly unprecedented the year’s events were. Then it provides an overview of the major events of 2017 as well as some of the major lessons learned. Finally, it concludes by providing an overview of the legislative and budgetary recommendations that were developed specifically for this report.

Again, these recommendations are intended to be more refined and developed than previous versions, but they will also require additional development in the future. This will occur as priorities are developed by legislators and executive branch agencies throughout 2018, as additional research and outreach with partners occurs, and as the landscape of threats, hazards, as well as preparedness capacity in Nevada evolves. Together with the other reports and recommendations developed ahead of the 2019 Legislative Session, they are intended to provide the foundation for comprehensive reforms in the areas of emergency management and homeland security.

II. Authorities

This report is provided under a number of authorities. Generally speaking, Nevada Revised Statutes 414 allows the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management to take measures to coordinate emergency management in Nevada. Additionally, as referenced above, the Governor signed Executive Order 2018-4 on March 12, 2018, requiring the following: “the Co-Chairs shall provide the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security a final list of legislative recommendations for consideration and approval for the 2019 Legislative Session in the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group Report due June 30, 2018.” The recommendations included here are intended be included with four additional reports of recommendations to fulfill this specific requirement of Executive Order 2018-4.
III. Background

The tragic events of October 1, 2017 in Las Vegas, Nevada remain one of the defining emergency response and emergency management incidents for the state and for the nation. Within hours of the attack, national news began referring to the incident as the “largest mass shooting in U.S. history,” while others argued that the attack on the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival amounted to “America’s Mumbai.” This report, co-authored by the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group, aims to place this tragedy within a context by showing how the October 1 incident was both a continuation of an unprecedented year of emergencies and disasters in Nevada, as well as a powerful opportunity to learn and apply lessons for the future.

This effort to provide context and direction comes with two significant caveats. First, while the report concludes with recommendations for the future, it is not intended to second guess tactical or operational decisions. It is the opinion of the authors of this report that local responders and the local community provided an incredible and ongoing response to this tragedy. And second, this report should also be viewed as the outcome of initial lessons learned and ongoing collaboration, discussion, and cooperation between state, local, tribal, and private sector entities. A comprehensive after action review for the October 1 event will be completed in 2018 pursuant to the Governor’s Executive Order.

The backdrop of historic levels of emergencies and disasters prior to this event is important for a number of reasons. First, the October 1 tragedy took place at a time of perhaps peak collaboration and coordination for Nevada’s emergency responders and emergency managers. This is due to exceptional foresight and preparedness by local first responders leading up to this event, and also due to the statewide mobilizations for flood response activities throughout northern Nevada in January and February of 2017. And second, this extraordinary event during this extraordinary year should encourage leaders and policy makers to ask if 2017 is truly an anomaly or if it represents a new normal for Nevada.

While the answer to this question is currently unknown, all will agree that vigilance is the only option for the future. At the statewide level, considering policy, budgetary, and operational lessons learned from this event for future implementation is the first and best way to remain vigilant. The recommendations included at the end of this report are intended to provide an initial baseline for the conversations going forward.

While these recommendations are broad and far-reaching, they aim to ensure public safety agencies in Nevada have all of the statutory tools necessary to maintain safe and livable communities in Nevada. In order to achieve this goal, the most important of these recommendations are aimed at ensuring that scant and diminishing resources from federal grants are used as efficiently as possible. It is the opinion of the co-authors that this should be done by prioritizing sustaining projects and building long-term capabilities.
IV. Historic Overview of Nevada Disasters from 1953

As seen in Figure 1, Nevada has experienced 67 federally-declared disasters since 1953. The vast majority of these incidents have been fire emergencies, which are often eligible for Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAG), which are declarations approved by the Regional Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Nevada will often experience multiple FMAG declarations a year, and Presidential Major Disaster Declarations have been much less common. As seen in Figure 2, disasters most commonly occur in Nevada in the month of July, which also likely corresponds to the FMAG declarations.

![Figure 1: Overview of Disasters in Nevada by type since 1953.](image1)

![Figure 2: Overview of Disasters in Nevada by month since 1953.](image2)
V. Overview of Nevada Disasters from SFY 2016

Emergencies and Disasters, SFY 16
(July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016)

TOTAL DECLARATIONS: 6

1) Multiple County Flash Flooding Event, July 3 – July 11, 2015: Thunder storms and flash flooding events occurred in Douglas County, Washoe County, Storey County, Lyon County, and Pershing County, all of which declared local emergencies.

2) City of Caliente Flash Flooding Event, July 15, 2015: On July 15, 2015, the City of Caliente declared a local emergency due to a major flash flooding event.

3) Lyon County and City of Yerington Joint Declaration in Anticipation of Flooding, September 25, 2015: The City of Yerington and Lyon County issued a joint emergency declaration in anticipation localized flooding.

4) Nye County Flash Flooding and Industrial Fire, October 18, 2015: Flooding and an industrial fire resulted in two local declarations and two state declarations.

5) Carlin Winter Storm, November 3-4, 2015: The City of Carlin approved a local declaration due to heavy snow that damaged local infrastructure.

6) Las Vegas New Year’s Eve Declaration, December 31, 2015: An emergency was declared by Governor Sandoval in order to ensure local governments had state support and all required resources to this significant tourism event.
VI. Overview of Nevada Disasters from SFY 2017

**Emergencies and Disasters, SFY 17**
(July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017)

1) Panaca Explosion, July 13 through July 15, 2016: Lincoln County and Governor Sandoval declared emergencies in response to this bombing.
2) Virginia Mountain Complex Fire, July 29 through August 6, 2016: Five separate near Pyramid Lake resulted in a tribal, state, and FMAG declarations.
3) Little Valley Fire, October 14 through October 18, 2016: This northern Nevada fire resulted in a county emergency declaration, a state declaration, and an FMAG.
4) Winter Flood, January 5 through January 14, 2017: This weather event resulted in declarations from five counties, three tribes, the Governor, and a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration and a Small Business Administration declaration.
5) Clark County Avalanche Threat, January 24 through January 14, 2017: Clark County filed a declaration for this event near Mt. Charleston.
6) February Flooding Event, February 5 through February 21, 2017: This weather event resulted in declarations from five counties, the Governor, and a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration and a Small Business Administration declaration.
7) Spring Thaw, February 21 through June 30, 2017: Preparing for major flooding in northern Nevada, multiple counties and tribes declared emergencies in order to ensure coordination and state support.
VII. An Unprecedented Year: Overview of Nevada Disasters from Calendar Year 2017

As described above through the description of emergencies and disasters in Nevada by fiscal year, calendar year 2017 appears to have been an extraordinary year in many respects. If considering only the pure numbers of disaster events in the state, 2017 would look like the two previous fiscal years examined here. However, it is the magnitude of the disasters and the consequences of the threats and hazards faced that truly make 2017 an extraordinary and even unprecedented year for the state.

There are a number of reasons that make 2017 an unprecedented year. First, never before has Nevada experienced two Presidential Major Disaster Declarations due to natural disasters in the same year, let alone for events in back to back months. Second, Nevada has never experienced as significant of a man-made disaster as the attack on the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival on October 1, 2017.

A full overview of the three most significant events of calendar year 2017 are provided below. Each overview begins with a general overview of the incident followed by specific details on major response and recovery activities. Again, these overviews are intended to be general in nature, with more specific AAR efforts to be developed in the future.

Overview of the January 2017 Flooding in Northern Nevada

Between January 5, 2017, and January 14, 2017, Nevada was impacted by a severe weather event caused by series of atmospheric rivers, resulting in record rainfall and record snowfall in northern Nevada. During this event, northern Nevada received half of its annual average rainfall, totaling 4.6 inches of 7.5 inches annually, and according to records, the eastern front of the Sierra Nevada Mountains near Lake Tahoe received 358 inches of snow when the average January snowfall is 74 inches. The combination of melting snow and unusually heavy rains resulted in widespread flooding along the rivers and urban flood prone areas in northern Nevada.

The flooding affected residents in the counties of Washoe, Douglas, Lyon, Storey, the City of Carson City, the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, and the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California. It caused damage to homes, property, and businesses, including areas within tribal jurisdictions. Water and debris damaged dozens of homes and businesses, flooded or washed out 88 county transportation routes and 20 state transportation routes, and required response all levels of government.

Many residents were instructed to shelter in place for multiple days due to closed transportation routes from the effects of flooding as well as the effects of unmanageable quantities of snow, including avalanche danger. Use of heavy equipment was necessary for debris removal, snow management, and the delivery of water, food, and various survival supplies to families who lost access to roads.
The counties of Washoe, Douglas, Lyon, Storey, the City of Carson City, the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, and the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California declared local emergencies, and in turn, requested assistance from the State of Nevada. A State Declaration of Emergency was issued on January 7, 2017, and amended on February 2, 2017, pursuant to state law, for the above listed city, counties, and tribes. This declaration activated state resources to assist local and tribal governments through the State Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), in accordance with Section 501(a) of the Stafford Act.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (FEMA Region IX) provided a team to assist Nevada in conducting local, state, tribal, and federal technical assistance and preliminary damage assessments (PDA). A joint team was assembled to conduct damage assessment on the affected areas. The joint damage assessment team met from January 30, 2017, through February 3, 2017, to survey the damaged areas and to estimate the costs to return the communities back to pre-disaster conditions.

The initial PDA analysis revealed that severe damage occurred to public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, culverts, buildings, equipment, utilities, and parks. At least 36 homes were seriously damaged throughout all of the counties and tribal jurisdictions assessed, and portions of 108 roads were damaged and needed to be repaired or cleared to allow for emergency responder access. There were permanent repairs, debris removal efforts and emergency protective measures on county roads as well as state and federal highways. Damages created by the severe winter storm, and resulting flooding, were of such severity and magnitude that effective response and recovery was beyond the capabilities of the State of Nevada and the affected communities. Federal assistance was necessary.

Response and Recovery

The response by public and private partners to the January 2017 winter storm event, and resulting flooding, reflected a well-coordinated, Whole Community approach to assisting disaster-impacted areas in Nevada. Local, state, and tribal officials issued emergency declarations and activated emergency operations plans. Public information announcements were coordinated utilizing television, radio, newspaper, and social media. Public safety organizations transmitted emergency and other data to ambulance crews, fire departments, law enforcement, public works, and other response units. State and local health departments provided technical assistance to ensure safe drinking water. Law enforcement, in conjunction with transportation officials, determined traffic movement restriction and coordinated safety support. Public works crews closed and flagged roads, and also determined the extent of damages. Fire crews and engineers assisted with impact assessments. Emergency managers coordinated resource requests and damage assessments in their respective communities, while the Division of Emergency Management coordinated support from State, Federal, and Volunteer agencies.

Following the announcement of the Presidential Major Disaster Declaration, Nevada
was eligible for grants under the Public Assistance Program and the Hazard Mitigation Program. These grant programs, administered by FEMA, provide reimbursement to local, state, and tribal governments to reimburse first response agencies for overtime, to rebuild public infrastructure, and to reinforce infrastructure to ensure that it is not damaged by future events of a similar nature. FEMA and DEM opened a joint field office to administer the millions of dollars in reimbursement grants for the affected area in March of 2017.

Additionally, on February 23, 2017, low-interest federal disaster loans were made available to Nevada businesses and residents affected by the severe winter storms, flooding, and mudslides that occurred January 5-14, 2017. SBA acted under its own authority to declare a disaster in response to a request in response to a request SBA received from Governor Brian Sandoval on February 22, 2017. This disaster declaration made SBA assistance available in Churchill, Humboldt, Lyon, Pershing, Storey and Washoe counties and Carson City in Nevada; Lassen, Modoc, Nevada, Placer and Sierra counties in California; and Harney and Lake counties in Oregon.

Overview of the February 2017 Flooding in Northern Nevada

February 2017 continued the trend of sustained above normal precipitation, especially for western and northern Nevada. Beginning on February 5, 2017, above normal precipitation continued across western Nevada including the Carson City, Reno, and Tahoe areas, and stretching across the northern quarter of the state. The northwestern portion of the state had precipitation totals of 150 percent of normal, with many areas exceeding 200-300 percent of normal precipitation, or more. Across the northern quarter of the state, most areas received up to 150 percent of normal precipitation, with a few areas exceeding 200 percent. Across much of western and northern Nevada, February was one of the top 10 percent wettest periods for the same month on record since 1895. Since the beginning of January, much of the state has seen above normal precipitation.

Except for the southeastern portion of the state, much of Nevada experienced precipitation amounts in excess of 150 percent of normal for the two month period. Areas near and around the Carson City, Reno, and Tahoe region saw precipitation totals of 200-400 percent of normal for the two month period. Across much of western and northern Nevada, this two-month period is the wettest January/February on record (since 1895). The continued very heavy rain and rapid succession of atmospheric river events came quickly after significant precipitation occurred throughout much of January. As a result, rivers, creeks, and streams swelled, and saturated soils that did not have time to recover. Response efforts associated with these declared events are ongoing.

Heavy snowfall also impacted higher elevations near Lake Tahoe, causing multiple avalanches that blocked roads and buried homes. Flooding affected residents in the counties of Washoe, Elko (including the South Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone), Humboldt, Douglas (including the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California), and the independent city of Carson City. It caused damage to homes, property, and businesses, including areas within tribal jurisdictions. Water and debris damaged
dozens of homes and businesses. At least 98 county transportation routes and 18 state transportation routes were flooded or washed out, engaging first response emergency agencies at all levels of government.

Many residents were impacted for multiple days due to closed transportation routes from the effects of flooding as well as the effects of unmanageable quantities of snow, including avalanche danger. Across northern Nevada, over 22 thousand homes were affected by 411 power outages of varying durations. Use of heavy equipment was necessary for debris removal, snow management, rock slides, and the delivery of water, food, and various survival supplies to families who lost access to roads.

The counties of Washoe, Douglas, Elko, and Humboldt, and the independent city of Carson City declared local emergencies, and in turn, requested assistance from the State of Nevada. A State Declaration of Emergency was issued on February 10, 2017, pursuant to state law, and was amended on March 2, 2017, for the above listed city and counties. This Declaration activated state resources to assist local and tribal governments through the State Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), in accordance with Section 501(a) of the Stafford Act.

A request for Direct Federal Assistance (DFA) in the form of technical assistance; de-watering/unwatering of inundated areas; protective action measures to address identified areas of concern throughout the affected area; mass care support for the survivors and impacted communities that may need to be evacuated and/or sheltered as direct result of the continued and forecasted impacts; the environmental impacts of the contaminated waters, vector and health issues of the actively rising flood waters in Lemmon Valley; and support for the various animals, including livestock and pets, was included in the request for a Federal Major Disaster Declaration from FEMA. Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation were also requested. A request for a Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Declaration was submitted to make low interest disaster loans available.

Response and Recovery

The response by public and private partners to the February 2017 winter storm event, and resulting flooding, emphasized the protection of lives, property, critical infrastructure, and the welfare of responders and reflected a well-coordinated, Whole Community approach to assisting disaster-impacted areas in Nevada. Local, state, and tribal officials issued emergency declarations and activated emergency operations plans. Public information announcements were coordinated utilizing television, radio, newspaper, and social media. Public safety organizations transmitted emergency and other data to ambulance crews, fire departments, law enforcement, public works, and other response units. State and local health departments provided technical assistance to ensure safe drinking water. Law enforcement, in conjunction with transportation officials, determined traffic movement restriction and coordinated safety support. Public works crews closed and flagged roads, and also determined the extent of damages. Fire crews and engineers assisted with impact assessments. Emergency managers
coordinated resource requests and damage assessments in their respective communities, while the Division of Emergency Management coordinated support from state, federal, and volunteer agencies.

Following the announcement of the Presidential Major Disaster Declaration, Nevada was once again eligible for grants under the Public Assistance Program and the Hazard Mitigation Program. Because FEMA and DEM had already established a joint field office, recovery efforts for this second disaster declaration were also coordinated out of the existing office. On March 21, 2017, low-interest federal disaster loans were made available to Washoe County businesses and residents affected by severe storms and flooding that occurred February 1-25, 2017. On May 25, 2017, low-interest loans were made available to businesses and residents in Elko, Eureka, Humboldt, Lander and White Pine counties in Nevada; Cassia, Owyhee and Twin Falls counties in Idaho; and Box Elder and Tooele counties in Utah.

Overview of the October 2017 Mass Shooting in Las Vegas

The incident of October 1, 2017 began as a reported active shooter directed toward the Route 91 Harvest country music festival from the 32nd floor of a high rise resort overlooking the event. The shooting resulted in 58 deceased victims and more than 800 injured. All local police, fire, and medical entities within the Las Vegas Valley responded. Hospitals are still treating patients for their injuries. In addition, two aviation fuel tanks located at McCarran International Airport were targeted by the gunman. Two bullet holes were found in one of the tanks, and the holes were quickly repaired.

Both incident command and Clark County Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) operations were quickly established, following existing plans, policies, and procedures for establishing situational awareness, agency notification, and resource management through mutual aid and inter-local agreements. The Last Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and Clark County Fire Department (CCFD) established Unified Command, and their activities were supported by the LVMPD Department Operations Center and the MACC. Incident Action Plans and Incident Support Plans were developed and followed. Initial priorities in the MACC focused on life safety, scene stabilization, and identification of the deceased and injured. Previous investments in and benefits derived from planning, training, exercises and equipment, mostly supported by homeland security grant funds, were clearly evident throughout the response phase of this incident.

Under the provisions of the Nevada Revised Statues Chapter 414 and Clark County Code Chapter 3.04 the Clark County, Nevada County Manager, Yolanda T. King, declared a State of Emergency on October 2, 2017. Per Nevada Revised Statute 414.070 Governor Brian Sandoval, declared a State of Emergency on October 2, 2017. Also, in accordance with NRS 439.973, the Governor also declared a Public Health and Medical Disaster on the same day. The State Emergency Operations Center was also activated in support of this event.
Medical Surge was coordinated in the Medical Surge Area Command (MSAC). Implementation of the MSAC followed the Clark County Medical Surge Plan, which is included in Annex H (Health and Medical) of the Clark County Emergency Operations Plan. Due to the high volume of injuries, locally available EMS resources were quickly depleted. Many injured individuals were transported by private citizens that stepped up to help those in need. Patient tracking was very challenging during the response and recovery portions of this incident, as patients were transported to hospitals throughout the valley and some went to their personal doctors or clinics.

Additionally, HIPAA regulations along with the high volume of patients complicated the efforts to provide accurate patient information. This did not result in any lower standards of care, but did complicate other areas of the recovery effort. The LVMPD and Medical Surge Area Command (MSAC) were both utilized to assist with patient tracking efforts. Clark County Mass Casualty Incident Plans and Mass Fatality Plans were implemented for this incident. The Coroner’s office coordinated resources, established the Family Assistance Center (FAC) for family reunification and notification, and identification, autopsies, and death certificate issuance on behalf of the deceased. The Coroner’s Office requested resources from within the state and outside the state due to the volume of the deceased and complexity of this incident. Nevada 211 was also quickly mobilized to assist with information gathering and dissemination.

Public messaging throughout response and recovery was led by LVMPD and Clark County, with support from FBI and other agencies. Public messaging throughout response and recovery has been led by LVMPD and Clark County, with support from FBI and other agencies. During the Response phase, coordination of Public Messaging and Media Contact was accomplished through the JIC. During the Recovery phase, multi-agency coordination of Public Messaging will be essential to increase public confidence in the recovery process both economically and emotionally.

**Response and Recovery**

In the initial hours following the incident, several locations had become points of reunification for those affected, including the headquarters for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the Thomas and Mack Center, and local hospitals. In
the earliest discussions, and formally by 2:00 in the morning on October 2, 2017, a decision was made at the Clark County MACC to stand up a Family Assistance Center (FAC) at the Las Vegas Convention Center (3150 Paradise Road). The Clark County Office of Emergency Management (COCOEM) played a primary role in establishing the FAC in conjunction with the Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner (CCOCME). Other agencies and organizations supported this effort, including an incident management team assembled by the CCMACC, the American Red Cross (ARC), the FBI, the Southern Nevada Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), representatives from the City of Orlando and San Bernardino, and representatives of the Sheriff's, and Coroner's office of Washoe County.

Under the Unified Command of Chief John Steinbeck and Coroner John Fudenberg, the FAC officially began providing services at 1:00 PM on October 2, 2017. However, a soft opening occurred earlier, the first families of victims arriving at approximately 9:15 AM. Public notification of the FAC was supported through the 211 system, the establishment of a Clark County call center, a Clark County web page for information on the family assistance center and donations at www.clarkcountynv.gov. A series of press releases were distributed and daily news conferences were organized to keep the media and the public informed of new developments and progress on the response and recovery efforts. The messaging encouraged those affected to seek available assistance.

For the first three days, the FAC functioned in 24 hour operational periods, primarily to provide the services of a Victim's Assistance Center (VAC). These purposes include the conducting of investigations to positively identify victims, provide notifications to next of kin, and to support the families of victims with crisis counseling services. Although other social services were being provided, it was on October 5, 2017, that the CCOCME had completed the work supported by the FAC and the center transitioned hours of operation open to the public from 10:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening, providing a wider and robust range of social services in accordance with the Clark County Emergency Operations Plan (CCEOP).

The services included, but were not limited to:

- Ground and air transportation
- Onsite childcare
- Lodging
- Crime victim benefits and compensation
- Legal aide
- Identification services
- Counseling and spiritual care
- Personal effects return
- Donation management (i.e. supplies and services)

These services were provided by agencies and organizations from the local, state and federal governments, as well as from the private and non-profit sectors. It was this level of support that quickly combined to form the short-term recovery response to the 1
October incident. The FAC maintained operations through Friday, October 20, and assisted over 4,200 individuals. The transition from the short-term recovery center (FAC) to a long-term “Vegas Strong Resiliency Center” was accomplished between October 20 and October 23, at which time the Vegas Strong Resiliency Center was open to the public. The Clark County Office of Emergency Management, with support from County Purchasing and Social Services, played a lead role in establishing the Resiliency Center prior to transfer of responsibility to Social Services.

Overview of Fire Activity in 2017

In addition to these major events, Nevada also experienced a difficult year of fire activity in 2017 as well. Several Fire Management Assistance Grants were approved in 2017, to include three in the month of July alone: the Cold Springs Fire (July 14, 2017), Oil Well Fire (July 17, 2017), and the Preacher Fire (July 24, 2017). The graphics below show how 2017’s fire activity corresponded to increased flooding in northern Nevada, and as a result, the statewide acreage burned was much higher in 2017 than in previous years.
VIII. Recommendations

The unprecedented nature of the emergencies and disasters in 2017 has had a tremendous impact on emergency management, preparedness, and capacity building throughout the state. The ability for communities, tribes, and state agencies to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all types was tested and largely proved to be effective. However, such events have also greatly depleted reserve capacities and capabilities, exposed operational challenges, and consumed valuable time and resources for long-term and strategic planning.

Because of all of these factors—the unprecedented series of events, the extraordinary success with which they were handled, and the challenges that have been realized—it is essential to take time to learn and better prepare communities across the state for the future. This learning takes lessons not only from the events highlighted below, but also from analysis that has been previously conducted by the Division of Emergency Management and its partners throughout the state. This report is intended to provide final recommendations following months of review, assessment, and outreach to partner organizations.

The list below includes three sets of recommendations. First, this report provides the initial seven recommendations approved by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security in February of 2018. Second, this report provides a narrative overview of the budgetary recommendations approved by the Commission at the same meeting. And finally, this report provides additional recommendations developed by the Co-Chairs throughout various review processes.

Initial Legislative Recommendations Approved by the Commission

The Co-Chairs developed an initial list of legislative recommendations to provide a foundation for this process, starting with the initial presentation in December of 2017 and continuing with the second presentation in January of 2018. These broad policy recommendations have been further refined throughout the development of the
Directive, Executive Order, and Budgetary policies submitted during the February meeting. The recommendations below were approved by a vote of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security at its February 2018 meeting.

- **Recommendation 1**: Create funding override capabilities for the state’s Emergency Assistance Account (EAA) and Disaster Relief Account (DRA). This budgetary change would be further enhanced if statutes were changed to address the ways in which money can be transferred from the DRA to the EAA. Additionally, reestablish the Individual Assistance (IA) program at the state level as a category within the DRA.

- **Recommendation 2**: Require DEM to provide an annual report to the Nevada Department of Education, the Public Utilities Commission, and the Gaming Control Board regarding the status of compliance with emergency response plans for entities under their jurisdiction or oversight.

- **Recommendation 3**: Establish a deployable statewide Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT). This on-call team would serve in a reserve capacity, activated during emergencies and at the request of local, state, or tribal jurisdictions.

- **Recommendation 4**: Establish a deployable Disaster Assistance Response Team through Nevada Volunteers/AmeriCorps.

- **Recommendation 5**: Allow the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security to have one bill draft request for each legislative session. This would not only allow the Commission to have a distinct voice in the policy development process, but it would also ensure that state-level policy evolves as the landscape and environment evolves.

- **Recommendation 6**: Establish statutory provisions for licensure of out-of-state, private medical practitioners during emergencies and disasters.

- **Recommendation 7**: Require DEM to create regulations for all DEM grants.

**Budget Recommendations**

Calendar year 2017, given its unprecedented number of emergencies and disasters for local, state, and tribal partners in Nevada, produced even more opportunities to examine policy, processes, and partnerships. The ability for communities, tribes, and state agencies to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all types was tested and largely proved to be effective. However, such events have also greatly depleted reserve capacities and capabilities, exposed operational challenges, and consumed valuable time and resources for long-term and strategic planning.
Because of all of these factors—the unprecedented series of events, the extraordinary success with which they were handled, and the challenges that have been realized—it was essential to take time to learn and better prepare communities across the state for the future. Specific recommendations were developed and presented to the state’s homeland security commission, including estimated costs for the proposed recommendations that had budgetary impacts. Some of the recommendations could be implemented fairly quickly through directive of the commission or executive order by the Governor, while others would need to be submitted during the upcoming state budget build process for consideration during the legislative session. And then a few would require long term planning over the course of many years. For example, the recommendation to build a regional emergency operations center in southern Nevada is estimated at about $16 million and will obviously require multi-jurisdictional planning and much more time to realize.

Because of these variances, the recommendations were narrowed to more of a realistic set of priorities in order to determine a cost for full implementation over the next biennium, estimated at $6.7 million. The main recommendation in the list proposed a scenario that would allow the division to pass through additional emergency preparedness grant funds totaling approximately $2 million per state fiscal year to local and tribal partners. This may not be entirely possible in practice, as local and tribal partners may not be able to meet the matching requirements that would come with additional funds. If this were implemented, its purpose would not be to increase the division’s service level; but instead it would allow local and tribal partners to increase their capacity and resources at the local level, which is where all emergencies start in the first place.

All the other priorities allowed the division to add additional resources and capacity on multiple fronts and in turn would increase service levels statewide, such as allocating new state general fund appropriations to reestablish the position of a Deputy Chief within the division (approx. $150,000 per year), fund the state search and rescue program required in statute (approx. $72,500 per year), and build out a planning, training, and exercise program in southern Nevada (approx. $465,000 per year). It also included proposals to establish statewide incident management assistance teams (approx. $200,000 per year) and additional staff to support the state’s homeland security process and the disaster recovery section (approx. $470,000 per year).

The additional state investment in emergency management and homeland security would be a major shift in Nevada’s commitment. Currently, the division’s budget is approximately 90 percent grant funded and 10 percent state general fund. This causes a number of challenges for the agency with respect to matching funds and so on, but it presents the biggest challenge to local jurisdictions by denying them resources that could be used to build local capacity. Increasing the state general fund allocation over the biennium would be a progressive step to pass through additional funds to our local and tribal partners, while also strengthening the division’s position in regards to grant matching requirements and relying less on the in-kind match donations from our partners.
Additional Legislative Recommendations Developed by the Co-Chairs

NRS 414 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Include in the Governor’s disaster powers the ability to temporarily change laws.

NRS 414.060, which covers the powers and duties of Governor during an emergency or disaster, allows the Governor to “make, amend and rescind the necessary orders and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter within the limits of the authority conferred upon the Governor in this chapter, with due consideration of the plans provided by the Federal Government.” A strict reading of this means that the Governor cannot temporarily change laws if necessary during a disaster, a power that the Governor should have in order to protect life and property throughout the state. This recommendation would change existing statute to allow the Governor to temporarily change laws during a declared emergency or disaster.

Recommendation 2: Combine the Board of Search and Rescue and the Committee on Training in Search and Rescue into a single public body, and modify other duties as well.

NRS 414.170 establishes the State Board of Search and Rescue and NRS 414.220 establishes the Committee on Training in Search and Rescue. The Division of Emergency Management has the responsibility to manage these boards as well as to appoint a Coordinator of Search and Rescue to perform various duties. This recommendation calls for combining the State Board of Search and Rescue and the Committee on Training in Search and Rescue, while also combining their duties.

NRS 414.210 requires that the Coordinator of Search and Rescue “identify, inventory and coordinate resources available for searches and rescues.” This recommendation calls for removing this requirement since it is duplicated under the inventory requirements of the Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid System, which is established in NRS 414A. In order to ensure that this requirement is not lost, however, it might also be beneficial to add specific language for identifying, inventorying, and coordinating search and rescue resources within NRS 414A as well.

NRS 414.210 also requires that the Coordinator of Search and Rescue “maintain statistics regarding searches and rescues.” NRS 248.092 places the responsibility for searches and rescues with county sheriffs, but it does not require sheriffs to provide statistics to the Coordinator of Search and Rescue. This requirement should either be removed from the Coordinator of Search and Rescue’s responsibilities, or a reporting requirement should be added to NRS 248.092 in order to ensure that accurate statistics can be compiled and maintained.
NRS 239C Recommendations

Recommendation 3: Establish the position of Homeland Security Advisor in law.

The Division of Emergency Management oversees the Office of Homeland Security. The Chief of Emergency Management is also designated as the Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor, though duties and responsibilities for this position are not established in law. This recommendation calls for establishing the position of Homeland Security Advisor and outlining its duties in statute.

Recommendation 4: Establish the Nevada Threat Analysis Center, while providing for an advisory committee, and confidentiality of certain information in law.

The Department of Public Safety Division’s Division of Investigations includes the Nevada Threat Analysis Center. The Nevada Threat Analysis Center is a key state homeland security resource in our state, however, it is not established in statute. This recommendation calls for establishing the Nevada Threat Analysis Center in statute and providing it with an advisory body. Due to the sensitive nature of the Nevada Threat Analysis Center’s work, the advisory body should be able to hold meetings that are closed to the public, and information that the Center develops should be considered confidential.

Recommendation 5: Require NTAC to provide an annual threat assessment.

In order to support statewide threat assessment activity, the Nevada Threat Analysis Center should also be required to develop and present an annual threat assessment to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security during a closed session.

IX. Conclusion

This report is intended to partially fulfill the requirements of Executive Order 2018-4, signed by Governor Brian Sandoval in March of 2018. The Executive Order requires the Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group to develop final legislative recommendations ahead of the 2019 Legislative Session. Together with four other reports and recommendations, this report provides recommended solutions to identified gaps and challenges in Nevada law, in emergency management operations, and otherwise.

As a part of the overall final report to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, the recommendations included in this report are intended to be high level and conceptual. Over the months ahead, various groups will have opportunities to provide input on how to operationalize these recommendations without creating additional gaps and challenges. Finally, the Nevada State Legislature will have the final opportunity to consider all of the recommendations throughout the legislative process.
Together with the four other reports and recommendations, this report continues in the effort to transition Nevada’s emergency management and homeland security focus to one that is based on resilience. As such, they call for change in specific areas. Often, change is considered to be difficult, especially when multiple jurisdictions, systems, and agencies are involved. The authors of this report ask for consideration of these changes with an open mind, and encourage an ongoing dialog to refine them as much as possible.
APPENDIX: EXECUTIVE ORDER 2018-4
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEVADA'S STATEWIDE RESILIENCE STRATEGY

WHEREAS, Nevada experienced unprecedented emergencies and disasters during calendar year 2017;

WHEREAS, these incidents resulted in disruption and tragedy throughout Nevada, however, they also displayed Nevada's commitment to recovery and to building a stronger Nevada based on lessons learned from these incidents;

WHEREAS, Nevada's 2016 strategic plan, "Generations to Come: Nevada's Strategic Planning Framework," called for Nevada's emergency management vision to align with nationally-established resilience models;

WHEREAS, the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group was created by an Executive Order issued on March 3, 2008, and amended by Executive Order 2011-31 in December 15, 2011, and again by Executive Order 2015-32 on November 16, 2015;

WHEREAS, pursuant to these Executive Orders, the Chief of the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management and the Chair of the Las Vegas Urban Area serve as the Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group;

WHEREAS, Nevada's lessons learned from its unprecedented year, its commitment to recovering fully, and its established policy development and implementation framework through the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group can be combined to build and implement a plan for building statewide resilience; and

WHEREAS, Article 5, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution provides: "The supreme executive of this State, shall be vested in a Chief Magistrate who shall be Governor of the State of Nevada."

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as the Governor by the Constitution and laws of the State of Nevada, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall continue working to recover from the unprecedented events of 2017, expand the existing foundation for statewide preparedness, and align efforts for increased resilience ahead of the 2019 legislative and budget cycles. The Division of Emergency Management shall staff the processes outlined below under the direction of the Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group and under the guidance and oversight of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security.

2. Effective immediately, the Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall ensure that various grant sources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible in order to best recover from the emergencies and disasters in Nevada in 2017. This should include the following efforts:

a. Appointing a reduced number of members of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group for the 2018 Homeland Security Grant Program cycle, all of whom are voting members, in order to ensure focus on sustained efforts, addressing immediate needs, and maintaining an efficient process. Unless they are representing agencies or regions that have not previously been appointed, appointees for the 2018 cycle will be members who have served on the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group previously, and all shall be notified of their appointment or reappointment by the Co-Chairs. Appointees may include representatives of the following jurisdictions, areas, or organizations:

   1. DPS, Division of Emergency Management;
ii. Clark County Office of Emergency Management;
iii. Inter-Tribal Council;
iv. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department;
v. City of Las Vegas;
vi. City of Henderson;
vii. City of North Las Vegas;
viii. Washoe County;
ix. Washoe County Sheriff’s Office;
x. Northeastern Nevada;
xi. Southwestern Nevada;
xii. Western Nevada;
xiii. Central Nevada;
xiv. Office of Cyber Defense Coordination;
xv. Nevada National Guard;
xvi. McCarran International Airport; and,

b. The Co-Chairs shall develop a prioritized list of specific needs ahead of the 2018 Homeland Security Grant Program cycle, which is to be based on recommendations developed during the ongoing after action review processes for events in 2017. Additionally, the Co-Chairs shall develop a prioritized list of homeland security capacities and capabilities that currently exist and are essential for sustainment for funding for the 2018 grant cycle. The Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall consider these priorities when developing their recommendations to the Finance Committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security.

c. The policies and procedures of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group as established and amended through Executive Orders shall otherwise remain in effect.

3. The Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall build upon the existing foundation for statewide preparedness and the vision for statewide resilience by developing and updating plans for and implementing the following efforts:

a. The Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management shall update the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan as well as the Response and Recovery Guide with review and input from federal, state, tribal, local, private sector, and non-profit partners by September 15, 2018.

b. Directors of state-level Department shall provide updates regarding capabilities to the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management regarding services and resources available during emergencies.

c. The Co-Chairs shall develop and implement a training program for the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and the Response and Recovery Guide for Directors and identified key leaders for Department-level agencies within state government to be completed by December 31, 2018.

d. The Co-Chairs shall develop and implement a training program for the State Recovery Framework and agency roles during activation as Recovery Support Functions for Directors and identified key leaders for Department-level agencies within state government to be completed by December 31, 2018.

e. Under the authority of NRS 414.300, the Co-Chairs shall develop regulations for information sharing protocols for HIPAA-protected information and Personally Identifiable Information between federal, state, tribal, local, private sector, and non-profit partners during emergencies. These regulations shall include training requirements for state and local agencies to ensure understanding of the information sharing protocols.

f. The Co-Chairs shall also establish a state-specific certification standard for emergency managers in the state.

4. The Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall develop for approval by the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security a five-year resilience strategy to align statewide emergency management and homeland security initiatives through the following efforts:

a. Working with federal, state, tribal, local, private sector, and non-profit partners, the Co-Chairs of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group shall provide a statewide resilience strategy to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security no later than July 1, 2018. The statewide resilience strategy shall include at a minimum the following items:
i. Proposals for streamlining the numerous commissions, boards, and committees that advise the Division of Emergency Management through the creation of a statewide resilience commission.

ii. Proposals for streamlining various grant processes that impact emergency management and homeland security.

iii. Proposals for incentivizing local partners through grants and other preparedness opportunities to engage in local resilience models.

iv. Proposals for a regional approach to resilience and preparedness, to include recommendations to fund a Regional Emergency Operations Center in the Las Vegas Urban Area.

v. Proposals for partnership with institutions within the Nevada System of Higher Education.


e. The Co-Chairs will work with both Fusion Centers within the state to develop a joint threat assessment by November 15, 2018.

f. The Co-Chairs shall provide the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment for both the state and the Las Vegas Urban Area, as well as the State Preparedness Report to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security no later than December 31, 2018. These reports shall include specific reports by local, state, and tribal agencies, and shall coincide with the final report of the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of Nevada to be affixed at the State Capitol in Carson City, this 12th day of March, in the year two thousand eighteen.

[Signature]
Governor of the State of Nevada

By the Governor:

[Signature]
Secretary of State

[Signature]
Deputy Secretary of State
Report of the Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid System

Nevada Division of Emergency Management and Office of Homeland Security
June 25, 2018
I. Executive Summary

This report serves as the annual report of the Division of Emergency Management to the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee, as required by Nevada Administrative Code Chapter 414A. These regulations were established pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 414A, which established the Intrastate Mutual Aid System through Assembly Bill 90 during the 2015 legislative session. Similar to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact on a national level, the Intrastate Mutual Aid System provides a legal framework for local, tribal, and state jurisdictions to share resources during emergencies and disasters, whether they are declared or not.

This report intends to accomplish two objectives. The first objective is to fulfill the report requirement established in NAC 414A by providing an overview of the administration of the Intrastate Mutual Aid System throughout State Fiscal Year 2018. This includes providing a high-level picture of the current state of implementation of the system, as well as the in-state and out-of-state deployment of resources. The second objective of this report, which is also required by NAC 414A, is to provide recommendations from the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee for ways to improve mutual aid systems going forward.

Regarding the first objective, Nevada had an active year for emergencies and disasters in State Fiscal Year 18. During this period, Nevada experienced a significant mass shooting incident in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017, which required the coordination of mutual aid from local, state, and federal resource providers. In addition to this declared event, Nevada’s Division of Emergency Management also coordinated resources and information in response to over 260 non-declared emergency incidents.

Based on lessons learned from providing mutual aid assistance during these various declared and non-declared events, the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee approved a number of recommendations for future improvements. The committee chose to focus on coordinating health care resources during an emergency event, primarily due to the perceived effectiveness of the current Intrastate Mutual Aid System. Based on five presentations made during the committee’s June 2018 meeting, the members voted to approve fourteen general recommendations, including allowing the Governor to waive licensing requirements for health care practitioners during an incident, coordinating volunteer health-providers, extending liability exemptions for those responding in accordance to the state Crisis Standards of Care plan, establishing a requirement for a Disaster Behavioral Health Plan, and finally, repurposing the State Disaster Identification Team to serve as a coordinating body for the appropriate sharing of HIPAA-protected information in support of a local or tribal jurisdictions when responding to an emergency.
This report, and its recommendations, will be included in the overall set of legislative and policy recommendations made to the Commission on Homeland Security by the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group. These recommendations are required by Executive Order 2018-4, and are intended to provide general legislative concepts that will be refined throughout the remainder of calendar year 2018. The recommendations included in this report are similarly intended to be conceptual in nature, and to be refined in the months ahead.

II. Introduction

Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 414A, which establishes the creation of the Intrastate Mutual Aid System (IMAS or System), and the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee (IMAC or Committee) within the State of Nevada, was first established in 2015 through Assembly Bill 90 (AB90). The IMAS allows for the coordination of mutual aid during times of emergency. This coordination is done through the Division of Emergency Management (DEM), and requires DEM to maintain records that identify inventory local jurisdictions have that could be provided to other jurisdictions and political subdivisions within the state during these times of emergency. The IMAS is implemented through the Intrastate Mutual Aid System Policy and Operating Procedures. The purpose of these procedures is to provide for systematic mobilization, organization, and operation of all resources available for mutual aid in the state. These resources are crucial to the efforts of political subdivisions and tribal nations in mitigating the effects of emergencies or disasters.

Participation in the IMAS is mandatory for all state agencies per the statute; however, an opt-out provision is included, which requires each public agency to withdraw by resolution and provide notice to DEM and to the Governor. To date, no public agencies in the state have requested to opt out of the IMAS. Federally-recognized Indian tribes and nations have the opportunity opt in pursuant to the same statute and participate in the IMAS; this is done by a resolution of their governing bodies and notice to DEM and to the Governor. To date, four tribes have opted in.

The statute lists certain responsibilities for both the requesting and assisting participants. These responsibilities include allowing requesting participants to request aid before, during, or after a declared or undeclared incident, and to adequately describe the resources needed. Other requirements include the assisting participants to promptly respond to a request of assistance unless it would prevent that jurisdiction from carrying out its duties. They also require proper documentation for reimbursements for costs incurred by the assisting participant, and adequate insurance and workers compensation policies for those responders and vehicles/equipment involved. Requests may be made through DEM or directly to another participant or participants when an urgent response is needed, and after all of their respective local automatic aid and mutual aid agreements are exhausted, unless no other automatic or mutual aid agreements exist.
NRS 414A requires the IMAC to consist of 19 members, and its role is to develop comprehensive guidelines and procedures regarding requesting assistance, record keeping of those requests, as well as the process for reimbursement between jurisdictions and other political subdivisions. The committee provides DEM with ongoing input regarding the establishment of policies and procedures, which include the following:

1. Receipt of request for mutual aid
2. Requirements for training and exercising participants
3. Deployment of resources in support of a request for mutual aid
4. Redeployment of resources to this State following the support of a request for mutual aid

DEM is required to coordinate with county and tribal emergency managers to evaluate their status of participation within the System annually. This requires outreach to those emergency managers regarding any updates to the policies and procedures as recommended by the Committee. These policies and procedures are reviewed annually and the Committee is required to make recommendations to the Chief of DEM for any improvements in the administration of the System. The statute also requires DEM to develop regulations for the administration of the IMAS, and the regulations developed through the input of the IMAC require DEM to provide a report to the committee no later than June 30th each year. This report must include updates on the following items:

1. Information relating to declared emergencies and disasters in Nevada during the fiscal year
2. Information relating to undeclared emergencies and disasters in Nevada that were monitored by DEM during the fiscal year
3. Information relating to resources that were requested through the System and fulfilled within Nevada during the fiscal year and the status of those requests
4. An update, in the form of a financial report, on the status of reimbursements of the costs of requests described in paragraph three (3), above
5. Information relating to resources that were requested through the System by other states and fulfilled through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact during the fiscal year and the status of those requests
6. Information relating to the status of Nevada’s inventory of resources for responses to emergencies

In order to achieve its purpose, the members of the IMAC were appointed from various geographic parts of the state, disciplines and perspectives. Committee membership, for instance, includes representatives from the Nevada National Guard, Civil Air Patrol, local government agencies, local firefighting agencies, local health districts, tribal nations, and state and local emergency management. The following representatives from these disciplines and jurisdictions serve as appointed members of the IMAC:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Committee Position</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caleb Cage</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Nevada Division of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Neal</td>
<td>Vice-Chair</td>
<td>Clark County School District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Burger</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Nevada Highway Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Byrom</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Truckee Meadows Water Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tod Carlini</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>East Fork Fire Protection Dist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Christensen</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Washoe Tribe of NV and CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Brett Compston</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Nevada National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Allen</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Humboldt County Sheriff’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeanne Freeman</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Carson City Health &amp; Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Goss</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Clark County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Heidemann</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Churchill County Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Hourihan</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Inter-Tribal Emergency Response Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Hunter</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>ITERC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Hynds</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>City of Henderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Lee</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Lincoln County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Carol Lynn</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Civil Air Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Page</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Lyon County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Steinbeck</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Clark County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Bollier</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Nevada Division of Forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tom Ely</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Nevada Highway Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Members</strong></td>
<td><strong>Role</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samantha Ladich</td>
<td>Legal Counsel</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. SFY2018 Declared Emergencies or Disasters

Nevada had only one declared emergency within State Fiscal Year 2018. A brief overview of this incident is provided below:

- **1 October Mass Casualty Incident – Clark County:** On the night of Sunday, October 1, 2017, a gunman fired more than 1,100 rounds at concert goers at the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival on the Las Vegas Strip, leaving 58 people dead and 851 injured. This mass casualty incident is the deadliest mass shooting by an individual to date in the United States.

IV. SFY2018 Undeclared Emergencies or Disasters monitored by DEM

Emergencies are monitored by the DEM Duty Officers who work on one-week rotations. So far in State Fiscal Year 2018, the DEM Duty Officers have monitored and/or assisted in 261 incidents which have not risen to the level of a declared emergency. DEM Duty Officers were not informed of any incidents by tribal nations this fiscal year.

The most common incident types monitored by DEM Duty Officers were:

1. Wildfire
2. Search and Rescue
3. Hazardous Materials Regulatory Reporting
The charts below offer a statistical breakdown of the incidents monitored by the DEM Duty Officers:

DEM Duty Officer Calls - by County
Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid – No reimbursements requested or required SFY 2018 – 178 – as of June 22, 2018
Statistical Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th># of Incidents</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carson City</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churchill</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>Public Safety &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elko</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esmeralda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lander</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Flood - Flash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Active Assailant</td>
<td>Flood - Flash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washoe</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Pine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 of 17 Counties</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** There were no requests for reimbursement for any of the mutual aid requests covered in this table.
Out of State Responses Coordinated by
DEM Duty Officers – Types of resources provided
SFY 2018 – 83 – As of June 22, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># of Responses</th>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Type of Resource Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>VSP - Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>DEM Virtual Search Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Engines, Overhead, NVNG Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
<td>NVNG CST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hurricane</td>
<td>NVNG Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Engines &amp; Overhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>VSP - Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>DEM Virtual Search Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Engines &amp; Overhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wildfire</td>
<td>Overhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>DEM Virtual Search Planning</td>
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A breakdown of the various types of support in and out of state is provided in the slides below:

[Image: DEM Duty Officer Calls - by County]

Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid – No reimbursements requested or required
SFY 2018 - 178 – As of June 22, 2018
EMAC Responses – Nevada as Requesting State
SFY 2018 – As of June 22, 2018

- California:
  1 October Incident: $31,543 (Paid in full)

- Florida:
  1 October Incident: Costs Waived by Florida

- Colorado:
  1 October Incident: $2,883 (Pending Documentation)

- New York:
  1 October Incident: Costs Waived by New York

- Arizona:
  - Presidential DR 4303 & 4307
  - Winter Storms & Flooding: $28,773 (Paid in full)

EMAC Responses – Nevada as Assisting State
Deployment of Nevada National Guard resources
SFY 2018 – As of June 22, 2018

- California:
  - Napa Area Wildfire Support: $36,826 (Paid in full)

- Florida:
  - Hurricane Irma: No Costs Incurred

- Oregon:
  - Wildfire: $75,395 (Paid in full)

- Puerto Rico:
  - Hurricane Maria: $114,363 (No reimbursement to date)

- Texas:
  - Hurricane Harvey: $329,120 (Partial payment of $246,840 received)
V. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Deployments

EMAC deployments are coordinated through the emergency management agencies of the states involved. Below is a list of the EMAC resource requests from Nevada to other states and the requests from other states filled by the State of Nevada:

- **Nevada as the Requesting State**
  - 6 Requests total
  - 5 for the 1 October Mass Casualty Incident
    - California – Medical Examiner/Coroner (San Bernardino)
      - 4 people
      - 9 days
      - Billed $19,940 by CA. Paid in full 05/21/2018
    - California – Medical Examiner/Coroner (Los Angeles)
      - 4 people
      - 3 days
      - Billed $11,603 by CA. Paid in full 05/30/2018
    - Colorado – Medical Examiner/Coroner
      - 1 person
      - 3 days
      - Billed $2883 by CO. Not yet paid due pending additional documentation requested from CO.
    - New York – Medical Examiner/Coroner
      - 3 people
      - 6 days
      - No cost to Nevada
    - Florida – Legal Assistance
      - 3 people
      - 6 days
      - No cost to Nevada
  - 1 for DR 4303 & 4307 – 2017 Winter Storms/Flooding
    - Arizona - Recovery Public Assistance Specialist
      - Although the incident was prior to this fiscal year, this recovery person was requested and supplied during this fiscal year.
      - 1 person
      - 63 days
      - Billed $28,233 by AZ. Paid in full 01/18/2018

- **Nevada as Assisting State**
  - Nevada has provided assistance to other states with 5 deployments within State Fiscal Year 2018.
  - All deployments were Nevada National Guard resources.
    - Texas – Hurricane Harvey
      - Ch-47 with 4 personnel
      - 9 days
      - $329,120
• DEM has received a partial payment of $246,840 from TX.
  • DEM is still owed $82,280.
• Florida – Hurricane Irma
  o Joint Incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC) Unit and Sustainment Personnel
  o 31 days
  o This was a DOD deployment. Florida asked DEM to create an EMAC request for tracking purposes only.
• Puerto Rico – Hurricane Maria
  o Joint Incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC) Unit and Sustainment Personnel
  o 60 days
  o $114,363
    • DEM has received no reimbursement to date.
• Oregon – Wildfire (Whitewater Fire)
  o Type 1 Helicopter with Medevac qualified crew
  o 17 days
  o $75,395
    • DEM has received full payment.
• California – Wildfire Evacuation Communications Support
  o Joint Incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC) Unit and Sustainment Personnel
  o 24 days
  o $36,826
    • DEM has received payment in full.

VI. Tribal Participation – Opt In

Tribal nations are not automatically included as members of the Intrastate Mutual Aid System. Tribal nations must choose to opt in to the system by resolution of their Tribal Councils. Those tribal nations that have opted in to date are:

• Reno-Sparks Indian Colony
• Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
• Yerington Paiute Tribe
• Shoshone-Paiute Tribe of Duck Valley

VII. Political Subdivision – Opt Out

Political Subdivision within Nevada are automatically included in the Intrastate Mutual Aid System, however they may choose to be removed as members through a process of opting out. To date, no political subdivisions have opted out of the IMAS.
Resource Inventory Status

- Fire resources available for mutual aid are inventoried each year at the beginning of the fire season. The SFY2018 inventory was completed in May of 2018.
- DEM conducted initial meetings with Storey County in May of 2018 to develop resource inventory. Over the next six months, DEM staff is arranging individual meetings with each county to assist in the development or update of their mutual aid resource inventory.

VIII. Outreach

The Division of Emergency Management has performed the following outreach activities to promote knowledge of the Intrastate Mutual Aid System, as well as to lay the groundwork for use of the system by Nevada’s political subdivisions.

- Presentation to Nevada Association of Counties – August 2017
- Presentation to Nevada Preparedness Summit – February 2018
- Quarterly Update to Northern Nevada Fire Chiefs Assn. – July, October, January, April
- Presentation to Nevada Sheriffs and Chiefs Assn. – February 2018
- Presentation to the Nevada State Firefighters Assn – June 2018
- Meetings of the Intrastate Mutual Aid Committee and its subcommittee – Ongoing

IX. Recommendations

During the March 28, 2018 IMAC meeting, the committee members reviewed a draft outline for this report and offered input on how to build the outline into the final version of the report. Based on the success of the IMAS in the previous fiscal year, the IMAC members agreed to hold an additional meeting on June 4, 2018, during which time they would focus on ways to improve mutual aid for health care practitioners and facilities in the state. During the June meeting, the IMAC heard presentations on the mutual aid components of providing health care during an emergency, and the presentations resulted in various recommendations, which are provided below. It is important to note that the recommendations are intended to be general in nature, and that they are not presented here as specific legislative language.

Through these presentations, the IMAC engaged in a lengthy discussion about what improvements could be made, and whether those changes should be in the form of amendments to existing statutes or through other policy changes. These recommendations were based largely on lessons learned from the 1 October mass casualty incident, although some were based on a broader scope of experiences. The IMAC members voted to approve the recommendations listed below for inclusion in this report with the understanding that this report would be included in the state legislative recommendations presented to the Commission on Homeland Security as required by Executive Order 2018-4.
Christopher Lake, Nevada Hospital Association, provided a presentation on the subject of licensure reciprocity for medical professionals during emergencies and disasters. Specifically, Lake’s presentation provided an overview of the Inter-Hospital Master Mutual Aid Agreement (MMAA), including its purpose, its history, its uses, and how reimbursements are made between participating facilities. An important aspect of the MMAA is that it is an agreement between private facilities, and therefore, it is not included in the Nevada Intrastate Mutual Aid System.

Even though it is an independent system, Lake’s presentation noted that the MMAA could be improved through legislation. In particular, he discussed how the MMAA was used during the 1 October incident, and some of the barriers that private hospitals faced in responding. In particular, through internal assessments, hospitals in Nevada learned that they could benefit from bringing in a full spectrum of specialized medical teams, including surgical teams, mental health professionals, pharmacists, specialized nursing staff, radiology technicians, and others to help provide necessary resources during an emergency or disaster. These teams and similar resources could also come from hospitals outside of Nevada. In order to accomplish this, the IMAC voted to approve the following recommendation:

**Recommendation #1:** In the event of a public health emergency or a disaster declared by the Nevada Governor, the Governor should have explicit authority to temporarily waive licensing requirements and to grant temporary reciprocity to all medical providers, allied health professions, and others who work within a licensed hospital system that currently operates within Nevada for the declared period of the incident. Out of state practitioners could also receive temporary waivers if their specialties or services are specifically requested by a licensed hospital system that currently operates within Nevada. In order to implement this recommendation, the Division of Emergency Management and the Nevada Hospital Association should work with DHHS’s Public Health Preparedness section to develop procedures for coordinating and processing the out-of-state medical professionals listed above upon their arrival to and departure from the state to support the specific incident.

Jeanne Freeman, Carson City Health and Human Services, provided a presentation on the topic of enhancing a statewide database that is intended to honor background checks for medical professionals across county lines during emergencies and disasters. After providing an overview of current volunteer practices and policies in Nevada, Freeman listed a number of challenges and promising opportunities. She also provided the recommendations below, which are intended to improve the coordination of every kind of licensed and vetted medical professionals through mutual aid from county to county.

**Recommendation #2:** The State of Nevada should improve collaboration with allied health boards and health-related member organizations to communicate the need for, and role of, volunteers during an emergency or disaster, to establish a process for an automatic opt-in for service when licensed, the
importance of training and exercising the issuance of special volunteer medical licenses pursuant to NRS 630.258, and discuss opportunities to join national compact agreements.

**Recommendation #3:** The State of Nevada should improve collaboration with the mental and behavioral health professional community by creating a tool defining the training and capability for each professional category; identifying and providing training and exercise opportunities professionals need during disaster response, and creating a list of professionals ready to support disaster response.

**Recommendation #4:** The State of Nevada should improve planning for the use of volunteer health professionals as part of the Statewide Resilience Commission, identifying how volunteers would best be utilized in a local, regional, and/or statewide emergency, and establishing minimum criteria for the vetting of volunteers to be used in an emergency.

Malinda Southard, Nevada Department of Health and Human Services’ Public Health Preparedness program, provided a presentation on the structures and protocols for coordinating standards of care during crises. Nevada’s Crisis Standards of Care plan was developed in 2017 in order to prepare for health care needs during a pervasive or catastrophic disaster. The plan is activated when contingency surge response strategies (resource sparing strategies) have been or will be exhausted, and crisis medical care must be provided for a sustained period of time. In order to align the implementation of the Crisis Standards of Care plan with current liability exemptions, Southard suggested the following statutory change.

**Recommendation #5:** NRS 414.110 provides for immunity and exemptions for certain people or entities that are participating in emergency or disaster response, including the state, its political subdivisions, and certain licensed professionals. This statute should be amended to include the same immunity for any person working in good faith under crisis standards of care adopted by the State Chief Medical Officer, or any person involved in creating said crisis standards of care. This immunity is specifically from liability for the death of, or injury to persons, or for damage to property, to themselves or others, as a result of any such activity.

Stephanie Woodard, Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, provided a presentation on supporting a Disaster Behavioral Health Plan for Nevada. Woodard’s presentation stated that disasters are often unpredictable and can have far-reaching impacts, but that people and communities are also resilient. Some survivors of disasters may not experience post traumatic stress, while others may need support months after the incident. There are, however, effective interventions communities and organizations can use to promote healthy coping, address needs, and provide on-going support. Establishing a recovery process for individuals, communities, and systems requires planning and collaboration. Doing so is a long process, but one that can result in healthier places to live and work. In order to address this need, Woodard proposed the
following statutory changes.

**Recommendation #6:** The State of Nevada should require the establishment of a Disaster Behavioral Health Plan and require that it is reviewed and updated annually.

**Recommendation #7:** The State of Nevada should establish Psychological First Aid standards and training requirements.

Finally, John Steinbeck, Clark County Office of Emergency Management, and Caleb Cage, Nevada’s Division of Emergency Management, provided a presentation on developing protocols for sharing HIPAA-protected information during emergencies or disasters. This presentation focused on challenges related to sharing HIPAA-protected information during the 1 October incident in Las Vegas, as well as efforts to address some of those challenges. One of those solutions is required by Executive Order 2018-4 signed by Governor Sandoval, which requires Steinbeck and Cage to develop regulations through the State Disaster Identification Team (SDIT), which is established through NRS 414.

The SDIT is a current body within DEM, which is activated in support of local, state, or tribal emergencies or disasters where victim identification is required. According to NRS 414.280, the duties of the SDIT consist of providing technical assistance and personnel to local authorities to recover, identify, and process deceased victims, temporarily establish morgue facilities, provide the identity of deceased victims through various forensic techniques, as well as process and dispose of deceased victims’ remains. This statute also allows the Department of Public Safety to establish certain regulations for carrying out the duties and function of the SDIT.

The changes and recommendations suggested by the presenters come from both the Governor’s Executive Order requiring the development of regulations for establishing protocols previously mentioned, as well as a need to make changes to the current SDIT functions. Specifically, the duties of the SDIT as currently outlined in NRS 414 are duplicative in a number of ways. First, much of what is required of the SDIT members is already an existing function of County Coroners, as required by NRS 259. Further, because DEM does not have staff trained in forensic identification, morgue administration, or otherwise, these specific duties are inappropriately assigned to the Division. Second, the requirements are too narrow because much of what is required of the SDIT in statute is actually accomplished through traditional emergency management practices.

These challenges to the current law were seen during the 1 October incident. In response to the incident, the Clark County Coroner required additional support for victim identification, family notification, and other duties. As seen in this report, DEM was able to assist in coordinating the required resources by making requests to medical examiners’ offices in other states and other communities.
Based on this experience as well as the ongoing efforts of DEM’s SDIT, the recommendations below are intended to address both the requirements of the Governor’s Executive Order and also restructure the SDIT to fit the actual needs of coroners during emergencies and disasters. While HIPAA is a complex and challenging law, it is not an insurmountable barrier to the legitimate sharing of appropriate victim information during an incident, which can be done without compromising the victim’s civil rights or forcing health care providers, hospitals, or medical professionals into a position of increased liability.

The recommendations below call for repurposing the SDIT to become an information sharing body during an emergency, as well as providing for additional avenues for information sharing. These changes are conceptual in nature, and additional research and collaboration will be required to ensure that they do not allow for unintended consequences upon implementation. Based on current collaboration with state and local health districts and agencies, federal partners, and private hospitals, the current recommendations are intended to provide an initial framework for what final statutory or policy changes will include.

**General changes to NRS 414 regarding the SDIT:**

**Recommendation #8:** The membership of the SDIT outlined in NRS 414.270 should be changed from forensic and scientific practitioners to the following types of representatives at a minimum: state and local emergency managers, county coroner representatives, Deputy Attorney General, the Nevada Hospital Association, healthcare consumers, tribal health agencies, DHHS State Health Officer, DHHS Public Health Preparedness, and DHHS HIPPA Compliance Officer. This recommendation is intended to support the transition of the SDIT from a body providing forensic support for identifying victims to one that coordinates information sharing regarding victim identification and family notification during an emergency or disaster.

**Recommendation #9:** NRS 414 should be amended to state that the provisions of Chapters 239 and 241 of NRS do not apply to a meeting of the SDIT. This change is intended to not only ensure that the plans required by subsequent recommendations, below, remain confidential, but also that the private information discussed during the deliberations of the SDIT remain protected.

**Recommendation #10:** NRS 414.300 should be changed to allow the Department of Public Safety’s Division of Emergency Management shall adopt regulations to govern the SDIT. Currently, state law allows the Department of Public Safety to establish these regulations. However, the SDIT is under DEM, as is the requirement to establish regulations in the Governor’s Executive Order.

**Changes to the Duties of the SDIT in NRS 414.280:**

**Recommendation #11:** In order for the SDIT to fulfill its proposed function as an
information-sharing body instead of a forensic support body, current duties, such as using forensic methods to identify victims, establish morgue facilities, and disposing of the remains of deceased victims should be removed from statute. Instead, the duties of the SDIT should be amended to include requirements associated with information sharing. Specifically, in the event of a mass casualty incident or a public health emergency pursuant to NRS 439.970 and at the request of a county or a tribal government, the SDIT should be required to serve as a coordinating body for sharing of appropriate victim information during a mass casualty event by;

- Identifying what groups have a legitimate need for Protected Health Information.
- Identifying what specific information is necessary, and prioritizing the fulfillment of information needs.
- Maintaining a mass casualty incident registry.
- Identifying all appropriate mechanisms for releasing information.
- Coordinating sharing appropriate victim information with appropriate entities.
- Complying with local, state, and federal laws.

Recommendation #12: In order to carry out the duties suggested in Recommendation #11, the SDIT should be required to:

- Meet on a monthly basis.
- Establish standing information requirements.
- Develop and update annually letters with statewide service providers pursuant to 38 CFR 5701.
- Maintain a list of POCs at each hospital in the state for information.
- Develop a form required for NRS 629 (See below).
- Develop a confidential plan and review annually.
- Exercise the plan annually.
- Gather feedback from private, public, and non-profit on ways to improve the process.
- Provide an annual report to the Governor and the legislature regarding the activities of the SDIT, the status of developed policies and procedures, and recommendations for future changes.

Expanding Existing Reporting Requirements to Include Mass Casualty Incidents

Recommendation #13: Nevada law currently requires licensed health care professionals to report instances of burn victims and gunshot wound victims to appropriate public safety agencies, and NRS 629 should be amended to require similar reports regarding persons having injuries apparently inflicted during a mass casualty incident. Further, county, tribal, and state emergency management officials may require every licensed healthcare professionals to whom any person comes or is brought for treatment of an injury which appears to
have been inflicted during a mass casualty incident to promptly report the following information to the SDIT and to an appropriate emergency management agency. The report required must include:

- Patient name
- Contact information
- Location (hospital where patient is being treated)
- Injury type, if it’s a terrorist attack or crime related event
- Acuity level (critical, serious, stable, deceased, treated, and released)
- Total number of patients seen

Recommendation #14: With respect to Recommendation #12, NRS 629 should also include provisions similar to NRS 629.045(4), which states, “a provider of health care and his or her agents and employees are immune from any civil action for any disclosures made in good faith in accordance with the provisions of this section or any consequential damages.”

XI. Conclusion

The establishment of the Intrastate Mutual Aid System was an enormous step forward for Nevada’s emergency management systems. Now that this system is codified in law, jurisdictions throughout the state can rely on a uniform system for providing and receiving resources during an emergency. And now that the system is also implemented, the committee and DEM can continue to make refinements to processes, policies, and regulations.

This report is not only intended to fulfill certain regulatory requirements for DEM and the committee, but also to provide general recommendations for improving resource sharing across all professions and disciplines. While this report focuses on coordinating mutual aid for health care services during an emergency or disaster, there is almost no limit to the number of public systems that mutual aid can assist, and future reports will recommend improvements in other areas as well. Over the months to follow the publication of this report, DEM and its partners will look for ways to implement these recommendations, including legislative changes, policy changes, and continued collaboration.

Continued collaboration will also be required for continuing to implement the Intrastate Mutual Aid System. Local, tribal, and state jurisdictions around the state need to be informed of the potential of this system, the resource inventory requirements, and the potential to either opt out for political subdivisions within Nevada or the potential to opt in for tribal jurisdictions. The more partners who are aware of this system and prepared to participate in it, the more prepared Nevada will be to respond to the various threats and hazards that are faced by communities across the state.
Report of the Resort Planning Task Force

Nevada Division of Emergency Management and Office of Homeland Security
May 11, 2018
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**ANNEX: NEVADA RESORT HOTEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN GUIDE**
Executive Summary

Nevada Revised Statutes 463.790 requires resort properties within the state to submit emergency response plans to local first responder agencies and to the state Division of Emergency Management. The law outlines the required elements for the plans as well as provides a definition for the Nevada resort properties who must comply. In the 15 years that followed the passage of the bill that created this requirement in statute, various partners identified a need to review and update this law and its implementation, particularly with respect to updating it to comply with federal and national emergency management requirements.

The Resort Planning Task Force was established in February of 2018 in order to address this need. The Task Force was created as a short-term public body under the authority of the Chief of the Nevada Division of Emergency Management, and was composed of members from various subject matter experts at Nevada resort properties, law enforcement, emergency management, and gaming regulation. The Task Force met five times in the following months to accomplish specific goals as approved in the bylaws, with their work resulting in two primary deliverables—this report and a planning guide to assist in the development of new plans or the refinement of current resort emergency response plans.

This report serves a number of purposes. First, it was developed in order to capture the status of the current law and its history so that this information would be in one place for future efforts to refine the law or its associated processes. Second, it continues the emphasis on transparency in the Task Force’s deliberations, so that others around the state and nation can benefit from our discussions and decisions. Third, and perhaps most important, this report identifies a number findings and recommendations for the legislature, executive branch agencies, and local governments to consider to improve the current law and its implementation.

The second deliverable from the Task Force was the Nevada Resort Hotel Emergency Response Plan Guide. This guide was developed by the lead planner at the Nevada Division of Emergency Management with extensive input and approval from the Task Force. It is intended to provide an explanation of the law, the resources that are available to resort personnel who are tasked with complying with the law, scalable options and examples for implementing plans, and preparedness initiatives that will make emergency response plans even more effective, such as training and exercises. The planning guide developed and approved by this Task Force is included as an annex to this report and will also be distributed separately by the Division of Emergency Management to statewide partners in order to ensure that it can benefit in as many ways as possible.
The desired outcome of developing this report and the included planning guide is to ensure that the statutory requirement for resort emergency response plans is as meaningful as possible. The overview and history of the statute and the synopsis of the Task Force’s deliberations will be important to future efforts to update and refine these statutory requirements, and the recommendations and guide included here will help ensure that changes are made as quickly and as efficiently as possible. Such efforts will assist in ensuring that all of Nevada’s residents and visitors are able to thrive in safe and livable communities.

**Background and Overview of NRS 463.790**

Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 463.790, which requires resort properties within the state to submit Emergency Response Plans (ERP), was first established in 2003 through Assembly Bill 250 (AB250). AB250 was introduced by then-Speaker Richard Perkins and co-sponsored by several other members. The bill covered a wide number of specific topics, though in general AB250 focused on public safety as it related to terrorism.

While the purpose of the ERP submission requirement in NRS 463.790 was initially unclear, the requirements of the law are straightforward. The law requires each resort to develop an ERP, to file the ERP with local police and fire departments and with the Nevada Division of Emergency Management, and to file any new ERP with these entities within three days of any updates or revisions. Further, the law makes the submitted ERPs confidential, and requires that they are maintained in a secure location within each repository organization.

NRS 463.790 requires that each ERP contains:

- A drawing or map of the layout of all areas within the building or buildings and grounds that constitute a part of the resort hotel and its support systems and a brief description of the purpose or use for each area;
- A drawing or description of the internal and external access routes;
- The location and inventory of emergency response equipment and resources;
- The location of any unusually hazardous substances;
- The name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel;
- The location of one or more site emergency response command posts;
- A description of any special equipment needed to respond to an emergency at the resort hotel;
- An evacuation plan;
- A description of any public health or safety hazards present on the site; and
- Any other information requested by a local fire department or local law enforcement agency whose jurisdiction includes the area in which the resort hotel is located or by the Division of Emergency Management.
NRS 463.790 refers to a specific definition of a resort, which is provided in NRS 463.01865. In this section, a resort meets the following criteria:

- It is a building or buildings that serves as a hotel;
- In counties with a population of 700,000 or more, it has over 200 rooms;
- In counties with a population over 100,000 but under 700,000, it has over 300 rooms available;
- It has at least one bar with permanent seating capacity for more than 30 patrons that serves alcohol;
- It has at least one restaurant with permanent seating capacity for more than 60 patrons and is open 24 hours a day; and
- It has gaming.

**Background and Purpose of the Resort Planning Task Force**

The Resort Planning Task Force was established on February 5, 2018, following a series of news articles and public discussions regarding the need to update the current law to ensure that the required ERPs matched current emergency management practices. The Task Force was established by the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) under his authority in NRS 414, which allows the Chief of DEM to carry out emergency management programs for the State of Nevada. During its first meeting, the Task Force approved bylaws, which provided a mission, purpose statement, and specific deliverables. Although the Task Force did not discuss the specific elements of the individual ERPs submitted by the resorts, which remained confidential, the Task Force was established as a public body compliant with the Nevada Open Meeting Law in order to ensure that this important topic was discussed in a transparent manner.

According to the approved bylaws, the Task Force was established “to coordinate the efforts of its membership in the common interests of proposing measures that will enhance and standardize emergency response planning efforts for appropriate resorts, local governments, and the State of Nevada.” Toward this purpose, the bylaws require that, at a minimum, the Task Force deliberate on the following areas:

- Identifying appropriate representatives from properties meeting the resort definition established in NRS, as well as emergency management and response organizations within the respective districts;
- Peer-developing a template for resort representatives to build on, with support from best practices within the field of emergency management;
- Identifying options regarding digital submission of resort plans in order to facilitate security and ease of plan submittal for the resort properties;
- Identifying recommendations to the legislature to improve upon the requirements contained in NRS 463.790; and
- Reviewing processes and procedures related to resort emergency response plans and making recommendations to the Chief of DEM.
The bylaws required that the Task Force provide a formal report of their deliberations, findings, and recommendations, and that it complete its work within a 90-day timeframe. These requirements were included to ensure that the full work of the Task Force was documented, and that any recommendations were captured in time to be considered by policy makers during the 2019 legislative session. The completion and approval of this report by the Task Force fulfills the first of these requirements. However, due to administrative errors, the Chair extended the Task Force for an additional 30 days in order to allow the Task Force to complete its required tasks.

Task Force Membership

In order to achieve its purpose, the members of the Task Force were appointed from various geographic parts of the state, disciplines, and perspectives. Task Force membership, for instance, included representatives from law enforcement, gaming regulation, fire fighting, and state and local emergency management; from the private sector, the Task Force included security, emergency management, risk management, safety, and legal representatives from resorts required by statute to submit ERPs; and, the Task Force included membership from both the northern and southern parts of Nevada. Although the membership evolved over the course of the Task Force’s deliberations, the list below reflects the final makeup of the body, which voted to approve this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caleb Cage</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Chief and Homeland Security Advisor, Nevada Division of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Brockway</td>
<td>Vice-Chair</td>
<td>Chief of Security, Nugget Casino Resort</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aaron Kenneston</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Emergency Manager, Washoe County Emergency Management and Homeland Security Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew Rasor</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Director, Nevada Threat Analysis Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darrell Clifton</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Executive Director of Security, Eldorado, Silver Legacy, and Circus Circus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dean Hill</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Director of Security, Peppermill Resort, Spa, Casino</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Steinbeck</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Deputy Chief and Emergency Manager, Clark County Fire Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Walker</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Emergency Management Program Manager, Nevada Division of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Niel</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Deputy Chief, Enforcement Division, Nevada Gaming Control Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steve Goble</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Director of Emergency Management, Venetian Palazzo Resorts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Nelson</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>SVP, Deputy GC, and Chief Legal Operations Officer, Caesars Entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd Fasulo</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Executive Director of Crisis Management, Wynn Las Vegas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Barrett</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Executive Director of Safety and Health, MGM Resorts International</td>
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Overview of Task Force Meetings

The first meeting of the Task Force was on February 5, 2018, and it primarily served as an organizational meeting for the new public body. The Task Force bylaws were amended and approved, Task Force officers were elected, and Task Force legal counsel provided a presentation on the Nevada Open Meeting Law to ensure compliance. Following the organizational matters, members deliberated on various aspects of the current law, its purpose, and carrying out the requirements of the recently-approved bylaws, including appropriate resort points of contact, and automation process for plan submittal, and other topics.

Additionally, Dr. Aaron Kenneston provided an overview of ERP best practices from various national and federal guidance documents. Comparing his findings from these sources with the current law, Dr. Kenneston noted that NRS 463.790 lacked several key components of ERPs, and that the required distribution of those plans could also be broadened, to include local emergency managers. Based on his research, Dr. Kenneston provided three recommendations to improve the current requirements: developing a template that contained any potential missing element of an emergency response plan, creating a maintenance schedule that would allow for the updating and review of those plans and finally, and creating an automated system that would help both the resorts and the public sector agencies meet those recommendations.

Task Force members largely agreed with these recommendations, which were also reflected in the Task Force bylaws, however, pursuing any of these recommendations first required an understanding of what the purpose of the legal requirement for ERP submittal was. If, for example, the ERPs were required by law in order to ensure that the resorts had initiated a planning process, that would require different maintenance and submission requirements than if the ERPs were intended to be used by public safety professionals responding to an incident. The Task Force members agreed that developing a consensus regarding the purpose for these plans was crucial before further deliberation on any of these initial recommendations or others.

- **FINDING 1:** The list of items required to be in each ERP in NRS 463.790 does not reflect current guidance from national and federal organizations for developing effective ERPs.
• **FINDING 2: While NRS 463.790 makes local police and fire agencies as well as the Nevada Division of Emergency Management responsible for serving as a repository for these ERPs, the statute provides no mechanism to ensure compliance.**

The Task Force met for a second time on March 1, 2018. Because most of the organizational matters had been addressed at the first meeting, the Task Force was able to move deeper into deliberations regarding the various requirements approved in the Task Force bylaws. This included discussions regarding this report, information regarding the purpose of the ERP requirement within the NRS, and the initial draft of the ERP guide.

The Task Force received an initial outline for this report and discussed how the findings and recommendations could potentially move forward to and through the 2019 legislative process. Addressing this subject, Chief Cage summarized the recent meeting of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. During that meeting, the Commission tasked both Chief Cage and Chief John Steinbeck, as Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group, to develop a Statewide Resiliency Strategy and accompanying legislative recommendations. The Task Force report could be included in these recommendations.

Chief Cage read through the findings of Senior Deputy Attorney General Samantha Ladich regarding the legislative intent of NRS 463.790, as requested during the previous meeting. The legislative record for AB250 was relatively vague; however, Task Force members believed that the statute focused more on the tactical or response side of emergency plans rather than the operational side. Task Force members agreed that a statement of purpose would be the priority prior to proceeding.

Finally, during the second meeting, the Task Force reviewed and discussed the draft template for the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) guide. The plan was created as a starting point and a guideline for resorts to use in the development of their own plans. Many excellent suggestions were provided by Task Force members, all of which were incorporated into the subsequent draft of the ERP guide.

• **FINDING 3: Through in-depth discussion throughout the course of the Task Force’s deliberations, it was agreed that a specific purpose for the plans should be provided. To be clear, the emergency response, emergency management, and corporate compliance experts on the Task Force were uniformly clear on what the purpose of an ERP is in general, however, throughout the early discussion it remained unclear as to what specific outcome the State of Nevada hoped to achieve by requiring resorts to develop these plans. Understanding this purpose proved to be a key early finding for the Task Force, as no other substantive decisions and recommendations could be made until the purpose of the requirement was understood.**
The Task Force met for a third time on April 13, 2018. During the meeting, the Task Force members received a presentation on the current status of this report and provided input on how it might be adjusted ahead of the next meeting. Similarly, the Task Force also received a presentation on the planning guide currently under development by DEM planning staff and provided input for this document as well. The Task Force also received a presentation on Nevada’s adoption of the International Fire Code, and impacts the adoption would have on public infrastructure and critical infrastructure in Nevada.

The Task Force met for a fourth time on April 27, 2018. During this meeting the Task Force discussed the recommendations of this report as well as the Nevada Resort Hotel Emergency Response Plan Guide. Additionally, the Task Force decided to meet again during the following week to finalize both of these documents, however, due to administrative errors, the meeting was postponed until May 11, 2018.

Identification of Appropriate Resort Representatives

As noted, during the February 5 meeting, the Task Force discussed the identification of appropriate representatives from resort properties and emergency management and response organizations within the respective districts, as is required by the bylaws. The purpose of this requirement within the bylaws, as well as the subsequent discussions of the subjects during the Task Force meetings, is in part to ensure that a mechanism exists to ensure maintenance of these plans by the resorts and in partnership with local and state emergency responders and emergency managers. Although this requirement appears to be as straightforward as simply creating and updating contact lists for resort personnel and appropriate public safety agencies, Task Force discussions revealed that it is more complicated for a number of reasons.

The first challenge, which was discussed previously, related to the fact that the purpose of the ERP requirement for the resorts was not clear as written in statute. As currently written, NRS 463.790 requires that each plan include “the name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel,” however, depending on the purpose of the planning requirement, the resort’s emergency response coordinator may not be the appropriate person to ensure compliance. This role may also be reassigned over time, meaning that the submitted reports would be out of compliance, and there is no specific point of contact identified to reestablish compliance.

During deliberations on this topic, Task Force members presented arguments that appeared to reflect their professional perspectives. That is, a resort security chief noted that a resort’s security chief would be the first point of contact during an event, and therefore should be the point of contact; a resort legal representative noted that since developing an ERP was a legal compliance issue, the point of contact for such plans should be the resort’s legal department; and a gaming regulator noted that compliance issues were addressed directly with the licensee in all cases. Although the Task Force engaged in robust discussion regarding this issue, a lack of consensus persisted.
This lack of consensus was also in part due to the second identified challenge regarding identifying the appropriate point of contact for plan development, maintenance, and compliance. This challenge centered around the fact that regardless of the purpose of this statutory requirement, the resorts that are required to submit ERPs are private properties, and as such, should be allowed to comply with this requirement in the way that works best for their unique business practices, security practices, and interests. In fact, this principle is true for every aspect of this law: as private properties, the resorts should be allowed the latitude to develop plans that meet their operational needs, and not just plans that meet a compliance checklist within state law.

- **FINDING 4:** The current statutory requirement that plans include “the name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel” is insufficient, and further, individual resorts should be allowed the flexibility to identify who within their organization is the appropriate point of contact for ERP compliance and maintenance.

**Options Regarding Digital Submission of ERPs**

Given the challenges facing compliance with NRS 463.790 addressed throughout this report, an obvious suggestion is to automate the maintenance and submittal process. Various state and local public safety agencies have automated similar efforts in the past and have achieved varying degrees of success. Automating the planning process did appear to meet many of the shortcomings of the law as it is currently written; however, previous experiences also provided reasons to be cautious with relying too much on an automated solution alone to address the various concerns discussed throughout the meetings of the Task Force.

During Task Force discussions, several examples of previous or existing automated databases for plans were discussed as models or options that could be expanded to facilitate the submission of resort ERPs. In recent years, state and local governments have purchased automated solutions for continuity of operations plans for various levels of government, for example, and another system previously stored information on critical infrastructure throughout the state. However, both systems require substantial grant funding if they are to be sustained.

Conversely, the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) currently manages several automated systems to store plans and other information. SERC systems allow for appropriate users to submit documents, for the documents to be securely stored, and for reminders to be sent automatically regarding required plan maintenance and other scheduled updates. However, the file sizes for the plans in this system is limited, and more important, SERC is able to pay for these systems through licensing fees paid by those submitting the plans.

The benefits of such automation are clear. Automation can provide a secure platform for submittal, allow for ease of communication between public safety agencies and resorts regarding ERP maintenance, and reduce duplication of efforts. However, while
automation provides a promising approach to maintaining the resort ERPs, there is at least one major challenge with this approach: throughout discussions regarding automation of the plans process, a local emergency manager repeatedly noted that such automation would require a funding mechanism for sustainability. Noting previous and recent platforms for similar efforts, it was pointed out that the state has tended to rely on grant dollars to fund automated solutions, which may work in the short term but often fails to be sustainable in the long term.

- **FINDING 5:** A digital solution for ERP storage and compliance will likely require a significant and ongoing investment from the state. In the past, these investments have been made using federal grant dollars, which are not stable funding sources and have resulted in obsolete, redundant, or otherwise problematic systems. While such an investment may be justified, it should only be considered if funding is identified beyond grant funding.

**Recommendations to Update NRS 463.790**

**Finding 1:** Requirements in NRS 463.790 do not reflect current guidance for developing effective ERPs.

**Recommendation 1:** The Nevada Division of Emergency Management should provide a planning guide to Nevada resorts regarding the requirements outlined in NRS 463.790. Based on national guidance and best practices, the planning guide should include overviews and examples of the following requirements:

- Risk assessment
- Annual plan maintenance
- Training, testing, and exercising
- Concept of operations
- Functional roles and responsibilities
- Functional annexes (such as communications or shelter in place)
- Hazard-specific annexes (such as earthquake, flood, health issues, or terrorism)
- Quick Action Plans for distribution to local first responder

**Recommendation 2:** The Nevada Division of Emergency Management should reconvene the Resort Planning Task Force within one year in order to review the planning guide and to make recommendations for improvement.

**Finding 2:** NRS 463.790 provides no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.

**Recommendation 3:** Require resorts to submit to the Nevada Division of Emergency Management a new plan, an updated plan, or a letter certifying that the existing plan is current by November 1 of each year. The existing statutory language requiring that updates to existing plans be submitted within three days should also remain in the statute. Further, require the Nevada Division of Emergency
Management to obtain an updated list of properties meeting the definition of “resort” per NRS 463.01865 annually, and to correspond with the appropriate points of contact at each identified resort regarding the requirements of NRS 463.790 by July 1 of each year. After November 1 of each year, the Nevada Division of Emergency Management should provide a report of compliant and non-compliant properties to the Nevada Gaming Control Board regarding the current status of ERP submittal from Nevada resorts.

**Recommendation 4:** Require the Nevada Division of Emergency Management to explore what other types of properties, organizations, and entities that are not resorts and therefore do not fall under the requirements of NRS 463.790, but should be required to develop and submit ERPs.

**Finding 3:** *The purpose of the statutory requirement for the ERPs remains unclear.*

**Recommendation 5:** Provide a statement of purpose for the ERP requirement in NRS 463.790 in order to assist resorts in their planning processes. The Task Force developed the following purpose statement and recommends that it is included in NRS 463.790.

*The purpose of this statutory requirement is to facilitate the development of comprehensive and actionable all-hazards emergency response plans in order to provide opportunities for collaboration between resorts and first responder agencies through planning, training, and exercises in order to protect the employees and the public during an emergency or disaster.*

**Finding 4:** *The current point of contact requirement in statute is insufficient for maintaining ERPs.*

**Recommendation 6:** In addition to the current requirement that plans include “the name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel,” resorts should also be required to provide name and contact information for a designee responsible for the maintenance of the ERP.

**Finding 5:** *A sustainable automated solution for ERP compliance would greatly improve many of the current challenges in this process*

**Recommendation 7:** The Division of Emergency Management should pursue automated solutions for ERP development, maintenance, and compliance, however, implementation of this effort should only occur when a reliable funding source has been identified to sustain this effort in the long term.
Annex: Nevada Resort Hotel Emergency Response Plan Guide
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Foreword

NRS 463.790 requires Resort Hotels, as defined by NRS 463.01865, to develop, adopt, and maintain an Emergency Response Plan (ERP). This guide was developed by the Nevada Division of Emergency Management (DEM) with input from the Resort Planning Task Force to provide additional guidance for this statutory requirement, and to assist Resort Hotels of various sizes and locations to scale the models presented here to meet their business, security, and operational needs. ERPs, as required by statute and explored in this document, are intended to mitigate the risks and consequences of potential manmade and natural threats and hazards, specifically as they may occur within Nevada’s Resort Hotels, risks and consequences that are further mitigated by training and exercising of high quality plans after they are developed. This guide is intended to provide a starting point for Hotel Resorts just beginning the planning process or thoughts for refining existing plans. As such, it should not be construed as additional ERP elements required by DEM.

Caleb S. Cage, Chief
Nevada Department of Public Safety
Division of Emergency Management
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Annex A: Threats and Hazards Analysis
Annex B: NRS 463.790 Compliance Matrix
Annex C: Resort Hotel ERP Development Check Sheet
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I. Purpose

In February of 2018, the Chief of the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) established the Resort Planning Task Force (Task Force) in order to improve upon the current requirements of NRS 463.790. This guide is intended to provide a basis for the development or refinement of quality Resort Hotel Emergency Response Plans (ERP). These plans, when combined with training, exercising, and other preparedness activities, are the foundation of a comprehensive emergency management program.

Many Resort Hotels have developed well-crafted plans, which meet their business, security, and operational needs. This guide is not intended to be an all-encompassing template, nor is it intended to discourage innovation. Rather, this guide is intended to make plain the minimum requirements annotated in Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 463.790 and to recommend ERP components and preparedness activities, which, if implemented properly, will mitigate the effects of an emergency on the visitors and employees of a Resort Hotel.

II. Scope

This guide applies to Resort Hotels as defined by Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 463.01865 and local emergency response authorities that may respond to a Resort Hotel during an emergency.

NRS 463.01865 defines a Resort Hotel as follows:

“Resort hotel” means any building or group of buildings that is maintained as and held out to the public to be a hotel where sleeping accommodations are furnished to the transient public and that has:

1. More than 200 rooms available for sleeping accommodations;
2. At least one bar with permanent seating capacity for more than 30 patrons that serves alcoholic beverages sold by the drink for consumption on the premises;
3. At least one restaurant with permanent seating capacity for more than 60 patrons that is open to the public 24 hours each day and 7 days each week; and
4. A gaming area within the building or group of buildings.”

III. Authorities

- NRS 414: Emergency Management
- NRS 463.790: Emergency Response Plans
- Nevada Resort Planning Task Force Bylaws
- State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP)
- Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 provides guidance for developing emergency operations plans. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making to help planners examine a hazard or threat and produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans. CPG 101 assists in making the planning process routine across all phases of emergency management and for all homeland security mission areas. It helps planners at all levels in their efforts to develop and maintain viable all-hazards, all-threats EOPs. Accomplished properly, planning provides a methodical way to engage the whole community in thinking through the life cycle of a potential crisis, determining required capabilities, and establishing a framework for roles and responsibilities. It shapes how a community envisions and shares a desired outcome, selects effective ways to achieve it, and communicates expected results. Each plan must reflect what that community will do to address its specific risks with the unique resources it has or can obtain.


There are many ways to develop an ERP. The planning process that follows is flexible and allows Resort Hotels to adapt it to varying characteristics and situations. The below diagram depicts steps in the planning process, and at each step in the planning process, Resort Hotels should consider the impact of the decisions made on training, exercises, equipment, and other preparedness requirements.
Step 1: **Form a Collaborative Planning Team Designated by Organization Leadership**

- The overarching corporation should exercise authority and ownership of the planning process and designate a multi-disciplined planning team for the development of the ERP.
- The process of ERP development should be collaborative and involve entities that may be called on to support the Resort Hotel in an emergency. These may include local police, fire department, mass transportation, and cooperating properties in an evacuation.

**Step 2: Understand the Situation**

- Go through the process of performing a threats and hazards vulnerability assessment to determine which natural and manmade emergencies the property is vulnerable to, and develop a gap analysis to understand what the property needs to prepare and plan for.
- Annex A has an example of the instructions and an example worksheet to perform a threats and hazards vulnerability assessment. There are many threat and risk assessment tools in the marketplace which may be used to assist in the development of an ERP. The property management should determine which tool is best suited for its particular needs.

**Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives**

- The development of goals and objectives assists planners in the identification of tasks, tactics, and resources necessary to achieve the goal.

**Step 4: Plan Development**

- Generate, compare, and select possible solutions for achieving the goals and objectives identified in Step 3. Planners consider the requirements, goals, and objectives to develop several response alternatives.
- For each operational task identified, some basic information is needed. Developing this information helps planners incorporate the task into the plan when they are writing it. Planners correctly identify an operational task when they can answer the following questions about it:
What is the action?
Who is responsible for the action?
When should the action take place?
How long should the action take and how much time is actually available?
What has to happen before?
What happens after?
What resources does the person/entity need to perform the action?

Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review and Approval
- The planning team has to write the plan.
- The plan is then distributed to all the stakeholders and departments that have to implement aspects of the plan for review, comments, and revision.
- And finally, the plan is submitted to Resort Hotel leadership for review, approval, and promulgation.

VI. Contents Required By NRS 463.790

a) A drawing or map of the layout of all areas within the building or buildings and grounds that constitute a part of the resort hotel and its support systems and a brief description of the purpose or use for each area;
b) A drawing or description of the internal and external access routes;
c) The location and inventory of emergency response equipment and resources;
d) The location of any unusually hazardous substances;
e) The name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel;
f) The location of one or more site emergency response command posts;
g) A description of any special equipment needed to respond to an emergency at the resort hotel;
h) An evacuation plan;
i) A description of any public health or safety hazards present on the site; and,
j) Any other information requested by a local fire department or local law enforcement agency whose jurisdiction includes the area in which the resort hotel is located or by the Division of Emergency Management.

VII. Plan Format and Contents

Resort Hotel ERPs should be risk based, flexible, implementable from the bottom up, and understandable from the lowest level. The best plans are action oriented, concise, and emphasize actions to protect visitors and employees.
What follows are three examples of formats that Resort Hotels may consider in developing their ERPs. These examples are intended to give Resort Hotels suggested options for the development of ERPs, and are not intended to limit innovation. They are also intended to provide scalable options for Resort Hotels to consider based on their needs.

**Example Formats**

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<th>1. <strong>Policy Statement</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>a. Purpose</td>
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<td>b. Policy</td>
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<td>c. Situation/Threats and Hazards</td>
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<td>d. Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Emergency Command Post (Required by NRS)</td>
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| 2. Notification Procedures (Required by NRS) |
| 3. Evacuation Procedures (Required By NRS)   |
| a. A drawing or description of the internal and external access routes (Required by NRS) |

| 4. Fire Procedures |
| 5. Area Isolation/Shelter in Place |
| 6. Active Shooter Procedures |
| 7. Identified threat/hazard |
| 8. Identified threat/hazard |
| 9. Identified threat/hazard |
| 10. Identified threat/hazard |
| 11. Identified threat/hazard |

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<td>A. Drawing or map of the layout of all areas within the building or buildings and grounds that constitute a part of the resort hotel and its support systems and a brief description of the purpose or use for each area (Required by NRS)</td>
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<td>B. Location and inventory of emergency response equipment and resources (Required by NRS)</td>
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<td>C. A description of any public health or safety hazards present on the site (Required by NRS)</td>
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<td>D. The location of any unusually hazardous substances</td>
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1. **Base Plan**
   - a. Purpose, scope, situation/threats and hazards
   - b. Concept of Operations (The resort’s overarching approach to emergency management)
   - c. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
   - d. Direction, Control and Coordination
   - e. Information Collection and Analysis
   - f. Communications
   - g. Logistics
   - h. Plan Maintenance

2. **Implementation**
   - a. Activation and emergency notification
   - b. Evacuation (Required by NRS)
   - c. Shelter and Protect
   - d. Shelter in Place
   - e. Area Isolation

3. **Threat Specific Annex (Based on Threat and Hazard Analysis)**
   - a. Active Shooter
   - b. Fire
   - c. Civil Unrest
   - d. Flood
   - e. Earthquake
   - f. Bomb threat
   - g. Mass Casualty
   - h. Communicable Disease/ Mass Illness
   - i. Power Outage
   - j. Hazardous Materials Spill
   - k. Water Disruption/Contamination
   - l. Abduction
   - m. Criminal Activity

4. **Functional Annexes**
   - a. EOC/IC Activation and procedures
   - b. Response Team Identification, Organization, Roles and Responsibilities
   - c. Communication
   - d. Visitor and Staff notification, warning, and information
   - e. Law Enforcement Integration
   - f. Fire Fighting Integration
   - g. Visitor migration to alternate property.
   - h. Visitor Property Return
   - i. Shelter and Mass Care
   - j. Mass Transit
   - k. Maps of each section of property(Required by NRS)
     - i. Evacuation Routes(Required by NRS)
     - ii. Police Access Routes
     - iii. Location of unusually hazardous materials(Required by NRS)
     - iv. Location of Equipment and Caches(Required by NRS)
   - l. Location and Inventory of Emergency Response Equipment and Caches
   - m. Telephone numbers /Radio frequencies and names of emergency management coordinator, emergency response teams, emergency response personnel, and property management.(Required by NRS)
5. **Adjacent Special Event Area Specific Plan**
   a. Activation and emergency notification
   b. Evacuation
   c. Shelter and Protect
   d. Shelter in Place
   e. Area Isolation

**FAST IMPLEMENTATION FORMAT**

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1. **Fast Implementation**
   a. Introduction and instructions on how to use the plan
   b. Activation and emergency notification
   c. Evacuation (Required by NRS)
   d. Shelter and Protect
   e. Shelter in Place
   f. Area Isolation

2. **Base Plan**
   a. Purpose, scope, situation/threats and hazards
   b. Concept of Operations (The resort’s overarching approach to emergency management)
   c. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
   d. Direction, Control and Coordination
   e. Information Collection and Analysis
   f. Communications
   g. Logistics
   h. Plan Maintenance

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   c. Civil Unrest
   d. Flood
   e. Earthquake
   f. Bomb threat
   g. Mass Casualty
   h. Communicable Disease/Mass Illness
   i. Power Outage
   j. Hazardous Materials Spill
   k. Water Disruption/Contamination
   l. Abduction
   m. Criminal Activity

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   a. EOC/IC Activation and procedures
   b. Response Team Identification, Organization, Roles and Responsibilities
c. Communication
d. Visitor and Staff notification, warning, and information
e. Law Enforcement Integration
f. Fire Fighting Integration
g. Visitor migration to alternate property.
h. Visitor Property Return
i. Shelter and Mass Care
j. Mass Transit
k. Maps of each section of property (Required by NRS)
   i. Evacuation Routes (Required by NRS)
   ii. Police Access Routes (Required by NRS)
   iii. Location of unusually hazardous materials (Required by NRS)
   iv. Location of Emergency Response Command Posts
l. Location and Inventory of Emergency Response Equipment and Caches (Required by NRS)
m. Telephone numbers/Radio frequencies and names of emergency management coordinator,
   emergency response teams, emergency response personnel, and property management (Required by NRS)

5. Adjacent Special Event Area Specific Plan
   a. Activation and emergency notification
   b. Evacuation
c. Shelter and Protect
d. Shelter in Place
e. Area Isolation

VIII. “Grab and Go Package” Best Practice

A grab and go package is a best practice used by many casinos in Nevada. This package contains specific information for police, fire and other first responders about the property which will give the first responder information and tools unique to the property which will expedite response. The property should determine how many “Grab and Go Packages” it needs for an adequate first responder response and store them in strategic locations. The use of the “Grab and Go Package” is a recommendation by DEM for resort casinos to use, however its use is not mandated by NRS 463.790.

Fire Grab and Go Package
- First Aid Kit including:
  o Tourniquets
  o Compression bandages
  o Rolled Gauze
  o Assorted dressings
  o Gloves
  o Chest Seals
  o Trauma Tape
  o Triage placards
  o Trauma shears
• Set of master keys
• Location of fire suppression system controls, fire hydrants, and HVAC systems
• Location and keys to elevators
• Location of functional and access needs rooms
• Evacuation plans with maps of egress and muster stations
• Laminated property maps with all exits clearly marked, and a dry erase marker
• Roster of key resort staff and contact numbers
• Radio with property frequencies attached and extra batteries
• Flashlight with extra batteries
• Glow sticks
• Door stops
• Exclusion tape

**Police Grab and Go Package**
• First Aid Kit including:
  o Tourniquets
  o Compression bandages
  o Rolled Gauze
  o Assorted dressings
  o Gloves
  o Chest Seals
  o Trauma Tape
  o Triage placards
  o Trauma shears
• Set of Master Keys
• Location and keys to elevators
• Evacuation plans with maps of egress and muster stations
• Copies of shelter in place, active shooter and area isolation plans
• Laminated property maps with all exits clearly marked, and a dry erase marker
• Roster of key resort staff and contact numbers
• Radio with property frequencies attached and extra batteries
• Flashlight with extra batteries
• Glow sticks
• Door stops
• Exclusion tape
IX. Submission Requirements

NRS 463.790
“Each Resort Hotel shall adopt and maintain an emergency response plan. Each new or revised plan must be filed within 3 days after adoption or revision with each local fire department and local law enforcement agency whose jurisdiction includes the area in which the Resort Hotel is located and with the Division of Emergency Management of the Department of Public Safety.”

DEM highly recommends that each Resort Hotel reviews its ERP on an annual basis and update the plan as needed. Every five years the Resort Hotel should go through the formal planning process as detailed in this guide and perform a comprehensive rewrite. Subsequent submissions to the local fire department, law enforcement, and to DEM are required to occur within three days of adoption or revision in accordance with NRS 463.790.

After the annual review of the ERP, if there are no changes to the ERP, the Resort Hotel should send a letter to the DEM documenting the review and informing DEM that no changes occurred to the ERP.

X. Emergency Response Plan Training

Emergency Response plans are useless unless all personnel are aware of the contents of the ERP and his/her roles within the plan.

It is recommended that each Resort Hotel implement a training program as part of the new hire and continuing training curriculum, which details the ERP contents, concept of operations, and roles and responsibilities of individuals and teams. Individuals must be aware visitor safety procedures, evacuation, shelter, and area isolation. Quick Reference Tools should also be developed so staff can quickly refer to specific emergency response procedures.

It is recommended that staff are trained initially upon hire and provided with refresher training every three years.

XI. Emergency Response Plan Exercise

Organizations cannot claim to have an emergency response capability until the plan is tested by a realistic series of exercises. It is recommended by DEM but not required by NRS 463.790, that Resort Hotels utilize the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) to develop increasingly complex realistic exercises. It is recommended that Resort Hotels perform
an internal exercise each year. It is also recommended that Resort Hotels participate in full scale exercises offered by the emergency management organization in the city/county the resort hotel is located in.

For each exercise, it is recommended by DEM but not required by NRS 463.790, the Resort Hotel should develop an After Action Report (AAR) and Improvement Plan (IP) to detail lessons learned from the exercise. The AAR/IP should include recommendations from lessons learned to revise the ERP, develop training programs, order equipment or develop agreements outside the Resort Hotel.

**XII. Conclusion**

Having a well-conceived Emergency Response Plan, which is trained upon and rigorously tested, can save lives and protect property. These plans are currently required by law and are explored within this document. Once developed, they should also serve to facilitate opportunities for collaboration and coordination between private entities and public safety organizations.

**XIII. Acronyms**

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR/IP</td>
<td>After Action Report/Improvement Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG101</td>
<td>Comprehensive Planning Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Division of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Emergency Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>HSEEP</td>
<td>Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Incident Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Mission Essential Functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRS</td>
<td>Nevada Revised Statutes</td>
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</table>
This page is intentionally blank.
Annex A is an example of the instructions and a worksheet to perform a threats and hazards vulnerability assessment. There are many threat and hazards risk assessment tools in the marketplace which may be used to assist in the development of an ERP. The property management should determine which tool is best suited for its particular needs.

**Threats and Hazards Analysis Instructions**

1. **Identify Potential Threats and Hazards**
   - What threat and hazards could interrupt Mission Essential Function (MEF) performance (e.g. earthquake, flood, wildfire, haz-mat, civil disturbance, severe storm, terrorist attack, cyber, etc.)

2. **Identify Threat and Hazard Characteristics**
   - What are the characteristics of the potential threats or hazards?

3. **Estimate Likelihood of Threat or Hazard Occurrence**
   - Based on a numerical scale of 1 to 10, what is the likelihood each threat or hazard could occur and affect MEF performance?

4. **Evaluate MEF Vulnerability to Each Threat or Hazard**
   - Based on a numerical scale of 1 to 10, how susceptible is the MEF to failure due to each threat or hazard?

5. **Estimate Overall Impact if MEF Failure Occurs**
   - Based on a numerical scale of 1 to 10, how significant is the impact if the MEF cannot be performed?

6. **Determine Risk Value for Each Threat or Hazard**
   - Based on the likelihood, vulnerability and impact of the threat or hazard, what is the risk value for the MEF?
## Resort Casino

### Business Impact Analysis Worksheet: Threat and Hazard Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Number</th>
<th>Threat/Hazard (examples)</th>
<th>Threat/Hazard Characteristics</th>
<th>Threat/Hazard Likelihood (0-10)</th>
<th>MEF Vulnerability (0-10)</th>
<th>MEF Failure Impact (0-10)</th>
<th>MEF Risk Value (0-30)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fire</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Communicable Disease</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Active Shooter</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Flood</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Severe Winter Storm</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Bomb Threat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Example Threats and Hazards Analysis</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Cyber Attack</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Riot</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials Spill</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Power Outage</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Water Disruption/Contamination</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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## NRS 463.790 Compliance Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NRS 463.790 Compliance Standard</th>
<th>Page or Section</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) A drawing or map of the layout of all areas within the building or buildings and grounds that constitute a part of the resort hotel and its support systems and a brief description of the purpose or use for each area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) A drawing or description of the internal and external access routes</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) The location and inventory of emergency response equipment and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) The location of any unusually hazardous substances</td>
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<td>e) The name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) The location of one or more site emergency response command posts</td>
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<tr>
<td>g) A description of any special equipment needed to respond to an emergency at the resort hotel</td>
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<tr>
<td>h) An evacuation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>i) A description of any public health or safety hazards present on the site</td>
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<tr>
<td>j) Any other information requested by a local fire department or local law enforcement agency whose jurisdiction includes the area in which the resort hotel is located or by the Division of Emergency Management</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Resort Hotel Emergency Response Plan Development and Review Checklist (Abbreviated Plan)
*(Items highlighted in red and italicized indicate compliance standards required under NRS463.790)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Section and Page</th>
<th>Plan Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Basic Plan** – Provides an overview of the Resort Hotel emergency management/response program and the Resort Hotel ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters.

1. **Title Page** – The Title Page clearly states the name of the resort hotel, indicates that it is an emergency response plan and a date of last revision.

   **It is recommended that the plan should:**

   - Include the name of the property(s).
   - Include the name of the plan (Emergency Response Plan).
   - Include a date of last revised.

   Comments:

2. **Table of Contents and Plan Development and Review Checklist** - An outline of the plan’s format, key sections, attachments, charts, etc.

   **It is recommended that the plan should:**

   - Include a table of contents that lists/identifies the major sections/chapters and/or key elements of the plan.
   - Include a Record of Changes.

   Comments:
3. **Promulgation Statement** - A signed statement formally recognizing and adopting the plan as the resort hotel’s ERP.

   **It is recommended that the plan should:**

   Include the plan’s Promulgation Statement, signed by the resort hotel’s Chief Executive.

   Comments:

   

   I. **Purpose** - This explains the plan’s intent, who it involves, and why it was developed.

   **It is recommended that the plan should:**

   Describe the purpose for developing and maintaining the ERP.

   Describe what types of incidents and under what conditions the plan will be activated.

   Describe who has the authority to activate the plan.

   Comments:

   

   II. **Policy** – Provides an overview for the jurisdiction’s/agencies overall approach to emergency Management.

   **It is recommended that the plan should:**

   Describe the resort hotel’s overall objectives to emergency management.

   Describe the incident command arrangements from the initial response to the establishment of an Emergency Command Post (ECP).
Describe the organization structure for the Resort Hotel and how it will be implemented.

Designate a resort hotel emergency response coordinator and include the name and telephone number of the emergency response coordinator for the resort hotel.

Comments:

---

### III. Responsibilities

Provides an overview of the key functions and procedures that the resort hotel will accomplish during an emergency.

It is recommended that the plan should:

- Describe the emergency responsibilities of the chief executive and other members of the executive staff.
- Outline the role and responsibilities of the Safety Manager/Emergency Manager.
- Outline the role and responsibilities of the Facilities Manager.
- Outline the role and responsibilities of the Director of Security.
- Describe the common emergency management responsibilities for all Directors and Managers.
- Describe the common emergency management responsibilities for all other staff members.

Comments:
IV. **Emergency Command Post** – Provides a description of the emergency command post, details its purpose and lists the personnel expected to staff the emergency command center.

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- [ ] Describe the purpose and general layout of the emergency command post.
- [ ] List the positions that are expected to staff the emergency command post and their expected roles.
- [ ] *Provide a location of the Emergency Command Post and any alternate command posts that are identified.*

Comments:

---

**Emergency Procedures Annexes**

**Annex A: Notification** - Provides a description of the procedures to notify key personnel, resort hotel staff, resort hotel visitors and emergency services.

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- [ ] Detail the procedures for notification of key staff that an emergency exists.
- [ ] Detail the procedures for the notification of emergency services.
- [ ] Detail the procedures for alerting resort hotel staff and visitors of the presence of emergencies.
- [ ] Detail the responsibilities of staff members required to perform the notification process.
- [ ] Provide a list of emergency numbers.

Comments:
Annex B:  *Evacuation* - Provides a description of the procedures to evacuate specific areas of the resort hotel or the entire resort hotel as determined by the extent of the emergency.

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- Detail the key personnel who have the authority to order an evacuation.
- Detail the procedures for the notification of the need to evacuate for resort hotel visitors and staff.
- Detail the departmental responsibilities during an evacuation.
- Detail the evacuation routes and designated congregation areas.
- Detail the procedures for notifying emergency services.
- *Provide a drawing or description of the internal and external access routes*

Comments:

Annex C:  *Fire* - Provides a description of the response procedures in the event of a fire in the resort hotel.

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- Detail the general procedures for a fire response.
- Detail the procedures for the notification of the need to evacuate for resort hotel visitors and staff.
- Detail the procedures for notifying emergency services.
- Detail the location of key fire sprinkler and fire pump infrastructure.
Annex D:  **Isolation/Shelter in Place** - Provides a description of the response procedures in the event of the need to isolate a section of the resort hotel or to shelter in place.

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- Detail the circumstances when isolation/shelter in place is necessary.
- Detail the decision points for evacuation versus isolation/shelter in place.
- Detail the general procedures for an isolation/shelter in place response.
- Detail the procedures for the notification of the need to isolate/shelter in place for resort hotel visitors and staff.
- Detail areas where effective isolation/shelter in place can take place.
- Provide a map of areas that can effectively be isolated.
- Detail the procedures for notifying emergency services.

Comments:

---

Annex E:  **Active Shooter** - Provides a description of the response procedures in the event of an active shooter on the property or near the property

**It is recommended that the plan should:**

- Detail the general procedures for active shooter.
- Detail the decision points for evacuation versus isolation/shelter in place.

Comments:

---

Annex C:  **Resort Hotel ERP Development Check Sheet**
Detail the procedures for notifying emergency services.

Detail the procedures for the notification of the need to isolate/shelter in place for resort hotel visitors and staff.

Comments:

Annex E: Property Maps – Provide drawings or maps of the layout of all areas within the building or buildings and grounds that constitute a part of the resort hotel and its support systems and a brief description of the purpose or use for each area.

Annex F: Inventory of Emergency Response Equipment and resources – Provide an inventory with location of emergency response equipment and resources.

Annex G Public Health/Safety Hazards – Provide a description of any public health or safety hazards present on site.

Annex H Hazardous Substances – Provide the location of any unusually hazardous substances.

Additional Annexes are based on threats/hazards identified during the threats/hazards analysis as detailed in Annex B of the Guide. An example of plans may include:

- Bomb Threat
- Civil Unrest
- Flood
- Earthquake
- Bomb threat
- Mass Casualty
- Communicable Disease/Mass Illness
- Power Outage
- Hazardous Materials Spill
- Water Disruption/Contamination
- Abduction
- Criminal Activity
- Any others identified as a concern
April 19, 2018

Dear Colleagues:

As Chair of the Nevada Cyber Security Committee, Nevada takes very seriously the considerable cyber threats that our state faces at any given time. Recognizing these threats, Nevada has worked to coordinate existing efforts, determine best practices, and encourage strategic efforts to build upon the successes of our work in recent years. The following report aims to document much of these efforts to ensure that Nevada's future work in cyber security can build upon our existing foundation.

Under the chairmanship of Governor Brian Sandoval, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security serves as a key leader in cyber security administration for Nevada. In recent years, the Commission has selected cyber security as a priority for grants funding and during the Commission's annual Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment [THIRA] survey. The Commission’s prioritization of cyber security in recent years led to the establishment of the Cyber Security Committee as a subcommittee of the Commission, as well as the passage of Assembly Bill 471 during the 2017 Legislative Session, which created the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination within the Nevada Department of Public Safety.

Since April 2017, the Cyber Security Committee has deliberated on various aspects of Nevada cyber security capabilities, including the drafting and consideration of the following report and its preceding report from November of 2017. It is the Committee’s hope that this report serves as a culminating document for the previous years of work and investment to date, and also as a foundational document for Nevada’s ongoing cyber security efforts. Furthermore, to better illuminate the work on a statewide level, the Cyber Security Committee hopes this report will contribute to a broader understanding of Nevada’s ongoing cyber security efforts.

This following report serves as the Committee’s final effort, with the continual investments to be made over time to grow Nevada's cyber capabilities into increasingly robust and resilient efforts in the future. Through the Governor’s leadership, the Commission’s input, and the Committee’s focus, we have accomplished much, but more must be done to ensure that Nevada is able to prepare against, respond to, and recover from cyber attack.

Best regards,

Mark A. Hutchison
Lieutenant Governor
State of Nevada
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1. Executive Summary

This report serves as the final report of the Cyber Security Committee (CSC), a committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security (NCHS). It is intended to capture much of the great effort that has been made to protect Nevada’s information technology infrastructure, its economy, and its residents and visitors to date. In doing so, it is also intended to serve as the foundation for future efforts to continue in this same effort. As the final report, it is a continuation of the initial report, which was published in November of 2017.

In order to provide a relevant final report, the CSC endeavored to accomplish two general goals. First, the CSC was to provide an overview of the background of efforts to date, and second, the CSC was to develop findings and recommendations from that overview. Both of these goals combine to allow the CSC’s final report to not only solidify the successes from statewide efforts of the recent past but to also shape the future of cyber security success in the state.

This report begins with the CSC’s effort to provide an overview of recent activities. It includes a history of the CSC, the makeup of its membership, an overview of its meetings to date, and the mission and purpose the CSC developed to guide its efforts. Also included is an overview of the CSC’s role in vetting and refining cybersecurity grant proposals for the Homeland Security Working Group, the Urban Area Working Group, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, and its Finance Committee. The oversight of the Homeland Security Grant Program entails a lengthy process, but it has remained a deliberate effort that has resulted in identifying quality cybersecurity projects for funding, which have in turn been supported by state and local cyber security investments as well.

This report captures a great deal of work that has taken place to date, but it also necessarily serves as a roadmap for the way ahead. Although the cyber threat is constantly evolving, through efforts like this, the NCHS’s emphasis on cyber security, the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination (OCDC), and the ongoing investment of federal and state dollars in cyber security and cyber defense, Nevada will be better able to evolve with and respond to that threat. That is in line with the CSC’s mission, and with the best interests of the people of Nevada.
2. History of the Cyber Security Committee

   Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Chapter 239C was added to the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) which created the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security. This chapter of NRS provided the specific duties and makeup of the Commission and established the legal framework for its work. Since it was first established, the Commission has remained the central strategic and guiding force of Nevada's Homeland Security efforts which has only increased in stature since Governor Brian Sandoval chose to serve as the Commission's Chair.

   The duties outlined in NRS 239C include overseeing the grants process, advising on homeland security related issues, ensuring coordination of emergency response capabilities, and several other important functions. Additionally, NRS 239C.170 authorizes the Chair of the Commission to create a Committee on Finance, as well as “any other committees deemed necessary by the Chair to assist in carrying out the duties of the Commission.” On September 22, 2014, the Commission authorized the creation of the Cyber Security Committee (CSC) to address the protection and resiliency of statewide technology.

   In general, the CSC was formed to provide input for the grants process as well as to provide subject matter expertise on matters related to cyber security. To accomplish this, cyber security expertise was sought on a statewide basis to represent the CSC membership, including cyber security, information technology, and critical infrastructure at a federal, state, county, city, and private sector level. A list of the current members of the CSC is provided below:
The CSC met a total of three times in 2016. On March 8, 2016, the CSC was briefed with a complete overview of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) process and tasked with the development of priorities and objectives as a tool for reviewing and rank-prioritizing HSGP projects with a cyber security component. The establishment of priorities to which all cyber-related projects would be vetted was adopted by the CSC including:
• Alignment with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity Framework;
• Avoidance of conflict with Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity under Presidential Executive Order 13636;
• Review and ranking of HSGP projects for regional and/or statewide impact;
• 100% completion of project(s) within the allotted performance period of the grant;
• Sustainability of the project long-term;
• Compliance with the Commission’s priorities and direction; and
• Compliance with Federal and State grant guidance.

Using this matrix, the CSC reviewed a total of 12 FFY 2016 HSGP project proposals totaling $2,823,853.00. Of these projects, only six were deemed to meet the established priority criteria. Those six projects were rank-prioritized, per funding stream, for further review and consideration by the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group (HSWG). Pursuant to NRS 239C.170[1], the CSC voted to approve Lieutenant Governor Mark Hutchison as the Chair of the CSC, and Joe McDonald, Chief Security Officer, Switch, Ltd., as Vice-Chair.

On September 7, 2016, the CSC was briefed on Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41) released on July 26, 2016, that set forth guiding principles to govern the federal government’s response to a cyber incident effecting government or private sector entities. Of significance was the establishment of lead federal agencies and architecture for broader coordination in Federal response, and guiding principles including shared responsibility, risk-based response, respecting affected entities, unity of governmental effort, and enabling restoration and recovery. The CSC made the determination that PPD-41 may be considered in the examination of future projects for Nevada. Additional emphasis was placed on development of Nevada’s cyber posture in reducing risk and utilizing the CSC not only as a grants project review body to develop unity with regard to cyber efforts across the state, but also to coordinate a baseline approach using best practices to address cyber security issues facing the state.

On December 13, 2016, the CSC was briefed on the current HSGP status in addition to the upcoming FFY 2017 HSGP process as it relates to cyber-related projects. With the prior approval by the Commission on September 22, 2016, and pursuant to NRS 239C.140, the CSC voted to hold a closed session to receive a cyber security briefing.

The CSC met three times in 2017. On March 29, 2017, the CSC reviewed and amended a baseline draft of the Nevada Cyber Security Committee Objectives and
Recommendation report aimed at defining the long-term role of the CSC’s purpose with objectives and recommendations to include workforce, education, incident response and recovery, legal changes, and public information and awareness. Pursuant to NRS 239C.170 [1], the CSC voted to approve Nevada Lieutenant Governor Mark Hutchison, as the elected Chair of the CSC, and Terry Daus, Information Security Manager, City of Henderson, as the elected Vice-Chair. The CSC unanimously approved the use of established grant requirement objectives with the addition of requiring projects be in alignment with Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41 for the FFY 2017 grant process.

On May 2, 2017, using the approved grant requirement matrix, the CSC reviewed a total of five FFY 2017 HSGP project proposals totaling $917,040.00. All five projects were deemed to meet the established priority criteria, and were rank-prioritized, per funding stream, for further review and consideration by the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group (HSWG).

On October 31, 2017, the CSC met again with the primary intention of reviewing and approving this report and agreeing upon the course of action for completing and presenting it. During the meeting, the CSC reviewed various aspects of the report, developed several recommendations, and voted to allow the Division of Emergency Management to finalize the initial report ahead of the December NCHS meeting. Additionally, the chair established a subcommittee of CSC members to collaborate to develop the next round of recommendations to be included in the final report of the CSC in 2018. The subcommittee membership is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Organization</th>
<th>Committee Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terry Daus</td>
<td>Information Security Manager, City of Henderson</td>
<td>Chair – Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Carry</td>
<td>Sergeant, Cyber Crimes, Washoe County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Voting Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe McDonald</td>
<td>Chief Security Officer, Switch, Ltd.</td>
<td>Voting Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Olsen</td>
<td>Vice President, Information Technology/Chief Information Officer, NV Energy</td>
<td>Voting Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Skidmore</td>
<td>Emergency Manager, LVMPD</td>
<td>Voting Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Smith</td>
<td>Chief Information Security Officer, Clark County</td>
<td>Voting Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2018, the CSC first met on January 24 to establish grant requirements for the FFY HSGP 2018 grant process. Additionally, the subcommittee was directed to improve upon the CSC’s initial recommendations, and to further refine the initial report for the full Committee’s approval.
This subcommittee met twice to conduct its required work. The first meeting was held in both Carson City and Las Vegas on February 27, 2018, and the subcommittee discussed recommendations that should be included in the final version of the report. The subcommittee met for the second time on April 3, 2018, in order to finalize its report in order to recommend it to the full CSC for consideration and approval.

The grant guidelines for the FFY 2018 HSGP grant cycle established during the January 24, 2018 meeting of the full CSC were an updated version of the previous year’s objectives. These objectives, which will be used to vet the project proposals for the upcoming 2018 grant cycle, are as follows:

- Must be in line with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- Must not conflict with Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity under the Presidents Executive Order #13636
- Will be reviewed and ranked for regional and/or statewide impact
- Must be 100% completed within the performance period
- Must be sustainable for the long-term
- Must follow the Commission on Homeland Security’s priorities and direction
- Must be compliant with federal and state grant guidance
- Must be aligned with Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41)
- Must be aligned with the OCDC performance matrix
- Must have a primary project focus of cybersecurity; projects presented with cyber-components only may be rejected as cybersecurity-specific projects

Finally, on April 19, 2018, the CSC met to review and approve this report and recommend it to the full Commission on Homeland Security for consideration. During the meeting, the CSC reviewed various aspects of the report and voted to allow the Division of Emergency Management to finalize the report. Given the Commission’s vote to approve the development of comprehensive legislative recommendations by the Co-Chairs of the Homeland Security Working Group by June 30, 2018, the recommendations provided here are intended to be delivered to the legislature ahead of the 2019 legislative session.
3. Establishment of the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination

In addition to the activities and efforts of the CSC, Governor Sandoval also introduced legislation that would greatly increase Nevada’s cybersecurity capability while providing an additional opportunity for the CSC to provide input. Assembly Bill 471 (AB471) was passed during the 79th Session of the Legislature and signed by the Governor on June 2, 2017. The bill became effective on July 1, 2017.

AB471 established the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination (OCDC) within the Nevada Department of Public Safety (DPS) and outlined the office’s duties and responsibilities. OCDC will be headed by an administrator appointed by the DPS Director, and who will also serve as an ex officio, non-voting member of the Commission. The primary function of OCDC will be to periodically review the information systems that are currently operating or being maintained by state agencies, including conducting performance audits and assessments of the systems to determine adherence to regulations and policies set up by the Division of Enterprise Information Technology Systems (EITS). OCDC will also serve as “the strategic planning, facilitating, and coordinating office for cybersecurity policy and planning in this state,” which will be done by coordinating statewide trainings to teach awareness and educate regarding risks to the security of the information systems used by State agencies.

To achieve these goals, OCDC will establish partnerships with state agencies (including the Nevada System of Higher Education), local governments and the private sector to encourage the development of strategies that can mitigate risks and protect IT systems maintained by both public and private sectors. OCDC will also partner with the federal government so it can assist in strategy development, as well as be available for the state to receive assistance if something should arise. To mitigate risks to information systems, OCDC will consult with DEM and EITS to develop strategies to prepare and protect the security of information systems.

Per AB471, OCDC is required to establish policies and procedures that would allow for state agencies to notify the office of threats to their information systems, and in turn for the office to notify other agencies and appropriate law enforcement or prosecuting authorities. When the gathering of intelligence is needed and the initiation of investigations into cyber threats occurs, OCDC will partner with the Investigation Division within DPS, specifically the Nevada Threat Analysis Center, to gather all pertinent information. When a threat has been received by a state agency or private entity, it is up to the Administrator to convene a Cybersecurity Incident Response Team, which will be made of members of state, local, and federal agencies.
Finally, OCDC is required to prepare and publish a statewide strategic plan every two years that outlines its policies, procedures, best practices and recommendations to mitigate the risk of cyber threats. It is also required to publish a yearly report, due no later than July 1 each year that includes a summary of the progress made by OCDC during the past year in executing and administering the duties outlined in AB471. The report must also include a general description of any threats to the security of an information system that required the response team to activate, as well as a summary of goals for the next year and any challenges they think they might face.

The CSC recognizes this extraordinary new capability and authority on cyber-related issues within Nevada and the potential opportunities that such an office provides. Given the significant threats posed by cyber attacks, the CSC supported this measure and will continue to do so through the Commission. This report is intended, in part, to provide a foundation for the new Administrator of OCDC by capturing the important roles, history, and investments made by the state, as well as recommendations for the OCDC Administrator to consider for the strategic plan.

4. Mission and Purpose of the Cyber Security Committee

Governor Sandoval, who also serves as the Chair of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security, provided specific guidance on the CSC’s focus. The appointment letter given to each member of the CSC provides the following quote:

*The Cyber Security Committee is responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the [Nevada Commission on Homeland Security] on Nevada’s cybersecurity risk, cyber threat preparedness posture, statewide cybersecurity plans, cyber related training and exercises, and enhancement of security awareness through education, public awareness, and engagement with public and private sector partners.*

This guidance not only provided a clear and concise direction for the CSC, but also allows the experts appointed to the committee to further develop the committee’s scope through regular meetings.

During the March 29, 2017, CSC meeting, the committee agreed to make this direction the vision statement for its work. Additionally, the CSC established three agreed-upon roles that would define the purpose of the committee. In order to achieve the Governor’s vision, the committee would:
1. Provide insight to the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security on cyber related issues;
2. Raise issues to the Commission on existing and emerging cyber gaps, threats, tactics and techniques; and

Having established these three roles, the CSC developed the following mission statement:

*The Cyber Security Committee serves the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security by providing advice and expertise, maintaining awareness of threats, and recommending strategic measures to combat those threats.*

Given this vision and mission, the CSC also developed two primary objectives for its work:

1. Vet and prioritize cybersecurity grant allocations for the Commission; and
2. Provide strategic cyber security budgetary and policy findings and recommendations for the Commission.

This report serves as the CSC’s first major effort to fulfill these two objectives.

Following the CSC’s finalization of its initial report in late 2017, Chairman Hutchison presented it to the full Commission on Homeland Security at its December 6, 2018 meeting. The report was well received and was approved by a vote of the Commission. Based on that vote, the vision statement, mission statement, roles, and objectives provided here were also approved, and the two objectives described above are discussed further below.

5. **Objective 1: Vet and prioritize cybersecurity grant allocations for the Commission**

As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 enabled DHS to act as a stand-alone, cabinet-level department tasked with addressing the coordination and unification of national homeland security efforts in 2003. The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) was established as a funding mechanism to build and sustain national preparedness capability by enhancing the ability of states, local governments, and tribal
governments to prepare, respond, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters. Funding received from the HSGP was applied to preparedness activities including Planning, Organization, Equipment Purchase, Training, and Exercise (POETE) in addition to management and administration costs. There has been significant improvement to the HSGP based on stakeholder input and risk assessments allowing the program to move from a completely competitive process to a national allotment process wherein funding streams within the HSGP are allotted specific amounts of funding based upon ongoing risk assessment-methodology. Presently, the HSGP plays an integral role in the implementation of the National Preparedness System through the support of building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities that are essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient nation. To do this requires the combined effort of the whole community in lieu of any exclusive effort on the part of single organizations or levels of government. Based on allowable costs, the HSGP is designed to support efforts to sustain and build core capabilities across five mission areas, including Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. The HSGP is currently comprised of the following interconnected grant programs:

- **State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)**
  Provides assistance with state, local, and tribal preparedness activities addressing high-priority gaps in preparedness across all mission and core capability areas where a nexus to terrorism may exist. The SHSP funding stream is designed to support implementation of capability-based, risk-driven approaches addressing capability targets within urban area, state, and Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). The THIRA process establishes capability targets, and those targets are assessed in the State Preparedness Report (SPR) as a mechanism to inform POETE needs to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from terrorist acts or other catastrophic events.

- **Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)**
  Provides assistance for unique capability-based and risk-driven POETE needs of high-density, high-threat urban areas on the basis of capability targets identified through the THIRA process and other associated assessment efforts. Additionally, assistance is provided to build sustainable and enhanced capacity to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from acts of terrorism.

- **Operation Stonegarden (OPSG)**
  Supports enhanced coordination and cooperation among the United States Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, and local, state, tribal,
terриториal, and federal law enforcement agencies. Funding supports joint effort investments to secure borders and travel corridors between the United States and bordering countries of Mexico and Canada in addition to states and territories within international water borders.

Prior to 2012, two additional grant programs were included in the HSGP, namely the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and Citizen Corps Program (CCP), both of which have been subsequently incorporated into the SHSP and UASI grant programs under the HSGP. Nevada currently qualifies for both the SHSP and UASI grant funding streams under the HSGP, and DEM is the designated State Administrative Agency (SAA) and sole entity eligible to apply for HSGP funding.

Over the course of the past eight years, the national HSGP funding allocation has declined significantly as the process for allocation transitioned from a reactive and competitive basis to a risk-based methodology used to allocate funding for state’s preparedness activities. DHS uses comprehensive risk methodology with a focus on threat, vulnerability, and consequence to determine the relative risk of terrorism faced by a particular area. The risk is calculated on population affected, critical infrastructure, and the security of the economy. A noticeable trend in declining and stagnant HSGP allocations is seen from 2008 to 2016 equating to nearly a 39% drop in funding to 50 states and eligible territories. Figure 1 illustrates this declining trend in the HSGP program allocations including the SHSP, UASI, MMRS, CCP, and OPSG:

![Figure 1. HSGP Funding Levels – National](image)
Although the methodology for funding the SHSP remains based on minimum amounts established under legislative mandate in addition to DHS’s risk methodology, the same cannot be said of the UASI methodology for funding. Eligible HSGP urban areas under the UASI funding stream are determined through analysis of the relative terrorism risk faced by the 100 most populated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) within the United States. As relative risk is assessed in a classified manner, predicting where a state will fall in the annual funding allocation remains a mystery. With the lack of certainty regarding whether UASI funding will be available for Nevada, there is a constant threat that Nevada may receive only its SHSP funding allocation which significantly impacts the Las Vegas Urban Area and subsequently the ability to fund statewide projects as SHSP funding then must be further spread to cover urban area projects with statewide impact.

Nevada is uniquely transparent with the HSGP process, specifically in the selection of SHSP and UASI projects requesting federal funding. As the process of administering the HSGP lies with DEM acting as the SAA, preparation for the process begins in the fall as DEM conducts a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), which is a multifaceted process by which all states identify the events or conditions under which state capabilities are planned for and measured. Though not specific to those events with a terrorism nexus, the THIRA is a federal requirement in obtaining HSGP funding, and input for the THIRA can come from a multitude of sources including after action reports, improvement plans, multi-year training and exercise plans, surveys, quarterly reports, and other THIRA assessments. Completion of the THIRA involves statewide participation and outreach to federal, state, county, city, regional, non-profit, and private sector partners. The THIRA is the foundational assessment, under which the State Preparedness Report (SPR) is conducted. The SPR enhances this process by measuring the state’s core capabilities contained in five mission areas against the events identified in the THIRA, with the requirement of each state to identify the top 5-6 events from the THIRA to measure capability against. This process has the ultimate goal, in theory, to build capability for the top 5-6 events identified in the THIRA.

Each January, the results from the Nevada THIRA are translated to a visual tool referred to as the “Nevada Heatmap” showing increases, decreases, or static change in each of the 32 core capabilities established by DHS. As foundational reports for the HSGP process, both the THIRA and SPR are integral in the creation of Nevada’s capability priorities and ultimately the drivers of the final grant award for the state including the SHSP and UASI funding streams. With the completion of the THIRA and SPR, the process moves in an administrative direction over the course of
the next three months with the management of the HSGP Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) release and subsequent open meeting schedule allowing for the preparation, submission, vetting, and ultimate submission of the HSGP Grant Application to DHS. The allowable process time to complete these tasks ranges typically from 45-60 days. During this time, significant effort is placed on HSGP messaging, timelines, grant guidance, stakeholder outreach, project submission and review, and committee approvals necessary and required of the process.

Nevada is uniquely set up with a legislative mandate to provide a comprehensive state oversight structure for the coordination of domestic preparedness for acts of terrorism and related emergencies. Per Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 239C.160, the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security is tasked with making recommendations with respect to actions and measures that may be taken to protect residents and visitors of the state from potential acts of terrorism and related emergencies in addition to serving as the public body serving in review capacity for the state’s applications to the federal government for homeland security grants and related programs.

Upon release of the THIRA and SPR data, the NCHS reviews and approves a selected number of core capabilities to be used in consideration of HSGP project requests for the current fiscal year. HSGP project solicitations are sent out through DEM, collected, reviewed, and summarized. The HSGP projects submitted for those projects with statewide impact are presented to the Nevada Homeland Security Working Group (HSWG) for review, vetting, technical review, and ultimately rank-prioritization for funding consideration. The HSGP projects submitted for those projects with Las Vegas Urban Area impact are presented to the Urban Area Working Group (UAWG) in a similar and parallel process. Recommendations from the HSWG and UASI are forwarded to the NCHS Finance Committee for additional review, and then final funding recommendations are put before the NCHS for approval in submitting the final HSGP Grant Application to DHS.
The NCHS approved priorities for 2016 and 2017 include the core capabilities of Cybersecurity, Intelligence and Information Sharing, Public Information and Warning, Operational Coordination and Operational Communications. The cybersecurity capability is the need to protect, and restore if needed, electronic communications and services from damage, unauthorized use, and exploitation. The intelligence and information sharing capability is critical to provide timely and accurate information concerning physical and cyber threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests. The information gathered results from the planning, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of available information. Public information and warnings allow for coordinated, prompt and reliable information sharing through the use of clear and consistent methods that are both culturally and linguistically appropriate so the message is effective for the whole community. This is supported by operational communications that ensure timely communications that support security and situational awareness between affected communities in the area impacted and the response forces. None of this is possible without the proper operational coordination that helps establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure. It also helps integrate all the critical stakeholders and allows for the execution of core capabilities.
Overview and status of cyber security projects that have been funded by grant year.

Homeland Security Grant Program Cyber Projects
As of 11/21/2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgrantee</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Deobligated</th>
<th>Spent</th>
<th>Remaining Balance</th>
<th>Program Activities/Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Administration</td>
<td>Cybersecurity (SHSP)</td>
<td>$359,652.00</td>
<td>$95,121.47</td>
<td>$264,330.53</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>1. Fund 1 full time Cyber Analyst. Job duties include: vendor for an architectural review and purchasing APT Phase II; Preemptive Breach Detection Professional services to aid in deployment of new purchase commercial network/endpoint traffic. Purchase network scanning devices. Web Application Firewall (UASI) 31,000.00 $ 983.40 $ 30,016.60 $ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Henderson</td>
<td>Statewide Data Disaster Recovery (SHSP)</td>
<td>$180,000.00</td>
<td>$180,000.00</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Conduct Business Impact Analysis, Data Disaster Recovery Strategy and Planning for both the City of Henderson and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgrantee</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Deobligated</th>
<th>Spent</th>
<th>Remaining Balance</th>
<th>Program Activities/Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Administration</td>
<td>Advanced Persistent Cyber Threats (SHSP)</td>
<td>$558,478.52</td>
<td>$9,361.99</td>
<td>$549,116.53</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>1. Purchase Firewall Audit Software. 2. Purchase Intrusion Prevention Software. 3. Purchase Kill Chain Software. 4. Purchase Encryption Software. 5. Professional services to aid in deployment of new software (includes travel to various locations implementing software).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgrantee</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Deobligated</th>
<th>Spent</th>
<th>Remaining Balance</th>
<th>Program Activities/Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Administration</td>
<td>Cyber Protection (SHSP)</td>
<td>$468,842.00</td>
<td>$7,919.74</td>
<td>$460,922.47</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>1. Coordination and evaluation of the Cybersecurity Protection Grant Partnership. 2. Security Monitoring and analysis, statewide. 3. Security Monitoring and analysis, City of Henderson. 4. Security Monitoring and analysis, City of North Las Vegas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>Cybersecurity (SHSP)</td>
<td>$134,100.00</td>
<td>$134,010.41</td>
<td>$89.59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Purchase forensic software to analyze malware and attack methods. 2. Purchase server storage, protection and networking component upgrades. 3. Purchase network scanning devices. 4. Purchase Cardinal Wireless Scanner. 5. Purchase network attached storage arrays. 6. Qbuffs a custom forensic password cracking computer station. 7. Qbuffs 3 computer forensic workstations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark County</td>
<td>Disaster Recovery (UASI)</td>
<td>$180,000.00</td>
<td>$30,000.00</td>
<td>$150,000.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Vendor for an architectural review and recommendations for the SCORE II co-located failover system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Las Vegas</td>
<td>Web Application Firewall (UASI)</td>
<td>$51,000.00</td>
<td>$961.40</td>
<td>$50,038.60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Purchase and installation of a web application firewall device. Includes a vendor product manager, system manager and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Las Vegas</td>
<td>Oracle Access Manager (UASI)</td>
<td>$110,000.00</td>
<td>$22,000.00</td>
<td>$88,000.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Funds for a Project Manager, Product Specialist and Product Engineer. 2. Software training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgrantee</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Deobligated</th>
<th>Spent</th>
<th>Remaining Balance</th>
<th>Program Activities/Accomplishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Henderson</td>
<td>Cyber Incident Response Planning (UASI)</td>
<td>$186,000.00</td>
<td>$609.98</td>
<td>$175,390.02</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>1. Creation of a Cyber Incident Response Program that includes policies, plans, procedures and runbooks. 2. Training for incident response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Nevada, Reno</td>
<td>Cyber Statewide Capacity and Needs Assessment (NSF)</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
<td>$305.86</td>
<td>$99,694.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Faculty for Cyber Security Center &amp; Center for Applied Research. 2. Complete research, Needs Assessment, Gap/Fit Analysis, Policy Barriers and Recommendations, and Funding/Financing Strategy. A final report will be compiled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>Cybersecurity (SHSP)</td>
<td>$23,375.00</td>
<td>$11,523.16</td>
<td>$11,851.84</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Purchase forensic software to analyze malware and attack methods. Also includes encryption breaking software. 2. Purchase network scanning devices. 3. Purchase server storage, protection, and networking component upgrades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ely Shoshone Tribe</td>
<td>Cybersecurity (SHSP)</td>
<td>$3,000.00</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>$3,000.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1. Purchase $B operating systems to protect against everyday cyber attacks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nevada Commission on Homeland Security - Cyber Security Committee

**APPROVED FFY16 HSGP PROJECT PROPOSAL REVIEW RANKING - MARCH 8, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Investment Justification</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHSP PROJECTS ONLY</strong></td>
<td>SHSP Project Proposals were ranked in the following order (1 = Highest Priority, 5 = Lowest Priority)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Information Security Management System Modernization</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>State of Nevada EITS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Cyber Incident Response Planning</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>City of Henderson</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Washoe County Cyber Security</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Nevada Cyber Statewide Capacity and Needs Assessment Plan</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>University of Nevada Reno</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Ely Shoshone Tribe Cyber Security</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Ely Shoshone Tribe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UASI PROJECTS ONLY</strong></td>
<td>UASI Project Proposals were ranked in the following order (1 = Highest Priority, 2 = Lowest Priority)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Cyber Incident Response Planning</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>City of Henderson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Geospatial Security and Data Exchange</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Clark County Information Technology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nevada Commission on Homeland Security - Cyber Security Committee

**APPROVED FFY17 HSGP PROJECT PROPOSAL REVIEW RANKING - MAY 2, 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Investment Justification</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHSP PROJECTS ONLY</strong></td>
<td>SHSP Project Proposals were ranked in the following order (1 = Highest Priority, 3 = Lowest Priority)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cyber Security Capabilities</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>State of Nevada EITS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Nevada Cybersecurity Workforce Development</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>University of Nevada Reno</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UASI PROJECTS ONLY</strong></td>
<td>UASI Project Proposals were ranked in the following order (1 = Highest Priority, 2 = Lowest Priority)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Mesquite Network Security</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>City of Mesquite</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Southern Nevada SCADA System Cybersecurity Assessment</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Las Vegas Water District</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHSP/UASI PROJECTS COMBINED</strong></td>
<td>SHSP and UASI Project Proposals were ranked in the following order (1 = Highest Priority, 5 = Lowest Priority)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Cyber Security Capabilities</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>State of Nevada EITS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Washoe County Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Mesquite Network Security</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>City of Mesquite</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Southern Nevada SCADA System Cybersecurity Assessment</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>Las Vegas Water District</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Nevada Cybersecurity Workforce Development</td>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>University of Nevada Reno</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Objective 2: Provide strategic cyber security budgetary and policy findings and recommendations for the Commission

Based on this overview of the CSC and the statewide grant process for homeland security and cyber security, the CSC developed the initial recommendations that were intended to be general in nature. Further, they were intended to provide a starting place for the development of the OCDC strategic plan. The recommendations below should be seen as the CSC’s aspirational policy objectives that should complement current policies and practices in the state.

**Cyber Risk Management Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to develop an enterprise cyber risk management framework, including maturity ratings, to measure overall management to State of Nevada enterprise-level risks, and further require that an assessment of the state’s progress in complying with these baseline standards is provided in the Administrator’s annual report.

**Recommendation 2:** Require all State of Nevada cybersecurity stakeholders, including the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination, and the Enterprise IT Services Division Office of Information Security, improve oversight, transparency, access, and communication of capabilities and tools – of current and future State of Nevada cybersecurity programs and initiatives – between stakeholders and customers by:

- Evaluating the State of Nevada’s current policies, procedures, and standards for assessing cybersecurity strategies, operational activities, and future plans;
- Developing mechanisms to improve visibility, input, and access to cybersecurity strategies, operational activities, future plans, as well as cybersecurity tools and tradecraft to improve security at the lowest level;
- Requiring state agencies to report to the Office of Cyber Defense Coordination a summary of its actual and projected information technology costs as well as a summary of its actual and projected information security costs, in cases where this requirement does not already exist;
- Conducting or utilizing existing annual inventories of agencies’ information technology assets, including a list identifying vendors that operate and manage information technology infrastructure for State of Nevada agencies;
- Requiring state agencies to adopt a formal cybersecurity strategy, which is to be updated every three years and shared or certified with the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination; and
• Requiring political subdivisions within the state to adopt a formal cybersecurity strategy, which is to be updated every three years and shared or certified with the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination.

**Recommendation 3:** Invest in dedicated cyber security professionals by adding one additional full-time Information Security Officer to each Executive Branch Department, whose role is dedicated to managing cyber security risks for their organization and to coordinate directly with other Executive Branch Departments.

**Recommendation 4:** Provide procurement preference to vendors contracting with the state that carry cybersecurity insurance in order to indemnify the state against data loss, theft, hacking and other cyber-attacks.

**Cyber Education, Workforce Development, and Economic Development**

**Recommendation 1:** Require the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to develop comprehensive computer science education initiatives that include current cyber security best practices, and require the State Board of Education adopt and ensure implementation of grade-appropriate standards for computer science and cyber security for public school students in kindergarten through 12th grade.

**Recommendation 2:** Require the Executive Director of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development to provide funding through Workforce Innovations for a New Nevada or the appropriate funding source to establish a Cyber Security Center of Excellence within the Nevada System of Higher Education in order to promote research, development, and commercialization efforts with high potential of economic development.

**Recommendation 3:** Require the Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education to develop a report evaluating current cybersecurity education and training programs, and to determine the extent to which the state is meeting the workforce needs of the cybersecurity industry.

**Recommendation 4:** Require the Executive Director of the Governor’s Office of Economic Development to complete a report evaluating the economic impact of Nevada's cybersecurity industry.

**Recommendation 5:** Increase investments in the current cybersecurity workforce by bolstering training funds and allowing State of Nevada employees access to industry-leading training and certification programs based on their position, role within state cybersecurity, and available funding.
Cyber Confidentiality

**Recommendation 1:** Exempt certain offices from open meeting laws as it pertains to the discussion of cyber security incidents, operations, and strategies.

**Recommendation 2:** Revise NRS 242.105 to allow political subdivisions within the state to also declare confidential documents through the State’s Enterprise IT Services Division (EITS).

**Recommendation 3:** Enhance provisions established through Assembly Bill 471, passed during the 2017 Legislative Session, to protect private-sector information that is shared with the State of Nevada.

Cyber Governance and Oversight

**Recommendation 1:** Support the Department of Administration’s efforts to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the State CIO, the reporting structure for the State of Nevada Enterprise IT Services, Office of Information Security, and other efforts to provide incentives for attracting and maintaining the best talent for these positions.

**Recommendation 2:** Dissolve the Cyber Security Committee as a committee of the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security due to the fact that its duties and responsibilities are duplicated, following the establishment of the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination, and reestablish the CSC as an advisory committee to the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination.

**Recommendation 3:** Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to provide the Nevada Commission on Homeland Security an annual statewide cyber threat assessment during a closed meeting of the body.

Cyber Threat Prevention and Response

**Recommendation 1:** Develop legislation to establish “cyber-terrorism” as a criminal offense in Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS).

**Recommendation 2:** Revise NRS 205.4765, regarding unlawful acts regarding computers, to establish a range of offenses, from a misdemeanor to a felony, depending on the magnitude of the offense.

**Recommendation 3:** Expand the definition of emergency and disaster to include a significant cybersecurity incident.
Recommendation 4: Authorize the activation of the Nevada National Guard in the event of a significant cybersecurity incident.

Recommendation 5: Require political subdivisions within the state to develop Incident Response Plans and to share or certify those plans with the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination.

Cyber Awareness and Training for State Employees

Recommendation 1: Require that state employees receive cybersecurity briefings before travel outside the United States to certain countries.

Recommendation 2: Establish a culture of cybersecurity by requiring state employees to undergo cybersecurity training four times per year.

Recommendation 3: Require that private entities holding contracts for state services are responsible for the security of any system relating to nonpublic information, whether such system is maintained electronically or otherwise.

Recommendation 4: Recognize the month of October as “Cybersecurity Awareness Month.”

Recommendation 5: Require the Nevada Office of Cyber Defense Coordination to conduct cybersecurity briefings to the Governor’s Office and relevant Cabinet members on a quarterly basis.

Recommendation 6: Require periodic phishing or other social engineering testing for state agencies.